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Chapter One

Introduction: How Wrong Simple Story Lines Can Be?

11

The US Administration’s conceptualization of the violence, social disintegration and
chaos in post-invasion Iraq has been witnessing rapid change. It has evolved from
condemning the perpetrators of such acts as common criminals released from jails, to
excusing them as jubilant citizens celebrating freedom, then to identifying them as former
regime dead-enders along with foreign fighters in their last throws, and finally to
admitting that all major mobilized political groups, including those who support and
benefit from the occupation, share predatory characteristics and are contributors to
worsening the situation in Iraq because of their active participation in ethno-sectarian
violence within and in the shadow of “state” institutions.

In this journey of approaching reality, the administration, along with main-stream media
and academia, has re-affirmed a discourse that defines politically mobilized structures in
Iraq as if they were synonymous for ethnic, sectarian, and tribal identities of the
populations, and, by doing so, they characterize politics in Iraq as a field where these
millennia-old mythical structures of ethnicities, sects, and tribes collide with one another
in an eternal battle to assert their shares in the never ending power grab.

Such ahistorical claims about identities, their formation, function, and evolution in
studying Iraq, or in the broader context of studying human history and sociology are not
unusual in academia or in politics, but they can be very destructive when war and peace
decisions are based on them.

12

The sole attractiveness of this discourse is due to the way it allows the occupying forces
to view themselves, and to attempt to convince the violent elements to view them, as
arbiters between those struggling mythical creatures. But as this discourse gets adopted
and translated into strategies, policies, and everyday tactics on the ground, it also
provides opportunity structures for continuing the political and ideological dominance of
the same sectarianist, ethnic, and tribal elements that perpetrate the violence, the chaos,
and the social disintegration in Iraq, and severely marginalizes dissenting alternative
mobilization structures for generations to come.

But if the (common criminals) theorem, the (freedom is messy) theorem, the (foreign
fighters and regime dead-enders) theorem, and the (millennia-old re-fought battles)
theorem, are not credible, then what can explain the eruption of violence that followed
the occupation of Iraq since 2003?

Much of the intellectual and popular opposition to the occupation predicted some levels
of the violence and chaos. They based their prediction on the idea that foreign occupation
by its nature brings about sharp divisions within the occupied population that questions
the legitimacy and the motive behind toppling a regime from outside, along with a divide
over the nature, function, footprint, and the expected outcome of such an occupation.
Meanwhile on the tactical level, the opposition to the occupation questioned the wisdom
of toppling an oppressive regime without the feasibility of the emergence of a functioning
alternative.
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Being an Iraqi from the opposition to the occupation camp, it feels cleansing to blame the
occupation for the brutal disintegration of communities and the heart wrenching levels of
violence that followed the occupation on a single, easy to identify and more importantly,
foreign element. Yet the modern history of Iraq, especially the most recent history does
not allow for such comfort.

Kurdistan: The Other Iraq!

In an effort to market the relatively calm and secure Kurdistan region after 2003, the
authorities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq launched an ad campaign to attract investors
in the US. They borrowed their slogan from an iconic ad campaign to market pork, by the
National Pork Board, suggesting that pork was the other white meat! Ironically, this
claim was rejected health and agriculture authorities in the US. The same uneasy
relationship with truth is relatively applicable to Kurdistan, the other Iraq!

The Kurdistan region has just come out of a devastating civil war that started in 1994.
Close to 10,000 people were killed, tens of thousands were displaced from their homes
and the whole region split into two territories controlled by a single party in each one of
them. Although by the end of the 1990s the fighting withered away and both sides were
under pressure to end the war and unify their, so called, governing institutions, yet both
parties, as of March 2012, continue to control their territories and have police, armed
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forces and much of their territory’s economy under the control of a single party, each in
its territory.

The Kurdistan region of Iraq is a part of Iraq, and shares the major characteristics of
Iraq’s socio-economic structure and its violent history, Therefore, the study of the (1994?) Civil war in Kurdistan region, allows for a unique examination of all the explanatory
factors that dominant discourse used to explain the violence in post-2003 Iraq.

So, how do the supposed explanatory factors of post-2003 Iraq’s internal violence score
in explaining the Kurdish civil war that started a decade earlier?

First:
Kurdistan region is the part of Iraq where most of the populations are Kurd and
Sunni, and therefore its civil war presents a challenge to any ethno-sectarian
explanation.

Admittedly, the above statement suffers from the same generalization we claim to
oppose. Historically, and since the 19th century, there was a divide between Sunni
Muslim Kurds. Although they mainly followed the Shafi’i sub-group of Sunni Islam,
Kurds became divided, within the same sub-group, between two powerful Sufi orders; the
Naqshbandi, and the Qadri. Therefore it is more than an accident that the modern-history
leadership of the Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq is bitterly divided between Masud
Barzani and his late father, Mustafa Barzani who are leaders of the Barzani tribe, and also
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from a religious nobility house in the Naqshbandi Sufi order, on one side and Jalal
Talabani, from the house of Talabani who are tribal and religious nobility from the Qadri
Sufi order on the other side. Yet, this Sufi orders divide became increasingly irrelevant
after the early 20th century, and individuals from nobility Sufi houses of both orders have
joined the ranks and leadership of both sides of the conflicting political movement since
their inception.

Other more observable divides between the two historic branches of the Kurdish
liberation movement in Iraqi Kurdistan are the geographical divide, the urban/rural
divide, and some measures of political left/right divide.

Historically, the Barzani house dominated the north and north-west region, which is
known as Bahdinan region of Iraqi Kurdistan, more permanently. Jalal Talabani and his
followers dominated the south and the south-east region, which is known as Soran region
of Iraqi Kurdistan, more permanently. Bahdini and Sorani are the two main Kurdish
dialects that are competing for dominance as the unified language of Kurds in different
forms of media and written literature. Yet, with applying the same test of leadership and
ranking member composition to both branches of the Kurdish liberation movement, we
can find reasonable representation of both regions in both sides. Admittedly, more so in
the Barzani side than the Talabani side, because of the more tight dominance of the
Barzanis in their region.
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The Talabani side grew out of an internal conflict, in the historic Kurdistan Democratic
Party, between the political bureau of the party (the organizational leadership) and the
leader of the party, the late Mustafa Barzani, who was more of a patriarch and a
traditional personalistic leader of the party. After the collapse of the monarchy regime in
Iraq, in 1958, the Talabani wing of the party adopted a populist, Maoist ideology. And
again, after the collapse of the major Kurdish rebellious movement against the central
government in 1975, the Talabani wing turned into an alliance between different
organizations with different ideologies. But the most popular and active part of the
alliance was a self-identified Marxist-Leninist group that considered the Iraqi Communist
Party a revisionist group. With this evolving background, the Talabani wing, viewed their
conflict with the Barzani wing as conflict between the urban/modern/progressive wing
and the rural/traditional/conservative wing of the Kurdistan liberation movement. Yet, as
a life-long observer of this rhetorical clash, I witnessed the convergence of both sides
towards borrowing populist Marxist vocabulary after the collapse of their largest armed
campaign in 1975, while Marxism was popular world-wide. Then I saw their gradual
abandonment of Marxism for the international social democratic model, and their
competition over representing Kurdistan in the international forums of the social
democrats. Then in post 2003, they both adopted similar public policy philosophy that is
more inline with what is known as the Washington Consensus, or Vulgar Economic
Liberalism, as it is known by its opponents.

Then, there was an internal debate within the Talabani wing over the concept of
nationalism and the definition of homeland in mid-1980s, between a majority of self-
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identified Kurdistanists and a minority of so-called Iraqists. The Kurdistanists accused
their opponents of identifying Iraq as a given multi-ethnic homeland, while they
considered Kurdistan as the multi-ethnic homeland and adopted a geography-based
nationalism vs. the traditional Kurdish-ethnicity based nationalism that was common, for
half a century, earlier between both the Barzani and the Talabani wings. As a result,
much of the rhetoric of the Talabani wing replaced the word Kurdish with Kurdistani to
suggest a representation of all ethnicities in the homeland known as Kurdistan. This new
concept became the newest ideological divergence point with the Barzani wing of the
Kurdish movement. Yet, again, that rhetorical divergence also died away with the direct
involvement of the American government in the reorganization of the Iraqi opposition to
Saddam Hussein since the 1991 Gulf War that forced a model of future governance based
on a single ethno-sectarian identity. Since then, the Talabani wing returned to
representing Kurds, the ethnicity, just like their historic competition, the Barzani wing.

By the time the two sides of the Kurdistan liberation movement went to war against each
other in 1994, any former claims of urban/modern/progressive vs.
rural/traditional/conservative divide between them was no longer a credible divergence
point between the two sides.

Second:
There were no Baathist dead-enders, or foreign fighters in the Kurdish civil war of
1994.
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When all population centers in Kurdistan started uprising one after the other, there were
close to half a million registered paramilitary fighters getting their salaries from the
rapidly disintegrating Baath regime in Kurdistan. Meanwhile, the Kurdish insurgency
groups that fought Saddam’s regime were dealt a major blow, and their control was
reduced to a narrow sleeve on the boarder with Iran.

The decision by Saddam’s Kurdish paramilitary (locally known as the Jackasses) to
change sides was the main factor that allowed for the expulsion of Saddam’s forces,
reconnection of the Kurdish opposition parties with the population centers, and the
parties’ control of the region.

Soon after, the parties were quickly repopulated with supporters and former jackasses. In
fact the overwhelming majority of the Jackasses moved their whole hierarchical structure
and merged into the new dominant Kurdish parties. Relatively few dead-enders chose to
barricade themselves with the hardcore, mostly Arab, Baath party and security apparatus
leaders in garrisons in the cities, during the March 1991 uprisings. Those were
overwhelmed by the rebellious public and very few of them escaped to the areas that
ware still controlled by Saddam’s regime. Therefore there were hardly any Kurdish deadenders who did not get absorbed by the new power structure. Yet, that is not the whole
picture!

The absorbed Jackass leaders who continued to command and control their former
militias within the new power structure in Kurdistan played a major role in complicating
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relations between the two dominant Kurdish parties. In areas of historic popular support
for one side, the most hated jackass leaders, and their gunmen, found their way into the
ranks of the other side. Then, they used the host party to shield them from the population
they did much wrong to. In other words, they turned the local tensions against them into
an exercise of political competition between the two parties for local dominance. As a
result, the former jackass leaders and the structures they commanded played a major role
in building up tensions between the two dominant political parties, and in the decision to
resort to violence in the local conflicts that eventually led to the 1994 civil war.

Despite the significant role of the jackass leaders in instigating violent outbreaks, they
were no dead-enders!

As for foreign fighters, they were non-existent in the 1994 outbreak of the Kurds against
Kurds violence.

Third:
There was no divide over foreign occupation in the Kurdish civil war of 1994.

After the 1991 Gulf War and the mass exceeds of the population from Kurdistan region
to the Iranian and Turkish boarders in April 1991, the allied forces declared the town of
Zakho, on the boarder with Turkey a safe-heaven, and later established a No-fly Zone
(NFZ) to help the fleeing families return back to their cities and prevent Saddam’s forces
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from massacring them as they returned. Only in Zakho, allied troops were used to oversee
the withdrawal of Saddam’s forces from the town, while the NFZ covered only Dohuk
and Erbil provinces. Sulaimaniya and areas of Kirkuk and Diyala provinces that
Saddam’s forces and his administration withdrew from were outside the declared NFZ.
This was the actual extent of the involvement of the allied forces in Kurdistan region.
Other than this limited engagement, there was no actual foreign occupation of Kurdistan.
In face, there were massive demonstrations in major cities of Kurdistan asking for more
involvement, via expanding the NFZ to cover all the areas that became out of Saddam’s
control since end of 1991. Both of the two warring parties of the Kurdish civil war had
equal excellent relationships with the US and the rest of the allied forces, therefore there
was no divide over that relationship.

Forth:
There was no vacuum after the collapse of Saddam’s authority and the withdrawal
of his administration from most of Kurdistan region, prior to the 1994 civil war
between the two dominant parties in Kurdistan.

After the genocide campaign, known as Anfal, that resulted in the destruction of
thousands of Kurdistan villages, the removal of close to 100,000 residents of those
villages to concentration camps, in late 1980s, the Kurdish political parties lost much of
their fighting forces, their control over territories and their connection to much of the
remaining urban areas of Kurdistan. This tragic turning point of years of armed struggle
against the central government had one positive outcome; a formal peace and alliance
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agreement between the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (the Barzani group) and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (the Talabani group), along with other fractions and parties.
The alliance was called the Kurdistan United Front (KUF).

As soon as the preparations for the Gulf War of 1991 started, the alliance contacted the in
a united powerful message the leaders of the jackasses and offered them amnesty and full
integration in return for abandoning Saddam and providing protection for the planned
uprising. And with the uprisings in March 1991, the well-known local leaders of the KUF
entered the cities and assumed power with a popular support… but, they were not alone!

The short-lived first popular uprising of March-April of 1991, produced a new form of
contending authority that became known as the (Shura), which is the Farsi translation of
the Soviets or the People’s Assembly, in the neighborhoods, state-owned factories,
hospitals and power plants. Organizers of these assemblies distrusted the KUF and
traditional political party system all together and assumed power wherever they could. By
the end of March 1991 the relation between the KUF and the assemblies reached a standoff point and was only disrupted by Saddam’s counter-offensive to recapture the urban
population centers in Kurdistan, and the defeat of both the KUF and the assemblies in
that fight.

After the tragic mass exodus of April 1991, Saddam’s regime contacted the KUF and
asked for peace negotiation. A short period of dual authority of KUF and Baath regime
followed in the main urban population of Kurdistan. But, two popular uprisings later,
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convinced Saddam that he no longer was able to control the region and made him pull all
forces and administration from the area by August 1991. Since then, the KUF was
recognized by all sides as the de fact authority in most of Kurdistan region.

Out of the institutions of KUF came out the first elections and the first legislative council
and an administration that was shared by both dominant parties, up until the civil war of
1994.

Therefore, and since the dominance of the two political parties was never challenged by
any contenders outside of their own bilateral relationship, it is very hard to accept a
vacuum of authority as an explanatory factor for the civil war.

The Dead-end of the Dead-enders Approach!

In 1961, a local Kurdish landlord’s determination to fight-off the first agrarian reform in
Iraq led to the longest lasting Kurdish armed rebellious movement in modern history
against successive central governments in Iraq. In 1994, a dispute over ownership of
commercial property built on a previously contended agrarian land prior to its inclusion
in the city limits of a town from the same area, sparked a civil war in Iraqi Kurdistan
region that split control over governance in the region.
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More recently, in February 2005, news broke of a horrific eruption of violence in a town
near Baghdad, insurgent control of the town, sectarian cleansing, wide scale kidnapping,
and forced migration. The US army intervened, and tens of bodies were found floating in
the nearby Tigris river. Multiple-source investigation suggested that it all started with a
tribal dispute over the possession of government-owned agrarian land nearby. Iraqi
officials celebrated the report as evidence that the tragedy was not purely motivated by
sectarian fervor.

Such incidents provide an opportunity to examine underlying socio-economic motives for
the violence that are usually ignored for the more “attractive” and “easy-to-digest” news
about sectarian violence or opposition to the occupation.

Once we move beyond the attractive and the easy-to-digest, a new set of questions open
up:
What makes this sort of dispute over land unsolvable by respective communities in all
ways, but all-out violence and disintegration of the communities in the process?
How did tribal or ethnic or sectarian identities become the mobilizing factor in these
disputes?
How did the mobilizing tribal or kinship structures coordinate with, or were replaced
by, ethnic, political party, or sectarian militant organizations when, in case of the
1959 outbreak of violence in Kurdistan, the local landlord was a widely recognized
oppressor of the local population of his own ethnicity, the dispute that sparked the
1994 war was between people from the same community, same ethnicity and same
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religion, and after many generations of inter-marriages, no tribe can claim sectarian
“purity” in the part of the country where the tragic mass killing, kidnapping and
forced migration of 2005 occurred?

If we can establish that these incidents were not outliers, but rather the norm of
communal violent outbreaks, then more general research questions can be generated:
What is the historic, cultural, and socio-economic context of access to wealth
generating assets in Iraq?
How is it connected to the socio-political violence in Iraq?
How do Iraqi-significant conditions of this relationship between access to wealthgenerating assets and socio-political violence advance generalized theory?

Theoretical Perspectives on the Relationship between Wealth and Societal Violence:
A) The Political vs. the Economical

Directly or indirectly, the connection between access to wealth generating assets and
societal violence is at the heart of all major debates throughout the history of social
sciences. With the inherent risk of oversimplification, we can categorize these major
debates into two fundamentally opposing perspectives:

The first perspective is concerned with theoretical constructs and political arrangements
that allow for the disassociation between equitable access to wealth generating assets on
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one hand, and societal peace, political viability and stability of governance, on the other
hand. A powerful classical example of this perspective is Robert Dahl’s Who Governs?1,
where he claims that empirically robust evidence supports the actuality, and therefore the
theoretical possibility, of such disconnection in at least one political system; the
American.

Dahl’s main argument is that in a socio-political system such as the dominant one in the
US since the beginning of the 20th century, membership in economic elite society is not
cumulative, and is not indicative of exclusive political power. As a result, political strata
are accessible by the rest of society; politicians are driven by electoral payoffs to be
responsive to “citizen desires”, and power is distributed pluralistically.2

Although the empirical foundation of these claims is seriously challenged,3 their
ideological attractiveness made them dominant in the democratization theory literature.
The world view that Dahl and others advanced, in this regard, combined two ideological
frameworks; unregulated concentration of wealth (ideologically presented as free market
economy),4 with unlimited access to governing structures , outside elections and their

1
See: Robert Dahl. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. Yale: Yale University
Press. (1961).
2
Ibid. pp. 91-93.
3
See, for example, William Domhoff’s (Who Really Rules?) in which he follows Dahl’s own
methodology to provide evidence that his main claims could not be empirically supported:
- William G. Domhoff. Who really rules? New Haven and community power re-examined. New
Brunswick: Transaction Books. (1978)
4
The classic liberal definition of free markets included freedom from both government intervention and
monopolistic tendencies. The assumptions of free market mechanisms included a minuscule size of
individual economic units as compared to their industry, to the extent that no individual unit can affect the
conditions in which the industry operates within. Once this assumption is violated, the market is no longer
free. Yet, the vulgarized version of economic liberalism ignores this assumption and focuses solely on the
government intervention as a market distorting force, providing the ideological cover for the acceptance of
oligopolistic realities of unregulated concentration of wealth and wealth producing assets as “free” markets.
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political mandates (ideologically presented as the norm of plural societies, or
“Polyarchy”).5

The above combination is based on the political-ideological construct being modeled on
the economic-ideological construct, therefore deriving its logical integrity from it, and at
the same time, each being a necessary condition for the other (ideologically presented as
liberal economy being necessary condition for liberal democracy and vice-versa).6

The literature that deals with how to get to this interlocked economic/political model is
very blunt; drive economic policy out of the realm of politics and public political debate.7
In other words, you get there by convincing not only the public, but also all dissenters
that there is no alternative to the “liberal” economy for any advancement in the
democratization process.8

The only context, in which the consociational version of this model addresses access to
wealth-generating assets, is the idea that socio-economic inequalities can be addressed
through political arrangements to minimize the control of the state over economic
5

See Dahl’s theorization of the concepts of Pluralism and Polyarchy, and Theodore Lowi’s critique of
them:
- Robert Dahl. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale: Yale University Press. (1971).
- Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (Second
Edition), New York: W. W. Norton, (1969).
6
See Lowi’s eloquent explanation of the inter-dependency of the ideological structure of both concepts in:
- Ibid. p. 35.
7
See for example:
- Johan Williamson. Democracy and the “Washington Consensus”. World Development Vol. 21, No. 8,
Great Britain. (1993). p.p 1330-34.
8
See for example:
- Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996) . pp.
14- 33.
- Larry Diamond. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press. 1999. Chapter1.
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resources, mainly through fragmentation of sovereignty over those resources from state
level to communities9. And when that is coupled with economic liberalism and a race to
the bottom competition for investment from ever concentrating investment outlets, the
result is rapid transfer of control over resources from local to transnational entities.

As for the class-based inequitable access to wealth-generating assets, this model’s answer
is two-prong; first, is that in the long-term, the combination of liberal economy and
liberal democracy, despite the growing wealth gap it generates, can provide better income
and quality of life to the public than any other model in history.10Second, is that
inequality is the engine of survival, innovation, longevity and progress of mankind, and
without it there is nothing but a “dog’s life”.11

Proponents of this version of liberal democracy continue to assign magical qualities to
their model through what is know as Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), attributing peace
between nations and within nations to a unitary factor; that is liberal democracy.12 Quite
like the Dahlian claim about the disconnection between wealth and power, the DPT is
also pseudo-science, and is based on unexplained truncation of data, manipulation of
definitions13, along with wrong choices of statistical models,14 and intentional disregard

9

See: Arend Lijphart. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale
University Press. 1977.
10
See, for example: Diamond, op. cit.; p.7.
11
See: Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Hamish Hamilton. 1992. p. 311.
12
See for example: Charles Lipson. Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made Separate Peace.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2003. p. 54.
13
The DPT literature sustains numerous unexplainable of the war and peace data used to support their
claim, starting from definition of Democracy to the definition of what constitutes Militarized Interstate
Disputes, that leads to the omission of war events as significant as the American civil war, and every
militarized threat that did not result in 1000 casualties or more, as a result of the submission of the weaker
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of atrocities committed by colonizing “liberal” democracies in the colonized territories,
simply because they don’t quite fit the description of internal violence or violence against
other states since the colonized countries had no states yet.15 Despite the above, the best
statistical model of DPT is able to attribute only (17%) of the outcome of societal and
global peace to liberal arrangements of governance.16

On the opposing side of this perspective is the assertion that access to wealth-generating
assets is directly connected to societal peace, political viability and stability of
governance. One major contribution that represents this perspective is Samuel
Huntington’s work (Political Order in Changing Societies). What makes Huntington
uniquely positioned is that he does not oppose the liberal version of the democratization
theory from an anti-capitalist point of view. He is concerned about the viability of the
type of political order that is more suitable for the survival of global capitalism and
suggests that any opening of political participation without structural changes in access to

party. For more details, see: Henry S. Farber, Joanna Gowa. Common Interests, or Common Polities?
Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 2 (May 1997). Pp. 393-417.
14
Gary King’s main critique of the statistical models using time series approach is that the variation in war
vs. no war years is too small to be captured using any logistic model. He also challenges the idea of
building a uniform model that can predict the effect of marginal changes in democracy on propensity for
war regardless of the history of relations between the pair of countries. As an example, he suggests that a
Swaziland and St. Lucia have essentially no chance of going to war with each other if they become slightly
less democratic, but if any of Iraq or Iran become slightly more democratic then the chance of them going
to war against each other would dramatically be less. See: Nathaniel Beck; Gary King; Langehe Zeng.
Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture. The American Political Science
Review, Vol. 94, No.1 (March 2000), 21-35.
15
An example of what type data the DPT is ignoring is the 2 million Algerian casualties in the liberation
war against the French colonizers.
16
King. op. cit.; p.22
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wealth-generating assets, especially land, would lead to erosion of political order and will
provide fertile ground for anti-capitalist revolt.17

Another serious blow to the liberal logic was Karl Polanyi’s (The Great Transformation),
where he compared the role and the status of markets in pre 18th century societies with
those resulted from the nationalization and globalization of markets leading to state
enforced commodification of labor, land and money. He concluded that the
transformation was a planned state enterprise intended to dis-embed market from society
and re-embed society in market. Then, he went on to challenge the assumed positive
linear relationship between “liberalized markets” on one hand, and democracy, social and
global peace, on the other by linking the horrific violent events of the world wars and the
widespread social unrest to the societal reactions to the consequences of the attempt to
dis-embed markets from societies and re-embed societies in Markets.18

Another distinguished voice within this perspective is Ted Gurr’s lifelong research into
the causes of collective violent rebellious actions that he presented with the publication of
(Why Men Rebel).19 At the heart of Gurr’s theory is the concept of Relative Deprivation,
as his central explanatory factor for collective violence. Although this concept is
designed to address mental motivations, and therefore can be accused of subjectivity for
not rendering itself to empirical verification, yet there is the objectively verifiable aspect
of the concept that deals with the gap between local collective claims of possession of, or
17

See: Samuel Huntington. Political order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1968.
p. 375.
18
See: Karl Polanyi. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston,
MA: Beacon Press. 2001(First Edition 1944).
19
See: Ted Gurr. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1970.
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right to, economic assets and the status of those assets as defined by local or central
power structures.

Critiques of Gurr’s (RD) theory point out that levels of income measure is a better
explanatory factor for collective violence than RD.20 But Michael Sherraden’s work on
causes of long-term income poverty in the US provided support for the idea that
generational income disparity is a symptom of a much wider disparity in access to wealth
generating assets.21 If we accept the universal application of Sherraden’s theory of the
relationship between income and asset poverty, then downward trends in income levels
should be viewed as symptoms of widening disparity in wealth generating asset
distribution, where the fertile ground for objectively observable RD is.

Nevertheless, the most direct and comprehensive theoretical linkage between access to
wealth-generating assets and violence could be found in the literature that is heavily
influenced by Marxism. According to the Marxist world-view22, control over wealth
generating assets is crucial to the control of economic surplus. The configuration of
processes of this control is what defines mode of production in any given society at any
given moment of history. Another component of this world-view is the idea that the

20
See for example: Robert MacCulloch. The Impact of Income on the Taste for Revolt. American Journal
of Political Science. Vol. 48, No. 4, Oct. 2004. pp.830-48.
21
See: Michael Sherraden. Assets and the Poor: A New American Welfare Policy. New York: M.E.
Sharpe. (1991), pp. 95-145.
22
In the attempt to introduce a “Marxist world-view”, I am using Theda Skocpol’s method of stating
(without qualification) the “lowest common denominator of theoretical assumptions made by virtually all
writers who would consider themselves, or be considered by reasonable others, to be in the Marxistscholarly tradition.” See: Theda Skocpol. Social Revolutions in the Modern World. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press. 1994. p. 49 (Notes).
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social relations of production are the base for social class structure, and class struggle is
the engine of history. This struggle has the chance to be most productive of change when
social relations of production are prohibitive of progress in production forces and
alternative modes of productions are historically possible.

In the Marxist world-view, violence, in the context of revolutionary change in mode of
production, is a reaction to violent resistance of such change that the state puts up in its
effort to insure the continuity of the struggling mode of production. Social classes align
in this struggle in historically determined fashions according to their interest in protecting
or demolishing a mode of production and the superstructure that is essential to its
reproduction. But because it is easy to fall into mechanical assumptions about the role of
social classes, class consciousness, and social coalitions in varying circumstances, strong
voices within the Marxist-influenced literature came out to present much more analytical
and nuanced versions of reading the processes by which class consciousness and class
coalitions come to exist and develop.

Among the most recognized in this group is Barrington Moore’s (Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy), in which he analyses the history of the industrial
transformation of agrarian states to conclude that there is no one determined path of such
transformation. Moore identifies initial class structure, the relative power of each of its
segments vs. the others, available paths for class coalitions, orientation of agrarian
production prior to the industrial transformation, and level of communal ties among
peasantry as the main variables that decisively determined the entry into modern history
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via 3 paths: Bourgeois Revolution leading to Bourgeois Democracy, Peasant Revolution
leading to Communist Dictatorship, and Revolution from the Above leading to Fascist
Dictatorship.23

The surge in revolutionary movements in predominantly agrarian societies in the 20th
century led the Marxist-influenced literature to investigate, in a comparative manner, the
socio-political conditions that produce revolutionary movements within the peasant
population around the world. Instead of broad and ahistorical assumptions about the
“nature of peasants” or for that matter, the nature of individuals, they emphasized the
mobilization capacities and revolutionary tendencies of different segments of the
peasantry according to their relative wealth and access to agrarian land. Leading in this
quest are the writings of Eric Wolf, and Jeffery Paige.

In his book Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, Wolf argues that seasonal agrarian
workers lack the capacity to independently initiate violent rebellious collective actions,
not because of cultural reasons, but because they are too poor and, more importantly, too
dependent in their daily livelihood on landlords. On the other hand peasants who possess
small land who live in villages outside the reach of the state, even if they were very poor,
would have much more structural capacity for rebellious action. 24

23
See: Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
1966. pp. 413-508.
24
See: Eric Wolf. Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
1999 (First edition 1969). pp. 276-302.
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Paige, on the other hand, approaches the question from a perspective that suggests violent
mobilization is a result of the structural capacities and available options to both sides of a
conflict. Therefore, he suggests, when the non-cultivators derive their control of
economic surplus not from capital investment, but from political arrangements that give
them control over vast land, they would be structurally inclined to resist incremental
reform. And when this is coupled with cultivators who drive their livelihood from wages
and have no rights to land, then the conditions are conducive of revolutionary
movements regardless of whether they were initiated by the peasant communities or
not.25

While the two approaches seem to be contradicting each other,26 they can be
synchronized to suggest that when it comes to self-initiated rebellious mobilization to
preserve pre-capitalist communal relationships, there is a positive relationship between
access to possession of land and capacity to rebel. But when the studied phenomenon is
“revolutionary” movements that target outdated modes of production, then the
relationship between access to land and rebellious propensity is a negative one.

It is critical to note that class-based analyses can provide the framework for analyzing
class-based mobilization, but it could encounter serious challenges in studying violent
mobilization in communities where, and in times when, class-based organization, for
historic and practical reasons, is incapacitated and communities are atomized through the
25

See: Jeffery Paige. Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the
Underdeveloped World. New York, NY. 1975. pp. 40-66.
26
Theda Skocpol suggests this contradiction despite her acknowledgment that the authors are looking at
different aspects of peasantry movement; mainly self-initiated revolt vs. revolution, within in the Marxist
terminology. See: Skocpol. op. cit.; pp.217-8.
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practices of the state and dominant classes. This challenge is due to the fact that classical
Marxist-influenced world-view assumes class-based consciousness and, as a
consequence, class-based mobilization as the starting point for conceptualizing the
process of change in historical terms. Here is where Antonio Gramsci made a valuable
contribution; he coined the concept of Class Hegemony as a hybrid between the
Weberian concept of Legitimacy and the more common Marxist concept of Class
Domination.27

Gramsci rejects the simplistic dichotomy of state/civil society and presents a
collaborative relationship between the state and elements of civil society which allows for
not only the control, but also the active consent of dominated classes. He revises the
Marxist concept of the base determining the form of consciousness to suggest the base
determines what forms of consciousness are possible.28

A comprehensive elaboration on this Gramscian concept is made by Mahdi Amil, who
suggests a social structure has a lifecycle that ends with undergoing a structural cut
resulting in the dominance of a new mode of production. Meanwhile, the main
contradiction takes on different appearances (Ideological, economic…etc) according to
where a social structure is in its lifecycle, during which two opposing forces are in play;
one that gravitates towards the center, being the political appearance of the main
contradiction, where political dominance of a certain social class is in question, and
another that repels from the center towards the dominance of the other forms of
27

See: Antonio Gramsci. Selections from Prison Notebooks (Translated from Italian). London, UK:
Lawrence & Wishart. 1971. p.263.
28
Ibid. p. 244.
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appearances, where class dominance is not under immediate question. At any given
moment of history, Mahdi Amil suggests, the status of hegemony and counter-hegemony
depend on the outcome of the clash of these two forces.29 In other words; Mahdi Amil’s
contribution is in theorizing the structural constrains that make the dominance of possible
forms of consciousness improbable.

The post-American-occupation Iraq, presents a rich empirical context (if captured) for
such conditions where essentially class-based conflicts over access to wealth-generating
assets, especially land, are taking place under the conditions of improbable class-based
forms of consciousness and organizations.

Theoretical Perspectives on the Relationship between Wealth and Societal Violence:
B) State vs. Society

Different schools of thought that address state formation and its interaction with society,
agree that violence is a core component of theorizing the state. Max Weber defines the
state as “a compulsory political organization with continuous operations… [Whereby an]
administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use
of physical force… [in] a given territorial area.”30 Yet, it’s the function and the societal

29

See: Mahdi Amil. Theoretical Introductions to the Effect of Socialist Thoughts on National Liberation
Movements. (In Arabic). Beirut, Lebanon: Al-Farabi Publishing House.1972. Part One: On Contradiction.
30
Max Weber, Economy and Society, volume 1, (edited by: Guenther Roth and Clause Wittich). Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1978, p. 54.
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value of these continuous operations to uphold monopoly over use of violence that
divides socio-political thought.

A dominating sociological trend in the state-formation literature is the Weberian trend.
Based on Weber’s above organizational definition of the state, the Weberian perspective
assigns a single driving goal to the continuous operations of the organization of the state;
that is to uphold the claim of legitimate use of force in the territorial context. Everything
else that results from this single direction is circumstantial, including the historic
transition to capitalism as a socio-political system. This claim was central to Otto
Hintze31 and later Charles Tilly’s32 suggestion that the rulers’ need for financing
evermore expensive wars was central, not only to the process of bureaucratizing and
centralizing the state between 12-18th century in Western Europe, but also to the political
process of transforming absolutist monarchies to democracies open first to the
bourgeoisie, and later the working class in an effort to extract more financial resources
for war-making from those newly included in the political process. This line of reasoning
is fundamentally different from other scholars, like Theda Skocpol33 and Peter Evans34,
who are influenced by Weberian concepts and point out the importance of relatively
independent state actions, processes and capacities, yet they view them in the context of
historical transformations generated by societal conflicts.

31

See: Otto Hintze, The Formation of States and Constitutional Development: A Study in History and
Politics, in: Felix Gilbert (ed.), The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press. 1975.
32
See: Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1990.
33
See for example: Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France,
Russia, and China. Cambridge University Press, 1979.
34
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press: 1995, pp. 1-73

37

The major problem with attributing complex historical events of socio-political system
formation solely to the unintended consequence of warring rulers’ search for resources is
that it fails the global history test. Centralized and bureaucratized states and extensive
costly wars existed long before Western Europe experienced them,35 without the same
consequences. Of course, one can always claim that the state never existed before modern
West European history, but that would be an ill advised presentation of one’s lack of
knowledge of world history beyond Western Europe.36

Rational Choice theorists, on the other hand, present an individualistic and micro-level
explanation for the emergence of the organization they call Leviathan (borrowed from
mythology to symbolize a structure specialized in deterring undesired action through
fear). They point out problems with providing and sustaining common goods through self
governance, utilizing models like the tragedy of the commons37, the prisoners’
dilemma38. Then, they suggest that in order for collective good to be achieved, the
collective actors have to submit to one of two choices; privatizing the common good

35

Samir Amin applies his concept of uneven development to pre-capitalist societies and suggests that the
norm of the state in the old world was to be centralized and bureaucratized in the center and
underdeveloped in the margins. He claims that Europe was at the margin of the world system then. See:
Samir Amin, Class and Nation, Historically and in the Current Crisis, New York, NY: Monthly Review
Press. 1980.
36
This claim was actually presented by Jeff Goodwin in the context of the relationship between state and
revolution, when he suggested that revolution is a modern phenomenon that came to existence with modern
states, suggesting that for the rest of world history the key is: no states, no revolutions. See: Jeff Goodwin.
No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press. 2001.p. 40.
37
Garret Hardin’s article in 1968 that revived Aristotle’s idea that the larger a common the least care it gets
from the members to suggest the tragedy of the common in all commons that are not small enough for each
one of them to monitor everybody else’s action in a common. See: Garret Hardin. The Tragedy of the
Commons. Science. No.162, (1968). Pp. 1243-1248.
38
This is a modification of earlier model that is attributed to Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher and
formalized by Albert Tucker. For details on the origins and the development of the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
see: Elinor Ostrom. Governing the Commons: The Evaluation of Institutions for Collective Action. New
York, NY; Cambridge University Press. 1990. p. 271 (Notes).
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(preferable but not always possible) or submitting to Leviathan, which is defined as, and
is limited to, enforcing contract terms between free individuals engaged in collective
actions to provide and sustain the common good.

In this sense, the rational choice strand of socio-political thought provides a theoretical
linkage between state monopoly over violence and societal contractual arrangements that
regulate providing and sustaining the common good via direct involvement in areas that
cannot be privatized, and via protection of private access from the rest of society in areas
where privatization is actualized.

The major problem with this form of conceptualizing the state is the assumption that it is
a product of a contract between free and equal individuals, and therefore all individuals
and groups have equal chances of access to it. Yet no actual historic evidence is available
to support such assumptions. 39

It is also worth noting that the term State is alien to Rational Choice theorists’ structure of
thought40, and has no place except in the international relation’s arena, where it refers to

39

The birth of the American state is frequently introduced as an evidence of a state made by free and equal
representatives of the people, but that assumption was challenged by Charles Beard who suggested that the
constitution as it came of the constitutional convention was a product overwhelming presence of upper
class and related members with middle class and farmers mostly financially in debt to the others, along
with the exclusion of working class, never mind the slave population, and wemen. This is hardly a
representation of free and equal and all-included members of a common. See: Charles Beard. An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1913.
40
A good example of how alien this school of thought is from the concept of the state, as debated between
Weberian and Marxist trends, is David Easton’s attempt to illustrate the uselessness of the concept by
suggesting a logical path from Nicos Poulantzas’ own conception of the state to conclude that social
science will do just fine without reviving the concept that he declared to be dead earlier. See: David
Easton,. The Political System Besieged by The State. Political Theory. Volume 9. Number 3. (August
1981). p 303.
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territories of national sovereignty. In this theoretical context, the research of state
formation is practically a research into nation formation.41

Another trend in conceptualizing the state and state formation is the Durkheimian
perspective. Emile Durkheim emphasized the cultural and normative dimensions of state
activity, and proposed that the state is “above all, supremely, the organ of moral
discipline.”42 The Durkheimian definition focuses on the civilizing process that is
triggered not by the state’s physical monopoly over means of violence, but by the
legitimization of that monopoly, whereby and over time, the formation of progressively
larger collectivities, as the result of war, pacified social spaces, and forced ever growing
numbers of individuals to restrain the expression of their own violence and
gratification.43

The above logic of conceptualizing the state avoids questioning what the optimal size of
“progressively larger collectivities” is, for the war-making process to stop. The claim that
wars and territorial expansions civilize and pacify social spaces through legitimizing the

41

While the state-nation phenomenon is a dominant concept in international relations, it is actually a
product of centuries of historical development in Western Europe. This development involved gradual
elimination of numerous ethnic identities, or “nation destruction” in a unification process that generated
superior ethnicities, (See: Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1994, 22-66.).
The assumption of the applicability of this concept to all post-colonial history is driven from the colonial
efforts to impose this concept on the colonized communities, by offering their massive influence in
generating supreme ethnicities, proved to be yet one more destructive social engineering effort with grim
consequences that continue to unfold in massive atrocities around the world. One does not have to be a
stanch leftist to realize the above. See for example: Elie Kedourei, Nationalism, (fourth Edition, Reprint)
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2004 (originally 1960).
42
See: .Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, (translated by: Cornelia Brookfield), New
York, NY: Routledge, 1957, p. 72.
43
See, for example: Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners, (translated by: Edmund
Jephcott), New York, NY: Urizen Books, 1978.

40

states monopoly over means of violence, is the state’s concept of itself and, left to its own
devises, it has yet to produce “The war to end all wars”.

Finally, there is the Marxist trend that views the state as an abstract concept referring to
not only governing and coercion mechanisms and institutions, but also the ideological
apparatus that together preserve and reproduce the social relations responsible for
generating economic surplus.44

Marxists, in general, do not reduce the state to the governing institutions the way Rational
Choice theorists, and pluralists, in particular, do. They view monopoly over means of
coercion as a tool of subordination, but more central to their concept of
subordination/hegemony is the ideological apparatus.45

On the issue of the state formation, one can identify two lines of analysis within the
Marxist trend, stemming from different Marx and Engels’ writings. The most prominent
is the one suggesting that the state is a post class-division phenomenon, and, therefore, is
driven in its preservation of surplus generating social relations to be the main structure
for asserting class domination.46

The second line of analysis views surplus generation and its geographical uneven
distribution among communities as a pre class-division phenomenon that generated the
44

See for example: Ralph Miliband, Poulantzas and the Capitalist State, New Left Review, No. 82, 1973.
See for example, Louis Althusser’s article titled Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes
Towards an Investigation in: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm
46
See for example: Paul Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development, New York, NY: Monthly Review
Press, 1942, p. 243.
45
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organizational structure of the state to defend against raids organized by deprived
communities, which eventually developed its coercion mechanisms internally as class
division materialized later.47

State and Society Beyond State formation

Theorizing the role of Sate-Society relationship in the connection between access to
wealth-generating assets and violence beyond the state formation stage requires
investigating how schools of thought address a set of questions best formalized by Theda
Skocpol and John Campbell48 as a guide:
•

Who or what determines state action?

•

What is the content of state policy?

•

What are the key sources of political conflict?

•

What are the key sources of political stability?

•

Is the state autonomous from forces in society?

•

Is the state biased in favor of certain interests?

47

See for example: Ahmed Sadiq Saad, The Socio-economic History of Egypt, in the Light of Asiatic
Mode of Production (In Arabic). Beirut, Lebanon: Ibn Khaldoon Publishing House, 1979.
48
See: Theda Skocpol and John Campbell. American Society and Politics: Institutional, Historical, and
Theoretical Perspectives. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1995. Table 1. p.3.
The table addresses 4 schools of thoughts according to their analytical focus: Pluralist, Elite, Class, and
Institutional. I am adapting the table to my own categorization.
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The literature on the relation between state and society can be grouped into two
distinctive trends and a hybrid area between them. The two trends are: Society-centered
and state-centered perspectives.

Society-centered perspectives (SOCP) tend to view the state’s structure and actions (or
governmental institutions and actions for the pluralists) as a reflection of societal entities
and their interest. While state-centered perspectives (STCP) view the state as an
autonomous body along-side society that interacts with it. In this interaction, the state is
mainly constrained by its own structure or by the independent preferences of individual
actors within it. Another aspect of the STCP is the claim that the state actions are
sufficient explanatory factors in studying societal change.49

State policy, as viewed by SOCP, is the outcome of the competition of mobilized societal
interest over resources, be it open-ended between individual preferences (pluralist) or
constrained by the mode of production. On the other hand, the STCP view state policy
outcomes as a result of the balance of power between politically organized societal
groups or classes and state actors that are constrained by state structure.50

SOCP suggests societal conflict among interest groups or social classes as the source of
political conflict, while STCP views it to be the conflict between state actors within the
state or between them collectively and the outside world (societal groups or other states).

49
As it is presented in the example of the STCP explanation for the historical change towards the
dominance of capitalist democracy in Western Europe.
50
See for example the classic works of pluralist approach to community power in the US. Most prominent
among them is, the previously referenced, Robert Dahl’s Who Governs.
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Stability in the political system, as viewed by SOCP, is achieved as a result of
overlapping interests of members from different interest groups and through internalized
or institutionalized rules of group interaction (pluralist), or is achieved through
subordination of working class via violence, pay-off and ideological manipulation. The
STCP looks into the historical legacies of political institutions and their relative stability
for sources of political stability.

On the question of state autonomy, the picture is more complicated. Some within the
SOCP, namely the pluralists, deny the autonomy of the state on the basis that it responds
to the demands of the interest groups, but because they also deny a societal identity of the
state, as in representing any interest group in particular, I contend that they do believe in
the autonomy of the state in that manner. Others within the SOCP believe in the relative
autonomy of the state that varies depending on the level of organization of social classes
and other economic and geopolitical conditions. As for the STCP, they, at the minimum,
agree with the relative autonomy of the state, and theorize the potential full autonomy of
the state, depending on the structure and the capacity of the state.

Finally, and based on the above conceptualization of the autonomy of the state, the SOCP
is divided on whether the state is biased or not. The pluralists view the state as a neutral
arena where group struggle takes place, just the way they conceptualize market to be for
forces of supply and demand. But others view the state to be systematically biased
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towards the dominant social class, as long as and as much as conditions of class struggle
allow for.51

As one can notice from the above grouping of the schools of thought, the main candidates
for SOCP are both pluralism and a certain interpretation of Marxism that utilizes some of
the most simplistic and non-analytical writings among classical Marxist literature.

The Pluralist Perspective
At the core of the pluralist conceptualization of the origin of the state is the idea that
although it is a coercive structure, it is a creation of free and equal individuals attempting
to produce, preserve and sustain a common good through enforcing the contracts the
common engage in.

If the design of the constitution in the United States and the institutions that emerged
from it is supposed to fit this scenario, it is also worth noting that pluralist recounting of
the creation of the American governing institutions suggest that those who engaged in
creating the American Leviathan were also aware of the tendency of the individuals
entrusted by the common with the monster were not saints, and could and would most
likely act to maximize their own gain from the monster , and therefore installs as much
constrains as to deny them the “structure and capacities” to do so. One can only wonder

51

See for example: Paul Sweezy, op. cit,.
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how that is different from the STCP’s assertion that the state is “potentially autonomous”
depending on the institutional structure and capacities of the state.52

Supporters of the state autonomy perspective highlighted the shortcomings of the
pluralist approach by contrasting their simplistic concept of the governing institutions
with modern history of the developing countries, where the state initiated broad changes
in those countries. They also pointed out modern history of the developed world and the
post World War I types of intervention in the economy where governments became
directly involved in the production of goods and services and in re-distribution of
wealth.53

The Marxist Perspective

The second unfortunate candidate for the SOCP is a form of Marxism that is generated
more by limited access to, and appreciation for Marxist literature, than the actual
contribution of that school of thought.54

52

This is in reference to Skocpol and Campball’s entry under the institutional theory of the state. See:
Skocpol and Campbell, op. cit.; same page.
53
See Theda Skocpol’s article in: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (editors).
Bringing the State Back In. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 1985. pp 4-5.
Also see: Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (editors). State, Power and Social Forces:
Domination and Transformation in the Third World. Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 12
54
Best illustration of this claim is the way Miliband is characterized as a “classical example” of this form
of Marxism, mainly based on a claim by Poulantzas’ characterization of his position without actually
looking into his literature that suggests a similar appreciation for the role of the state to what Poulantzas
shows, accept for the fundamental difference between the two in the area of the epistemological approach
to empirical study of abstract concepts, where miliband has an empiricist approach to Marxism while
Poulantzas belongs to the Structuralist trend in Marxism that rejects the theoretical value of empiricism.
See: Miliband, op. cit,.
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The Marxism that is included in this group is one that has no understanding or
appreciation for the full range of the State’s function, and limits it to only being the tool
for repression of the subordinate classes. Marxism is an epistemological world view and
could not be contained in one unified theory. Actual Marxism is very diverse in the
conceptualization of the state in modern times and in history.55

Although we can find in the literature reference to old vs. new forms of Marxism,56 most
of the trends in conceptualizing the state originated from both Marx and Engels,
including but not limited to the following lines of different conceptual understanding of
the role of the State:
•

The state as a social class. This is prevalent in the development of Marx and Engels’
term Asiatic Mode of Production.57

•

The state as the initiator of “change from the above”. In his book The Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Napoleon,58 Karl Marx introduced a different concept of the state
from what he produced in his major works. The state in this book is very independent
from the social classes. It is a powerful actor that transforms all classes in the society
as it acts. Many Neo-Marxists used this model of a state to explain the “changes from
above” in the underdeveloped countries, or what came to be known as the Petite-

55
Eugen Varga, a victim of the Stalin era addresses how this “unified” form of Marxism was forced upon
the International association of the communist movement during Stalin’s time. See: Eugen Varga, Politicoeconomic problems of capitalism, Moscow, USSR: Progress Publishers, 1968.
56
Skocpol uses the term neo-Marxism, while John Roemer uses Analytical Marxism. Others have used
structural Marxism, anthropological Marxism…etc.
57
See: Joshua Fogel. The Debates over the Asiatic Mode of Production in Soviet Russia, China, and Japan.
The American Historical Review. Vol. 93, No. 1, (Feb., 1988). Pp.56-79.
58
See: Robert Tucker (editor). The Marx-Engles Reader. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1978.
pp. 594-618.
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bourgeoisie state59, and to explain the mechanisms by which Fascist states operated in
Europe.

That leads me to suggest that most of the trends in Marxism fall in a hybrid place
between the SOCP and the STCP.

The Elitist Perspective

Another group that espouses a hybrid view of the relation between society and the state is
elitism. Perhaps the American Theodor Lowi could be the best representative for this
group. Starting from the same assumptions of the collective action behavioralists about
the function of the state as a grantor and the enforcer of the social contract, the
Conservative Theodor Lowi paints a very different picture of the state in a pluralist
society. He suggests that the pluralist model grants powerful interest (business and other
large organizations) access to government favors beyond the social contract and limits the
options of government to bargaining, instead of the enforcement of collective will.
Lowi’s model of the American polity is one that has a limited and a diminishing role for
citizens facing a pact between the heads of governing institutions in all levels of
government with their counterparts in the business and large not-for-profit community.60

The Four Networks of Power Perspective

59
60

The reference here is to the social origins of key state players and to the dominant class.
See: Theodor Lowi. op. cit.; Chapter One.
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Another occupant of the hybrid section is Michael Mann’s theory on power that suggests
power is rooted in organizations and it is concentrated in four overlapping and
interacting, but independent networks; ideological, economic, military61 and political (the
state).62
Mann suggests that not one of the networks comes first and not one is more basic than the
others, but one or more can be more dominant than the others, and just like the concept of
energy in natural science, each one of the networks can turn into the other. Therefore he
does not use the state terminology the way other theorists use it.

The State-Centered Perspective

This category is meant not to include every literature that addresses socio-political
change from the point of view of the state, and not the ideal type that is used to measure
how a body of literature is coming close to a form of analysis that views the state as a
permanently separate from and not bound by society, but the actual body of the literature
that suggests the historical possibility of the state being exactly that. An example of this
line of thinking in the literature is the assertion of an empirical possibility, which makes
theoretical necessity, of a type of state that is capable, not in a historically short-term, to
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Michael Mann suggests that the military network of power is not an aspect of the state power because
most historical forms of states had no territorial control over all their military and militaries have
undertaken more action outside the regulation of the state then state theorist would admit, and even when
the military is under the control of the state it has historically been separated from the rest of the state
organizations. See: Michael Mann. The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning
to A.D. 1760. Volume 1. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. (1986). p.11.
62
See: Ibid., p. 1.

49

act completely independent from society63 to the extent that “In some contexts, it would
be more nearly correct to describe economics as the superstructures of states.”64

Included in this category is the literature that views the state and its action to be a
sufficient explanatory factor for historical socio-economic change at the expense of all
other factors. I presented an example of this line of analysis in the segment about state
formation.

This leads me to suggest that Goodwin treats the Weberian ideal type of Sultanist state,
where the Sultan (one of the oriental terms describing the head of the state) has absolute
powers that are not checked by any societal force, not as a measuring tool to compare
authoritarian regimes with, but actually an empirically verified historical form of the
oriental states.65

Notes on State Formation and State-Society Relations in the Middle East

In the effort to understand the formation of Middle Eastern states and their relationship
with Middle Eastern societies, I suggest that the hybrid perspectives to be useful. The
Colonial intervention in Middle East and the engineering of the socio-political structure
63

See: Skocpol. Bringing the State. op. cit., pp. 5-7
Goodwin, op. cit., p. 39 (Footnote)
65
In the Islamic history there is actually one Caliph in the Islamic Umayyad Empire who inherited power
in 719 AD and thought that he had the kind of authority that the ideal type of Sultanic state assumes. Umar
bin Abul Aziz decided that his tribe compiled their wealth by taking over land and looting the Muslims’
House of Treasury (Baitu Mal Il-muslimeen) and it was his duty as a (just dictator) to give it all back to the
Muslims. He lasted 13 months and was killed by his own extended family.
64

50

that is associated with it,66 along with rentier nature67 of many of the states in that region
support the observation of capacities for independence from society greater than the norm
of modern European history. This is especially true in countries that experienced
prolonged crisis of class dominance. This supports the idea that the relative
independently capacities of the state in the Middle East are enhanced by conditions that
are referred to in Marxist literature as Bonapartian state.68

It is also true that the military has demonstrated great capacity to act independent from
the political network of power and was able to transform to political power in many
countries of the Middle East.69 This supports the notion of the military as a network of
power that is independent from the political network.

There is also growing evidence, since the 70s, for elitist theory style partnership between
newly empowered business leadership and the Middle Eastern state that utilizes modern
66

See as an example of class engineering practices of colonialism in the Middle East: Hanna Batatu. The
Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and
Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba’thists and Free Officers. New York, NY: Princeton
University Press. 1978. First chapter.
67
A rentier state, according to Hazem Beblawi and Glacomo Luciani, is a subset of an economy where rent
is predominant, external to the economy, paid mainly by foreigners, received mainly by the government
and while the majority of the population is involved in the distribution and the consumption of it, very few
are involved in generating it. These characteristics provide to the state exceptional capacity to be free from
the Tillyain equation of taxation for representation, by allowing it to act outside the constraints of the
domestic economy. See:
- Hazem Beblawi and Glacomo Luciani (Editors). The Rentier State: Nation, State and Integration in Arab
World (Vol.2) New York, NY: Croom Helm. 1987. p. 12.
68
Reference to Marx’s analysis of the French state in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. For an
application of this concept on the Middle East and Iraq in particular, see: Isam Al-Khafaji. Al-Dawla WalTatawwur Al-Raasmali fi Al-Iraq 1968-1978 (State and Capitalist Development in Iraq 1968-1978 (in
Arabic). Cairo, Egypt: Al-Mustaqbal Publishing House, 1983.
69
It is worth noting that an organization such as the Free Officers that captured power in several Middle
Eastern states kept the military organizational structure and made it the base for the ruling organization.
Jamal Abul-nasir was not an ecceptional political leader who earned his position as the head of the leading
council of the “revolution”, he was the highest ranking officer, so was his successor, Anwar Al-Sadat who
had very little in common with Abdul-nasir ideologically, yet he was second in line. The same is true about
Abdul Karim Kasim of Iraq and his second in command Abdul-salam Arif.
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international economic ties to bypass public policy-making institutions to insure greater
share for the leadership of the business sector in power arrangements with the state.70

Yet to understand the past, current, and future actions of the state it is essential to pay
attention to the literature that addresses the cultural, and class impediments to the
bureaucratization and centralization of the Middle Eastern state in a Tillyian sense. There
is the problem of the role of extended family and tribes,71the negative influence of the
dominance of Religious beliefs72 and the class composition and origin of the state
bureaucracy and class relations in the country. 73

The following chapter attempts to put the above into an Iraq perspective.

The literature on the connection between Iraq’s structure of land tenure and its modernhistory national political environment is a dominant theme that was utilized by top Iraq
scholar; Hanna Batatu. He not only approached the political history of Iraq through
researching the structure of land tenure, and its effect on the development of social
classes, but also operationalized this general theme to the level of individual political and
economic actors. He did so by presenting their embodiment of class structures via their

70

See Fuad Mursi’s pioneer book on neo-liberal adjustments in Egypt: Fuad Mursi. This Economic
liberalization (In Arabic). Cairo, Egypt: Al-Thaqafa Al-Jadeeda Publishing House. 1976.
71
See for example: Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1988.
72
See for example: Elie Kedouri, The Nation-State in the Middle East. The Jerusalem Journal of
International Relations, Volume 9/3, 1987.
73
For an outstanding application of class analysis on Iraq’s history by Hanna Batatu, where he presents the
class backgrounds of the ruling coalitions in Iraq‘s history to explain their actions, see: Hanna Batatu, op,.
cit.
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own personal family socio-economic history and their interaction with the national
political events.

Unfortunately, this extensive operationalization of broad concepts such as social classes,
and social change, in Batatu’s study only extended to the 1970s, but his method of
research was continued by Isam Al-Khafaji, an Iraqi scholar who presented the social
changes up to the end of the 1970s utilizing the same method of connecting personal
stories of the new socio-economic actors with their family history connection to the state
and the general national political environment.74

Hanna Batatu’s influence dominated, and continues to dominate, scholarly research.
Especially his approach to explaining communal violence and local uprisings using a
top-down analysis to explain the effect of Iraq’s national political environment, social
class structure and macro-level social change on local outbreaks of violence. Yet this
approach assumes a class-based collective action that stems from class self-consciousness
of the local actors, along with a national political collective action organization that
brings together the fragmented local conflicts in citizenry-based public policy approach.
This assumption is no longer applicable in post-1970s Iraq when Saddam’s regime
succeeded in a sustained daily terror campaign, in eliminating all national-level civil
society self-expression institutions.

In this different environment, local conflicts over land tenure and other forms of
possession of wealth-generating assets did not disappear. Instead, local sides of post
74

See: Isam Al-Khafaji. The State and Capitalist Development in Iraq . op. cit.
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1970s conflicts were faced with compartmentalized and localized conditions with no
interest-based national forms of self-organizations to be found. In addition, there were
further complications with the significant decline of the state and its economic dominance
in Iraq’s society since the 1990s, which significantly minimized the ability of the state to
play a unifying role through enforcing its own laws.Then the regime collapsed in 2003,
and a new post-2003 national political order was designed around a single ethno-sectarian
identity per political representation, and that type of representation, by its nature is the
polar opposite to national citizenry-based public policy.

The conditions under which these compartmentalized and localized conflicts take palace
and the mechanisms by which they reconnect in a non-unified way with the nationallevel political process is the focus of this research, and its hope to contribute to our
knowledge of the effect of economic factors on communal violence.

Methodology:

The original plan of research was to utilize an unpublished study of conflicts of land
tenure in Iraqi Kurdistan after the 1991 Gulf War (1991-1995), that I conducted in 1996,
with a follow-up investigation of changes in the socio-political environment and in the
legal structure of land tenure in Iraq and in the region after the American occupation in
2003.

A) The 1996 study consists of three components:
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•

On-site personal interviews with local village council members or elders of 53
rural population centers in Sulaimaniya Province, and comparing their testimonies
with official records of land ownership in their counties that were maintained by
the provincial agricultural authorities.

•

Examination of reports issued by provincial authorities commissions on conflicts
in 17 other rural population centers. The choice of the reports was based on the
severity of the conflicts they addressed.

•

Interviews with local administrative staff of randomly chosen 9 nonegovernmental agencies NGOs that were 10% of all NGOs in the province, helping
with the reconstruction and rehabilitation of villages, about their encounter with
land tenure conflicts and their policies and procedures in handling those
situations.

B) The Spring-Summer of 2009 follow-up on changes in socio-political environment the
legal structure of land tenure in Iraq and Kurdistan region, after the American occupation
and collapse of Saddam’s regime:

The objective of the original plan for the Spring-Summer field study in Iraq was to
identify how main influential Iraqi socio-political structures interact with post-2003 land
tenure conflicts, to assess the severity of those conflicts, their violent potential, and to
identify the mechanisms by which these conflicts intertwine with the ideology-based
violence. The groups identified for interviews were:
•

Coalition forces. Mainly the US, and potentially British forces.
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•

Iraqi and Kurdistan administrative authorities. In the Ministries of Agriculture and
Interior.

•

Political parties within and outside the legislative body.

•

Tribal leadership structures with expressed political agendas

•

Displaced families that are claiming loss f possession of land and registered with
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

But a commitment, to University of Missouri- St. Louis (UMSL)’s Institutional Review
Board on Human Subjects Research, not to personally travel beyond the relative safety of
Iraqi Kurdistan region made on-the-ground conditions for research in Iraq largely
unproductive. Meanwhile, the Chief Historian of the Central Command (US Armed
Forces) communicated that they were not able to support the research by providing the
logistics to distribute questionnaire forms designed to identify standard procedures for
handling incidents of land tenure conflicts or claims of agrarian property damage.

The questionnaire forms that were designed for Iraqi political parties and tribal political
structures have been distributed since May 2009, yet a dismal number of mostly Kurdish
parties partially filled them out. I have received no correspondence from both the Iraqi
Ministries of Agriculture and Interior. Despite directives from Ministers of Agriculture
and Interior in Kurdistan region to their offices in the region’s Provinces and to their
central departments, none of the forms, as of today have been returned.

The UNHCR does not have publically visible official offices in the Kurdistan region and
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they operate under the umbrella of a network of NGOs. They only supervise camps for
internally displaced Iraqis in Sulaimaniya. In other Provinces they run mobile units in the
population centers where they suspect there are internally displaced families, and serve
only the families that seek their help. Conditions in the Sulaimaniya camps are so bad
that given the choice of $500 resettlement assistance, many families left to the areas
where they came from. Only 50 families currently occupy the Qalawa tent camp in
Sulaimaniya, supervised by the UNHCR. Most of them survive on dual registrations for
food rations from the national food ration system. Only 2 heads of households accepted
and gave on-camera interviews in Sulaimaniya, and one identified by a mobile team,
filled out a form.

The uncooperative conditions prompted me to redesign the study plan and the search for
alternative routes of data collection. I am using the available aggregate data collected by
the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes (CRRPD), a court system
designed to address grievances from the pre-occupation era that were blocked from
normal legal procedures by former regimes. The data reflects the widespread nature of
these grievances. I interviewed 3 head of households that had claims registered with the
CRRPD in the volatile Province of Kirkuk to expose the complex nature of these claims.
I also interviewed the first head of Agricultural Department, in the post-occupation era,
of Diyala Province, another volatile Province in Iraq.

In focusing on Kurdistan region, I followed the changes in the legal structure of land
tenure in the region by interviewing the highest ranking Land tenure expert in the
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Province of Sulaimaniya, collecting information on pre-legislation preparations in the
Ministry of Agriculture, the Administrative branch’s proposal, the Legal Committee’s
draft to the Kurdistan Region’s Parliament, the deliberation record and the signed-intolaw version of the laws.

The second chapter is a brief introduction to the connection between wealth-generating
assets and violence in modern Iraq, the role of foreign occupations in reengineering that
relationship, an overview of the special role of land tenure conflicts in providing a
sustained source of violence and political instability in Iraq, and a broad-picture
perspective on the economic background that the new (post-2003) political order was
founded upon.

The third chapter is a presentation of the effect of the Iraqi regime’s genocide campaign
in Kurdistan in the 1980s on the landscape of agrarian land tenure conflicts after the Gulf
War of 1991.

The following chapter is a presentation of the results of the 1996 field study that I
conducted on the effects of land tenure conflicts on civil peace in Kurdistan and on the
reconstruction and rehabilitation of rural Kurdistan.

Chapter five is a statistical study utilizing the dataset from my 1996 study to build a
model for predicting violent outbreaks in rural communities with land tenure conflicts.
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Chapter six is a presentation of the new political order (of post-2003)’s performance in
handling the legacy of property rights abuse by Saddam’s regime, and their political and
ideological capacity to address new and resurging conflicts of possession of wealthgenerating assets, especially agrarian land tenure since 2003.

The conclusion section is an attempt to summarize the pieces of the story that I told
throughout the previous chapters to illustrate the challenges to democratization and civil
peace that Iraq’s new political order is facing, and will not disappear without a fair,
equitable and citizenry –based solution for the chronic problems of the possession of
wealth-generating assets, and especially agrarian land tenure in the country.
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Chapter Two:

Demons of the Far and Near Past:
Access to Wealth-generation Assets and Political Violence in Iraq
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Wealth-Generating Assets and Violence in Modern Iraq:
A Historical Background

It is undeniable that the post-2003 Iraq’s politics is dominated by sectarian, ethnic and
tribal claims to power that are often expressed through outright violence or capacity to
back territorial claims with intimidation, and systematic exclusion. It is also undeniable
that the occupation administration supported the dominance of the sectarian-ethnic-tribal
representation in the institutions of governance in Iraq, but did not anticipate, plan or
hope for anything less than a peaceful occupation.

Both, the Iraqi dominant political organizations and the occupation administrators view
the sectarian-ethnic-tribal arrangements as free expression of Iraqis choice of political
mobilization and governance on one hand. On the other hand, they view the violence as a
result of historic imbalances in previous power arrangements between the same societal
elements., And since the violence in Iraq is claimed by elements that provoke sectarianethnic-tribal grievances and aspirations as the cause of their violence, their self-image of
the ideological expression of their socio-economic interests in these transformational
times becomes the only image. This makes the reconstruction of other explanatory factors
a challenge that requires a historical perspective of Iraq’s modern history. A comparison
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between the American occupation and the earlier British occupation can prove to be a
fruitful exercise in this regard.

The Story of Two Occupations

A comparison between the background, circumstances, and the fortune of both the British
and American occupation reveals much more similarities than the architects of the
American occupation had hoped for.

The mission in both occupations was fluid, confused and had too many conflicting
objectives. They both were carried out in a changed international environment that could
not support a simple claim of imperial conquest, and obligated the occupiers to oversee
the building of governance institutions in Iraq.75 Both occupations were done with
overwhelmingly superior but severely undermanned armed forces that could not
adequately perform the tasks of managing the occupied population, after the “mission
(was) accomplished”.76
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See for the British occupation:
Toby Dodge. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and A History Denied. New York, NY:
Colombia University Press. 2003. Preface and first two chapters,
Charles Tripp. A History of Iraq. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002, second chapter.
And for the mandate of the US occupation in Iraq, see UN resolutions (1483 in May 2003) and (1511 in
October 2003)at:
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/2003/res1483.pdf
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/2003/res1511.pdf
76
See for the British occupation:
Hanna Batatu. op. cit,.. p. 89.
And as for the American occupation, the media documented the, then, Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld’s dismissal of the military officials’ estimates of the troops needed for the occupation and
stabilization of Iraq.
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And as a result of their self-made disadvantages, both occupation administrations entered
a patron/client relationship with mobilized and armed socio-political entities that were/are
diametrically opposed to the modernization, and democratization objectives that were
claimed to be the end-result of both occupations.

In the British case, the occupation authorities helped build a weak state headed by nonlocal militant tribal leaders with religious nobility claims and a Pan-Arab agenda, and
decentralized power through re-engineered tribalization of the society. The reengineering occurred through forcing non-tribal populations to belong to tribes,77
registering communally possessed tribal land as individual property of “friendly” tribe
leaders,78 exempting tribes from civil and criminal laws of the land,79 advancing such
exemptions with a regulation language that restrained any future Iraqi government
emerging from the British mandate from changing it,80 “advised” Iraqi government to
allow tribal raids between tribes,81 and turned traditional patronage relations between
peasants and landlords into contractual financial obligations that tied peasants to the land,
held them financially responsible for crop failure and prohibited them from leaving to
77

The British political officer in Sulaimaniya province wrote to his superiors in 1919: “every man who
could be labeled as a tribesman was placed under a tribal leader…petty village headmen were unearthed
and discovered as leaders of long dead tribes; disintegrated sedentary clans…were told to reunite and
remember that they had once been tribesmen”. Source: Ibid. p. 94.
78
This happened despite the advice of the British expert Sir Dawson, who was brought to Iraq to
recommend policy for dealing with commonly held land in Iraq. See: Trip, op. cit.; p. 70 and 85.
And yet another British expert (Lord Salter) suggested, more than 30 years later, that remaining state
owned land was so abundant that if it had been leased properly to landless peasants, there would not have
been such a severe land tenure problem in Iraq, but instead, leasing policy was an integral part of stripping
the communally cultivated land to the benefit of the “friendly” tribal leaders. See: Ibid., pp.138-139
79
This is reference to The Iraqi Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation of 1918.
80
See: Batatu, op. cit.; p. 93.
81
Batatu refers to a troubling document that reviles “very reluctant” advice from the British high
commissioner to the Iraqi government to grant the request of the tribal chiefs of Shammar and Anizah, two
large tribes from west of Iraq, and permit raiding between them because “unless their tribes were permitted
to carry on their traditional raiding, they (the tribal leaders) would not be able to keep them (their tribes)
together under them (their tribal leadership)” Source: Ibid., p. 98.

63

cities if in debt to landlords and also banned the employment of an indebted peasant by
any other landlord, government agency, or private company.82

But the most troubling aspect of this British strategic choice of reengineered
primordialization of Iraq was that it was mainly based on the harsh budget and personal
constraints on one hand and the bureaucratic readjustment to the new concept of mandate
that required an early Iraqi face on a very fragile British dominance, but nevertheless, it
was introduced as merely discovering and following the “regular law of the country”.83

The American twenty-first century version of Iraqi “regular law of the country” is what
emerged from the Salahaddin Assembly in 1992, a decade before the occupation. Most of
active Iraqi opposition groups participated in that assembly in the Kurdish town of
Salahaddin under the threat of isolation from eminent great events that were about to be
orchestrated by the US government to end Saddam Hussein’s regime and install an
alternative political body that was to take shape in an assembly of the willing Iraqi
parties. That meeting led to the announcement of a shadow government (with presidency
council, parliament and an executive council) that was funded, supported , and presented
to the world by the US as a willing and able body to replace the crumbling regime in
Iraq. US organizers of this assembly were operating under the entrenched belief that the
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Iraqi society was “irrevocably divided between sectarian and religious groupings,
mobilized by deep communal antipathy.”84

The structure of the shadow government that emerged from the Salahaddin Assembly,
and came to be known as the Iraqi National Congress (INC), was modelled after the
structure of government in Lebanon. For the first time in the modern history of Iraq, a
national political body for governance was created that limited representation to
sectarian, ethnic and tribal organizations along with a complementary marginal
representation of general citizenry-based organizations and liberal individuals. Moreover,
this body assigned all high ranking posts of the shadow government on the basis of the
person’s sect and ethnicity to insure “a balanced representation” of Iraqis. 85

This re-engineered shadow governance structure enjoyed the support of 3 consecutive
administrations even when it was bogged down from the start by high levels of
corruption, and was a subject of US congressional investigation for squandering millions
of dollars of American funds. But more tellingly, it quickly became yet another body
among Iraqi opposition groups mainly because the American orchestrated, eminent great
event never took place beyond a limited and ill-prepared coup d'état attempt.

More than a decade after that re-organization effort, the US administration decided to be
fully in charge and used the American army to bring about the great event of toppling
Saddam’s regime, and installed a governing system that followed the same structure of
84
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Salahaddin assembly of 1992, and went further in the process of what an Iraq scholar
calls the “primordialization”86 of Iraq’s polity for generations to come.

One example of this trend is pointed out by a former advisor to The Coalition Provisional
Authority who had this to say about the new Iraqi constitution that the US administration
considers the crown jewel of its achievements in Iraq:
“The truth is that this [then] draft constitution, hailed by the US ambassador to Iraq as the
‘most progressive’ one, is much more reactionary than an 80 year old 1925 constitution,
the only democratically approved one in the history of Iraq. For whereas the ‘old’
document does not mention primordial collectivities, the twenty first century constitution
drafted under the heavy influence of the most democratic country in the world stipulates
that, ‘the state pays special attention to raising the status of Iraqi tribes and clans.’”87

What can be learned from the open and direct involvement of successive American
administrations that oversaw the formalization of a shadow and later a prevailing
structure of governance in Iraq, is that those administrations intentionally and forcefully
supported a form of governance in Iraq that strived to project an ethno-sectarian-tribal
pact, promised and delivered on the promises of awarding political posts along the lines
of alleged representation of single identities per citizen in Iraq.

And as the occupation authorities found out very soon after the occupation that the
“leaders” they brought back to Iraq from exile were contributors to their communication
86
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problems with both the Iraqi society and the international community, modern and
centrally functioning governing institutions became out of the question even before they
had a chance to be considered. Instead, the occupation authorities helped build a weak
central government made up of an ethno-sectarian and tribal pact that delegated most of
its powers to (or otherwise was ignored by) the provinces. Meanwhile, the provinces
were/are, without exception, left to be controlled by ethno-sectarian or tribal militias.

After what was known as the Debaathification88, the occupation authorities oversaw the
repopulation of the bureaucratic machinery of both local and central governments on the
basis of the candidates’ loyalty to the militias they represented. The same happened with
what was supposed to symbolize the monopoly of a central government on the legitimate
use of force, the army and the police.

This patronage relationship between the patron (occupation authorities) and the clients
(the militias) is increasingly becoming the only means of population control in Iraq, as on
the ground realities in Al-Anbar province and the Sunni triangle demonstrate.

It is also worth noting that only when a potential or an actual militia/client seeks power
and domination outside this patronage relationship, only then, is the media informed of
that militia’s predatory characteristics to justify handling them through American military
intervention.

Beyond “Blame America”
88

An attempt to rid state institutions from high ranking members of the Baath party.

67

Yet the theoretical question of how such mafia-type organizations dominate the political
structure is not answered by solely blaming the engineering efforts of the occupation
authorities. The investigation has to expand to the role of Iraqi historical and societal
factors that contribute to this dominance.

The most known scholarly representation of this line of investigation would be the
writings of Iraq’s famous sociologist Ali Al-Wardi, who refers the characteristics of Iraqi
individuals and society to a persistent re-occurrences of nomadic raids leading to the
dominance of nomadic tribes over rural and city dwellers’ for centuries. And that, AlWardi argues, led to an entrenched, and individually internalized nomadic culture that has
survived recent changes in modern history. 89

This line of thinking has been echoed (with a very different perspective) by the most
prominent Iraq historian, Hanna Batatu, who puts in the centre of history making
contradictions of modern Iraq, the struggle between dominant socio-economic forces in
population centres and their counterparts in the rural surroundings.90

But this assumption of city/progressive vs. rural/backward, which is parallel to a
dominant but increasingly challenged reading of European history, is questioned by Isam
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Al-Khafaji91 who also assigns determining qualities to internal factors within the
developmental path of Iraqi society and challenges the traditional line of the dependency
theory in blaming colonialism for altering an independent internal mechanism of
development in colonized societies. He argues that those internal mechanisms are still in
motion but do not fit the city/progressive (capitalist) vs. rural/backward (pre-capitalist)
model, just as the European developmental path towards capitalism in Western Europe
did not fit that model. Al-Khafaji suggests that the prevalence of the bourgeois class in
both cities and rural areas of Europe was a result of profound changes in the rural social
conditions that the bourgeois class of the cities did not support, but nevertheless was
profoundly advantaged by and suggests similar mechanisms were/are prevalent in the
non-European developmental path.92

Al-Khafaji rejects the notion that modern middle-eastern societies are full-fledged
capitalist societies (in the sense that was advanced by the dependency theory; capitalism
of the periphery and the only possible form of capitalism) and asserts that these societies
have only relatively recently entered in a transitional phase towards capitalism, 93 and
views the co-existence and interdependence of the pre-capitalist forms of socio-political
collectivities and the bourgeois class (both domestic and foreign) as evidence for such a
transitional phase as it was in the West-European history.
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Another line of analysis that supports the idea of the prevalence of ethno-sectarianism
and tribalism prior to the American direct involvement in Iraq focuses on the
characteristics of the state in the Middle East and suggests that because of Iraqi state’s
exclusive access to the national wealth from the oil industry since the 70s, it became
independent from society and from the rest of the national economy, in a way that
allowed it to demonstrate predatory behaviours without consequence towards society and
made it hostile to all forms of social congregation and economic activity that existed
outside its control. And as membership in the state apparatus became the equivalent of
membership in a socio-economic dominant class, the issue of transitioning wealth and
power between generations became more and more a matter of kinship and led in Iraq to
what Tony Dodge views as a shadow state,94 where a tight network of Saddam’s clan
alliance took over the state bureaucracy in the shadow and, by using massive state
resources in a utilitarian way, they engaged in “primordialization” of all societal
congregation structures.95 An example of the extent that this process reached would be
the fact that during Saddam’s massive genocide campaign against the Kurds in the late
80s, he had close to 500,000 Kurds registered as mercenaries organized within their
kinship structures and attached to military units, and many of them were used as foot
soldiers in the genocide campaign.

It is worth noticing that this state-centred approach to explaining the “primordialization”
of Iraqi society presents tribal population and tribal structures as passive subordinates of
the state, and it is therefore criticised by Faleh Jabar who proposes a more complicated
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process and different forms of tribalization that allow for explaining different periods of
the history of the relation between the Iraqi state and the tribal structures, whereby tribes
were constructed, deconstructed and also resurged independently to react to the
simultaneous decline of both the state and civil society.96 This proposed interactive nature
of the relation between the state and the tribal structures is also the theme of an article by
Hosham Dawod that is successfully summarised by its title: “The State-ization of the
Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: The Case of Iraq”.97

How Agrarian Land Tenure Became a Source of Sustained Violence in Modern Iraq

One of the most stubbornly repeated, ideologically motivated, mistakes that domestic and
foreign “liberators” of Iraq in modern history have been making is the attempt to reshape
agrarian land possession/ownership structure irrespective of the historical significance of
that structure and against the aspirations of the peasant population in the name of the
great prosperity that is around the corner.

This section attempts to present the historical contrast between promises of state, the
outcomes of its policies, and the continuous cycles of hope and devastation that
generations of peasants have experienced as early as the introduction of Islam to what is
now known as modern Iraq.
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Abu Hanifa, a prominent Islamic thinker and an authenticator of Al-Hadith banned
renting agrarian land or crop sharing on the grounds of his readings into Mohammad (the
prophet of Islam)’s teachings that limit the possession/ownership of land, for agrarian
purposes, to no more than what a person can cultivate on his own.98 This simple, yet
powerful rule was put to test after his death, when Muslim conquerors led by the second
Caliph, Omar, captured the fertile lands of Mesopotamia (637 C.E.) and Egypt (641
C.E.).

Although Omar kept the Asiatic structure of Land ownership and designated all land, not
documented as owned individually, as owned by the Islamic state,99 he added three new
components to the structure, regarding production relationship and distribution of tax
revenues. He banned non-economic methods of exploitation of labor (i.e. forced labor),
recognized peasants as free individuals who engaged in labor based on contractual
agreements that they could end at will and move even to cities at will, if they decided to
end contracts. On the level of distribution, he established Baitu Mal-il-Muslimeen
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Despite the fact that Abu Hanifah’s interpretation of Al-Quran (Islamic holy book) and Al-Hadith
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(Muslims Treasure House) where the surplus of revenues, after covering state expenses,
was used as a welfare component to support the neediest of the Muslims.

But this utopian project did not last long. An inevitable class polarization led to an
uprising that ended the life of the third Caliph, then the biggest civil war in the history of
Islam that led to the assassination of the fourth Caliph. This assassination marked the
collapse of the utopia of the Islamic state and gave way to the rise of Islamic Empires
(since 661 C.E.) that were modeled on the characteristics of surrounding empires, in the
face of restless opposition.

The succeeding Islamic Empires disabled the welfare component of the state’s
obligations, restructured possession of state-owned land to be a function of the state’s
hierarchy, re-instituted non-economic methods of exploitation100 and enforced excessive
taxation and de-Muslimized converted Muslims for tax purposes. 101

The Islamic history from 661 C.E. all the way to the 10th century is full of remarkable
contentious mobilizations that were shouldered by peasants and slaves of the countryside
of the Islamic Empire, against the state. Some of them established utopian states and
battled the central forces for decades.102
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Despite the change in the landscape of production relationships in the countryside of the
Islamic Empire, the state was functioning, as a state in an Asiatic mode of production. T
extraction of the surplus was centralized and the state was performing economic function
of carrying out large irrigation projects and maintaining them up to the 10th century.

Decentralization and two waves of Mongol invasions crippled the economic function of
the state in the Islamic Empire. As a result, vast farming lands turned into deserts because
of neglect,103 most of the population turned nomadic and semi-nomadic, and with the rise
of the Ottoman Empire, land was redistributed in a feudalist militant hierarchy similar to
Medieval Europe and tax collection rights were auctioned to the highest bidder to impose
as much as the local traditions would allow beyond the state required taxes.104

Modernization on Its Head!

The rise of nation-states in Europe and the pressure they started to mount on the Ottoman
Empire led to an attempt of revolution from above aiming at redistributing land as a way
to re-centralize extraction of surplus value, in mid 19th century.

Movement (816-837), The Qaramita Movement (891-1007 C.E.), The unending Khawarij Revolutions
…ect.
103
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In two reform laws in 1839 and 1858, Sultan Abdul-Majeed dismantled the militant
hierarchic possession of land and the tax collection enterprise. He announced that anyone
possessing and farming state land exclusively and personally (not through rent or crop
sharing)105 for more than 10 years would “own”106 the land after paying a set amount.
The laws prohibited any one or few persons from owning all land in any given village,
and asserted that all residents had to be given shares of the land.107

This late return to Mohammad’s philosophy on land distribution was compromised by
two factors; a loophole in the laws suggesting that if there was no one to farm in the
village (and how else would they be earning their livelihood?), then all land could be
registered to one person! And a highly corrupt bureaucracy was in charge of
implementing the law.108

The results of implementing Sultan Abdul-Majeed’s laws were so diverted from their
intent that some scholars equated the laws with liberalization in the sense of
commodification and introduction of capitalism in agriculture. 109
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After the collapse Ottoman Empire in the WWI, Iraq became under direct occupation of
Great Britain (GB). In an announcement to residents of Baghdad, the new British ruler of
Iraq introduced his army’s presence as “liberators not invaders” and promised they would
bring modernity to Iraq.110 One of the items on top of his list was restructuring land
possession/ownership.

When GB occupied Iraq, much of Iraqi cultivatable land was not registered according to
Sultan Abdul-Majeed’s reforms. The British logic for the restructuring was: if not
registered in the name of any individuals then the land is not any individual’s land and is
nobody’s land. Therefore, the best way to modernize a “nobody’s land” is to establish
commercial plantations and capitalist management. What made this plan attainable was
the fact that Iraq was not densely populated and had an abundance of cultivatable land.111
But a popular uprising in all Iraq in 1920 brought about drastic changes in British plans.
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The uprising ended a heated debate within British policy making circles112 and prompted
a large scale redirection of GB’s policy in Iraq. The redirection aimed at reconfiguring
class structure in Iraq and most importantly at framing the reconfiguration within
reinvented tribal structures.

In the heart of this reconfiguration was the recognition of informal tribal land possession
known as (Al-Lazmah), but only with a colonial twist: They registered common tribal
land in the name of tribal chiefs, thereby striping all tribe members from traditional
access to what was their common land.113

They also continued to register land according to the Ottoman reform laws of 1858 but
with an official preference of registering massive land in the name of select individuals.
That meant that the corrupt implementation of the Ottoman reform laws, practiced in the
pre-WWI, became the official way of implementing them.

As a country with vast cultivatable land, even with accelerated efforts to register land
within the pre-WWI (Tapu) tenure structure or the new (Lazmah) structure,114 there still
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was an average 50% cultivatable land that was registered as government owned, with no
individual rights constraining its use. Lord Salter, an economist hired by the Iraqi
Development Board, suggested in a report in 1955 that with this much land fully
controlled by the government, it could rent it to peasant families, creating thereby a large
section of small farm units to counter balance and positively influence the production
relations in the rest of the land in the agricultural sector. But, instead, even those sorts of
lands were leased to influential landlords with Three year lease contracts that were
automatically renewed and transferred to heirs of the renter in the event of his death. 115

With this change, tribal structure was transformed from a communal social structure for
survival in a harsh ecological and socio-economic environment into a primarily power
structure that was sustained through the external power of colonialism. This new116
structure was serving as a tool of domination not only over the tribes but more
importantly over the emerging civil society. The Iraqi Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes
Regulation in 1918117 excluded tribal land from the civil legal system and replaced civil

cultivatable land in Iraq and by 1957 area of land registered as Lazmah grew 6 times. See: Naseer AlKadhimi, op. cit.; p206.
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courts with tribal arbitration councils, thereby making the social order a function of a
careful balance of power between tribes that could be manipulated by the colonial
administrators.118

In fact, those tribal arbitration councils had jurisdiction over the population of cities,
located within the illusive territorial boundaries of the tribes, leading to the subordination
of cities to the tribal structure.119

If one sentence can sum up the legacy of the British “modernization” of land structure in
Iraq, it would be the fact that, on the British watch, land distribution in Iraq was one of
the most notoriously concentrated in the history of colonialism in the world.120

The Illusive Dream of Land Reform (1958-1983)

In this extremely polarized society, and in a coup d'état blessed by underground political
parties, army officers took over power in Iraq in 1958. Since then, Iraq has witnessed
several successive violent power takeovers. Each seizure of power was accompanied with
promises of significant land redistribution and support for small family farms.
Charles Tripp, op. cit.; p. 85.
118
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The result was layers of laws and contra-laws leading to a chaotic legal structure with
devastating loopholes that led to control of former landlords over production around their
redistributed land in the first major law of 1959, retention of the concept of crop sharing
enforcing only peasants’ commitments but not those of the owners, in such crop sharing
contracts in all the major packages of laws, and continuation of the process of land
registration (Tapu) to “owners”, until 1975, in the same chaotic way the British
occupation, did and bureaucratic delay and clientelistic manipulation of the redistribution
process that was never completed until it was stopped by Saddam in the 80s.121

Saddam: “Reforming” the Reform

By 1983, and after crushing the all legal forms of organized contention, or even any
social organization that was not headed by an official from the ruling party, and then
depleting Iraq’s treasury on a miscalculated and devastating war against Iran, Saddam
Hussein became a subject to intense pressure from international creditors demanding
change in state economic philosophy and had already started a massive campaign to
redirect state economic machine, treasure and ideology towards a more selective
clientelistic relationship with society. State-owned enterprises started to be liquidated to
be transferred to a new “capitalist” class that had just hatched from the state incubator of
government contracts and security apparatus. Labor laws, that were designed during the
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height of state’s populist rhetoric in the 70’s, and were affordable not through
productivity but with oil money, were reversed.122

The reversal of policies could not be any clearer than it was in agricultural sector where
the support for small farms mode of production was officially declared unproductive by
Saddam himself. Backlogged land distribution from previous land reforms was stopped
since 1983. In fact, in a new set of laws (mainly decree No. 35 of “the Revolution
Leadership Council” in 1983) the Iraqi state started doing just the opposite, annexing
previously distributed land from peasants who refused to participate in the war or were
unable to farm because of the devastating affects of the war. That meant if a peasant was
drafted and went to war, and therefore could not farm the land was subject to the law as
well as the one who decided not to go to war when drafted!

The new legal structure gave the minister of agriculture the discretion to give full rights
of “land ownership”123 to large agrarian production producing companies if they rent
government owned land.

Within one year of the 1983 laws, 38.3% of all land under the authority of land reform
administration was rented to “owners to be” companies. By 1988, 99.4% of all
government loans were given to investors in the agricultural sector and all peasant

122

See: Abbas Al-Nasrawi, op. cit.; pp. 145-147
This is a right that was never given to peasants in any of the many land reforms since Sultan AbdulMajeed’s reforms!
123
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population received only the remaining 0.6%, and since then all loans were exclusively
given to investors.124

In Iraqi Kurdistan there was a different picture. The 1983 laws were not implemented
until the end of Iraq-Iran war and the start of the notorious Anfal campaign against
Kurdish villages. This campaign and its effects on the prospects of communal peace in
Kurdistan are extensively addressed in a following chapter.

The law packages, policies and practices since 1983 are an extreme version of land
annexation. It marginalized, without any access to legal channels of contention, a
significant portion of the population in Iraq that was already accumulating historic
grievances and frequent cycles of hope and devastation.

As the state practiced all of these extreme measures, it contributed to the formulation of a
group mindset within marginalized population throughout the social fabric of Iraq that
could be characterized as disrespectful of personal belongings of others, fearful and
resistant to law and order, suspicious of change and promises, incomprehensive and
unproductive of sustainable solutions.

This group mindset manifest itself in social behavior first in state organized looting of
Kurdish villages during the Anfal campaign and in the invasion of Kuwait (1990), but

124

See: Republic of Iraq, Central Agency for Statistical Studies. Annual Census Collection of 1983 and
1990.
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then independently in lootings accompanied 1991 uprisings after the first Gulf War and
again with the arrival of US troops to Baghdad.

Another contributor to the social decay that spread throughout the ailing body of the Iraqi
society was the socio-economic price the country paid for the 3 decades of war and
devastation that started with the Iraq-Iran war.

Decades of Socio-Economic Wilderness

Iraq’s basic economic indicators, of the past thirty years, paint a devastating picture of the
consequences of three wars, thirteen years of chocking economic embargo, an occupation
and waves of post-occupation violence. This enormous hardship could be measured by
the immediate results of the wars; lose of life and limb, massive internal displacement,
and forced migration outside the country. Yet, the long-term toll on surviving generations
and those yet to come could arguably be even more consequential.

Between 1980 and mid 1990s, Iraq’s GDP per capita took a nose dive and dropped from
$3,453, in 1980, to $455 in 1996. This meant that Iraq’s economy shrunk by 1996 to less
than 1/7 of its size in 1980 (adjusted for growth in population). See the following graph.
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Figure #1: Iraq’s GDP per Capita (Current US $)
1960-2010
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Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators (WDI) . On-line Data. 2011

Although, the GDP per capita indicator has started to climb up with the relaxation of the
international embargo rules since the mid 1990s, and with the influx of billions of dollars
and close to a quarter million occupation forces and war related businesses personnel
since 2003. Yet, Iraq’s economy in 2010 is still less than ¾ of its size 30 years ago.

The harshness of this economic seen can be better illustrated with a comparison to
comparable countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

Figure #2: Growth of GDP per Capita in Selected
Middle East and North Africa Region (1980-2006)
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___________________________________________________________

Source: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
Confronting Poverty in Iraq: Main Findings. Washington, DC. 2011, p.18

As shown in the above graph, the fall of Iraq’s GDP per capita is unmatched, even by
Iran, which was on the other side of the first, long and devastating Gulf war of 19801988. But the real opportunity lose is better illustrated when Iraq is compared, not to
stagnant economies, but an economy that had a fair chance at growth during the same
period, such as Turkey.

An equally important indicator is trends in health and life expectancy. The following
table summarizes changes in life expectancy from 1980 to 2006 in the Middle East and
North Africa group:
Table #1: Changes in Life Expectancy in
Developing MENA Countries (1980-2006)
Life expectancy
Change
Country
(in years)
(no. years)
between 1980-2006
1980
2006
Egypt
55
71
+16
Oman
61
76
+15
Yemen
47
62
+15
Libya
60
74
+14
Morocco
58
71
+13
Tunisia
62
74
+12
Saudi
61
73
+12
Arabia
Algeria
60
72
+12
Iran
59
71
+12
Syria
63
74
+11
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Turkey
Jordan
Kuwait
Djibouti
Lebanon
Iraq

61
63
71
48
67
61

71
72
78
54
72
58

+10
+9
+7
+6
+5
-3

_____________________________

Source: Ibid. p. 55

The table demonstrates that Iraq was the only MENA country to lose ground in
advancement of life expectancy in that period. But, this is more of an indictment of the
extra-ordinary conditions brought upon the population by the wars, internal violence and
mass displacement. The picture of the condition of health infrastructure is more
complicated than that. After decades of being ahead of most countries in the MENA
region, and ahead of the average LMI countries in lowering infant mortality rates, underfive mortality rate and maternal mortality, those advancements started to wither away
since 1990. A snap shot of those statistics in 2008 shows Iraq in a growing disadvantage,
and only ahead of Yemen and Djibouti that are at the bottom of the income and health
ladder in the region.
Table #2: Infant Mortality Rate, Under-Five Mortality Rate and Maternal Mortality Comparison
between Developing MENA, Avg. MENA and Avg. LMI Countries in 2008
Under-Five
Maternal
Infant mortality
Mortality
Mortality (Per
Country
(Per 1,000 live
(Per 1,000
100,000 live
births)
in cohort)
births)
Kuwait
9
11
4
Oman
10
12
64
Syria
12
14
130
Libya
17
18
97
Tunisia
19
23
100
Saudi Arabia
21
25
18
Jordan
21
25
62
Turkey
24
26
44
Lebanon
26
30
150
Egypt
29
35
130
Iran
30
34
140
Algeria
33
38
180
Morocco
34
37
240
Iraq
35
41
300
Yemen
75
100
430
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Djibouti
MENA*
LMI**

86
34
28

130
42
36

650
200
180

*MENA: Middle East and North Africa Region (Developing only)
**LMI: Low Middle Income Countries

__________________________
Source: Ibid., Index 7.1

A main contributor to this decline is the reduction of public spending on health to a
negligible percentage of total state expenditure in the 1990s and all the way up to the
American occupation, resulting in sharp decline in total spending on health (Public, notfor-profit, and private, combined), when compared with countries from Iraq’s region or
from the same income per capita category. See the following graphs:
Figure #3: Public Spending on Health as a Percentage of Total Public
Expenditure in Iraq (1996-2009)
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Source: World Bank. WDI. 2011
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Figure #4: Changes in Total* Expenditure on Health per Capita
In Iraq, MENA, and LMI (Current US$) 1996-2009
200

180

160

140

120
Low & middle income
100

Middle East & North Africa (developing only)
Iraq

80

60

40

20

0
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

* Total: Includes Public, NGO, and Private spending combined
____________________________________________________________

Source: WDI, 2011

Yet, even with the decline of public spending on health, and the exodus of Iraq’s highly
trained professionals in the past three decades, access to available health services in Iraq
is relatively equitable between the poor and non-poor segments of the population.
According to World Bank, in 2006, 95% of the poor and 95% of the non-poor population
in Iraq receive medical attention for their reported illnesses or injuries, and 77% of the
poor and 84% of the non-poor with chronicle illnesses receive attention.125

125

See: IBRD. Op, cit., Table 7.2
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The mass migration and displacement of Iraqis, since the end of 1970s, has had a
dramatic impact on the composition of the working force in Iraq. According to Brookings
Institute’s Iraq Index estimates, and as of January 2009, there are 1,200,000 Iraqi
refugees living in Syria and another 450,000 in Jordan.126

IBRD’s (Confronting Poverty) study aggregated multiple data sources to compare the
educational background of those Iraqis in the Syrian and Jordanian exile with the
educational background of the Iraqi workforce that is still inside Iraq and the result was
that close to 60% of Iraqis living in Jordan and close to 50% of those living in Syria had
vocational and/or university education, while the same category made up around 10% of
the workforce inside Iraq. See the following graph:

Figure #5: Educational Attainment of Iraqis living in Jordan, Syria and inside Iraq

126

As the case with much data about Iraq and Iraqis, the Brookings Institute’s numbers are but one of the
estimates. The World Bank relies on an aggregate of United Nations Inter-Agency Information and
Analyses Unit, from 2007, that puts the number of Iraqi refugees in Syria between 1,200, 000 and
1,400,000 and in Jordan between 500,000 and 600,000. See:
- http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index20110830.pdf
- IBRD. Op, cit., Figure 4.6
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Source: IBRD. Op, cit., p. 32

The prospects for future generations are not optimistic either. After leading the region in
net enrolment in primary education in 1980, Iraq’s enrolment rate dropped more than
20% by 2006. See the following graph:
Figure #6: Net Primary Enrollment ratio (to Enrollment Age Population)
in Select MENA Countries (1980-2006)
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_______________________________

Source: Ibid., p.18.

Iraq’s current record in enrollment, in 2006, puts it among countries in the region that
have had a long history of under-achievement in education. See the following table
Table#3: Net Enrollment, and Female-to-Male Enrollment in Primary and Secondary
Education in Iraq, other MENA Countries, MENA Avg., and LMI Avg. in (2006)*
Enrollment
Female-to-Male
(Net)
Enrollment
Country
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Algeria
95
66
93
108
Djibouti
38
22
81
67
Egypt
94
83
94
92
Iran
94
77
127
94
Iraq
77
38
82
66
Jordan
91
79
102
103
Kuwait
83
78
99
105
Lebanon
82
73
97
110
Libya
N/A
N/A
95
117
Morocco
88
35
89
84
Oman
74
77
101
96
Saudi
93
60
97
92
Arabia
Syria
95
63
96
95
Tunisia
97
64
97
110
Turkey
90
66
95
82
Yemen
75
37
74
49
MENA
91
66.7
95
92
LMI
92
67
97
99
*The data is for the most recent as of 2008. Iraq’s is for 2006.
_________________________________________
Source: World Bank. WDI. 2008.

As security concerns and unchecked patronage have trumped all other considerations for
employment in the public sector in post-occupation Iraq, the connection between
education and wage income is highly distorted in Iraq. Employment in the public sector is
mostly a form of social welfare, and wages are skewed towards security services, where
not much of education is required for hired guns. With the state remaining the largest
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employer in Iraq, its wages structure sets the standard for all other employers and
economic activity.

According to the data from Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES)127, there is
virtually no difference in hourly wages between an illiterate and someone with primary
education. See the following graph:
Figure #7: Median Hourly wage in Iraq by Education (2006)

____________________________________
Source: IBRD. Op, cit., p. 54

The IHSES data provides a detailed picture of the composition of the workforce and
sources of income in Iraqi households. In 2006, which was the year the survey was
conducted, only 38% of Iraqis above 15 years of age were employed. 57% of this age
group, mainly women, was out of the labor market. In that sense, unemployment rate,
defined as percentage of those who are not working, being available to work and actively
seeking to work, was only 7%. The following graphs put these numbers in perspective:
127

For a digital copy of the full survey, see:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRAQEXTN/0,,contentMDK:
22032522~menuPK:313111~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:313105,00.html
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Figure #8: Percentage of Working Adults (above 15) to Total Adult Population in Iraq and MENA,
Avg. of MENA and Avg. of LMI Countries (most recent data as of 2008)

Labor force Participation Rate
_____________________________________________________
Source: Ibid., p. 38.

The graph shows that the share of working Iraqis to the work-age population is at the
bottom of the MENA countries, rivaled only by West Bank and Gaza, where life
conditions (especially in Gaza) are considered comparable to living in a prison. This
picture is skewed by the dismal share of women in work-age category who are out of the
labor market. While 75% of Iraqi men in the work-age category are either employed or
actively seeking employment, only 13% of women in the same age group are in the labor
market, working or actively seeking employment. The following graph puts these
numbers in the MENA and LMI context:
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Figure #9: Percentage of Men and Women Participants in Labor Force to Their Respective Adult (above
15) population in Iraq and MENA, Avg. of MENA and Avg. of LMI Countries (most recent data as of
2008)

Labor force Participation Rate
Female

Male

_____________________________________________________
Source: Ibid., p. 40.

Here also, Iraq is rivaled only by the densest, largest open-air prison in the world; Gaza
and West Bank. The common denominator between Iraq and Gaza and West Bank is that
both societies are under extra-ordinary socio-economic conditions that devastated
economic activity for generations and made encounter with violence the norm of daily
live for most of the population. These are the typical conditions for reversing progress
trends in women’s participation in the labor market, and confining them to primarily
bearing and raising children in their homes.
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The IHSES data provided an important window on poverty in Iraq by investigating
sources of income of Iraqi households. Using Iraq specific data on food and nonfood
consumption, the IHSES research group determined the poverty line in Iraq to be 76,896
Iraqi Dinars (ID) per capita/per month.128 That is equal to $52.13, according to market
exchange rates at the time of the study, provided by Iraq’s Central Bank. (See table# 4)

According to this Iraq-specific poverty line,129 and as of the end of 2006, there were
6,890,000 Iraqis living under the poverty line, and they were almost equally divided
between the rural and the urban areas; 3,440,000 in the rural areas and 3,450,000 in the
urban areas. But when we look at the headcount index, we find out that 39.3% of the rural
population is poor and 16.1% of the urban population is poor. This explains some of the
geographical variation in poverty that is observed in Iraq.

The following map of poverty by provinces in Iraq demonstrates that the provinces with
most rural population headcounts are the ones with most poverty headcounts also.
Figure #10: Poverty Headcount by Provinces in Iraq (end of 2006)

128

See the study group’s documentation of the methodology and data used to determine the poverty line in
Iraq in Annex 2.7 of the published Main Findings. The document is available at:
- http://siteresources.worldbank.org/MENAEXT/Resources/2.7.pdf
129

See: summary of poverty indicators in rural and urban Iraq at:
- IBRD, op., cit. p 16.
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_________________________________________
Source: Ibid., p.25

This map also corresponds with the poverty-gap-squared index (PGSI) distribution by
provinces, showing the difference in severity between poverty in rural and urban areas.
PGSI in urban areas of Iraq is only 0.7, while it is 3.1 in the rural areas. This means that
where the largest headcount of poverty is, there is also the most severe poverty in Iraq.

According the same study, the Gini index for measuring inequality in living standards in
Iraq is (0. 309). This is exceptionally low. In fact, at the level of Iraq’s GDP per capita in
2006, there was no country that had higher level of living standards than Iraq, as it is
demonstrated in the following figure:
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Figure #11: Iraq’s Position in a Scatter Plot Representing 127 Countries According to
Their Gini Index and Their GDP per Capita (most recent data as of 2008)

___________________________________________________________
Source: Ibid., p.19

But the type of equality that is observable in Iraq is not a cause for celebration. It is a
product of most of the 77.1% of the population living above the poverty line, being only
slightly above the line. An average urban Iraqi’s actual expenditure per month is only
$42.03 higher than the poverty line, while an average Iraqi living in the rural areas spends
only $13.56 more than the poverty line. See the following two graphs:

Figure #12: Population Distribution by Per Capita Expenditure (Iraqi Dinar/Person/Month) in Iraq (2006)
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_____________________________________________
Source: Ibid., p.21

Figure #13: Rural and Urban Population Distribution by Per Capita Expenditure
(Iraqi Dinar/Person/Month) in Iraq (2006)
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_____________________________________________________________________
Source: IBRD. Op, cit., p.26

So, the equality that three decades of war, violence, economic embargo and occupation
brought to Iraq was severe impoverishment of the already poor and the utter collapse of
the middle class income category in the society.

The effect of this bleak economic picture on land tenure conflicts and the resort to
violence in local communities to address those conflicts in the context of the new (post2003) national political process is the subject of a following chapter.
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Chapter Three:

Genocide and Its Agrarian Outcomes!
The Unique Agrarian Land Tenure Problems of Kurdistan

100

Land Re-redistribution by Death and Destruction:
The Anfal Campaign in Kurdistan Region

In 1983, the Iraqi regime officially reversed its decades-old agrarian policy. It announced
that the support for small-family-farming way of life expressed in all previous laws since
1959 was no longer an official policy in the country, because of what were considered
inherent economic inefficiencies. The regime produced what is known as the 1983
package of laws. These constituted an assault on the small-family-farming way of life and
its mode of production, by switching almost all state aid in the agrarian sector to agrobusiness projects and ending land distribution to farming families. The campaign to
annex previously distributed land used poor performance observations as a way to declare
the under-performing land as “not needed by the community of farming families”. No
legal recourse was provided to the displaced families. However, the campaign ignored the
fact that the failure of the land was related to compulsory military service in the war
against Iran, a country with a population more than three times that of Iraq. Those who
enlisted could not farm. Those who resisted became fugitives, with farming being the last
issue on their mind. According to available data at the end of 1989, more than 38% of
state owned land, which was managed by the agrarian reform authorities, was
repossessed and re-rented in accordance with the 1983 package of laws.130 See the
following table for details:

Table #4: Area of Agrarian Land Rented in Accordance to Law # 35 of 1983 in Iraq’s Provinces as of
12/31/1989
130

This percentage only went higher since then, but I was not able to compile a national or find any official
documents, except for Sulaimaniya Province. This will be explained later in this chapter.
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Province
Ninawa
Salah ad-Din
At-Ta'mim
Diyala
Baghdad
Al-Anbar
Babil
Karbala'
An-Najaf
Al-Qadisiyah
Al-Muthanna
Dhi Qar
Wasit
Maysan
Al-Basrah
Dehuk
Erbil
Sulaimaniya
Dismantled State Farms (in Multiple Provinces)
Total Re-rented
Total State Administered Agrarian Reform Land in 1/1/1979
Percent Re-rented to Total Agrarian Reform Land

Area (in Dunnums)
636,069
316,390
368,000
275,956
1,706
83,517
194,691
22,457
68,468
556,756
94,855
226,226
175,399
267,438
67,953
5,195
295,153
4,575
158,000
4,529,704
11,824,800
%38.3

Source: Republic of Iraq, Central Organization for Statistics. Annual Statistical Collection of 1990

The Kurdistan region was practically shielded from this package of laws until 1988.

Prior to 1988, many of the rural areas in Kurdistan region were out of the central
authorities’ reach, and under the control of various Kurdish rebel groups along with a
large population of Iraq-Iran war dissenters.

As for the areas of the region that were under the state’s control, they were also shielded
because most of the military-service-aged male population in those areas were registered
as an alternative to military service in a state-organized paramilitary force. These forces
were charged with spearheading military attacks on the rebellious areas. In reality,
though, most of those registered in the paramilitary were farmers who either paid the
paramilitary warlords for their registration cards or simply relinquished their monthly pay
102

to the warlords in return for little or no service. This allowed them to keep their farming
contracts with the land reform administration.

But everything changed dramatically with a brutal campaign of genocide that the Iraqi
regime chose a Qur’anic name for: Al-Anfal131. See the following detailed maps of the
stages of the campaign.

131
Al-Anfal (The Spoils of War) is the name of the eighth Soora of the Muslims’ holy book. In this text,
Muslims in their stronghold of Al-Madina, were allowed to punish their neighboring Jewish communities,
who are otherwise treated as believers of God, in the pre-Islam traditions of pillaging, to retaliate for
conspiring with the siege of the “Infidels’ Alliance” from Mecca on Al-Madina (627 AD).
The intention behind choosing this name for the 1988 operations against the rural population in Iraqi
Kurdistan, was a clear indication that the Iraqi regime was going to resort to any and all savage means to
“punish” the population for their support of the rebellious groups that have occasionally supported Iran’s
war efforts from the areas they controlled during the Iran-Iraq war. This was also an admission that the
campaign was not going to adhere to any norms of use-of-force sanctioned by the international community.
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Figure # 14-1: Overview Map of Al- Anfal Campaign (February – September, 1988)

Figure # 14-2: Map of First Stage of Al- Anfal Campaign (23 February – 11 March, 1988)
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Figure # 14-3: Map of Second Stage of Al- Anfal Campaign (22 March – 1 April, 1988)

Figure #14-4: Map of Northern Theatre of Third Stage of Al- Anfal Campaign (7 – 20 May, 1988)
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Figure # 14-5: Map of Southern Theatre of Third Stage of Al- Anfal Campaign (7 – 20 May, 1988)

Figure # 14-6: Map of Fourth Stage of Al- Anfal Campaign (3 - 8 May, 1988)
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Figure # 14-7: Map of Stages 5, 6, 7 of Al- Anfal Campaign (15 May – 26 August, 1988)

Figure # 14-8: Map of Final stage of Al- Anfal Campaign (25 August -6 September, 1988)

Source: www.RightsMaps.com
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In eight months (from February to September 1988) and in eight stages, the campaign
destroyed at least 4138 villages or small towns (as shown in the following table),
displaced more than 1, 400,000 residents132, among them 50,000 – 100,000 women and
children, who were taken away to concentration centers and are still being dug out of
mass graves all over Iraq.133
Table #5: Destruction of Villages in Kurdistan Region in the Al-Anfal Campaign
(February–September, 1988)*
Province of Dehuk
Municipality
Local Admin. Units
Total
Destroyed
Spared from
Villages
in Al-Anfal Destruction
in 1987
Center of Dehuk
Center of Dehuk
9
0
9
Zaweta
63
61
2
Doski\Mangesh
56
55
1
Atrush
46
46
0
Summel
Center of Summel
41
40
1
Faida
38
37
1
Slivani
67
67
0
Zakho
Rozgari
37
35
2
Sindi\Sranish
57
56
1
Gli\Batufa
62
59
3
Amedi
Center of Amedi
48
44
4
Sersang
107
102
5
Barwari Bala\Kani
82
82
0
Masi
Nirwarikan\bibo
63
63
0
Akre
Center of Akre
15
2
13
Nahle\Dinarta
103
21
82
Surjia Bjil
49
10
39
Al-Ashair Al90
18
72
Sab’a\Barda Rash
Grwasen
90
11
79
Sub-total
1123
809
314

Destroyed
(%)
0
96.82
98.21
100
97.56
97.36
100
94.59
98.24
95.16
91.66
95.32
100
100
0.13
20.38
20.4
0.2
0.12
72

Province of Erbil
132

This calculation is made assuming an average of 50 households in each destroyed population center and
an average of 7 members in each household.
133
These are estimates of Human Rights Watch. See:
Gorge Black. Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds. New York: Human Rights Watch,
1993, ISBN: 1564321088
Kurdish researchers and Kurdistan regional authority put the numbers around 182,000. See for example:
Chia, Displacement of Population from Stratigic Sectors of Kurdistan (In Kurdish). Siasati Dawli:
International Politics. No. (4), Year (2). Sulaimaniya, Iraq, 1993. pp 25-30.
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Center of Erbil

Makhmoor

Koisenjaq

Shaqlawa

Soran\Rawanduz

Zebar\Mergasoor

Choman
Sub-total

Ein Kawa
Qushtapa
Khabat
Center of Makhmoor
Qaraj\Baqrta
Kandinawa\dybaga
Guwer
Center of Qoisenjaq
Shorish\Degala
Taq Taq
Salahaddin
Khoshnaw\Hiran
Harir
Khalifan
Rawanduz
Diana
Bradost\Sidakan
Merga Soor
Mizuri Bala\Sherwan
Mazn
Barzan
Galala
Haji Omaran

82
112
40
35
94
75
55
53
44
55
88
50
82
55
39
42
221
75
67

37
112
16
15
59
75
31
51
44
54
58
44
61
27
33
1
212
75
67

45
0
24
20
35
0
24
2
0
1
30
6
21
28
6
41
9
0
0

45.12
100
40
42.85
62.76
100
56.36
96.22
100
98.18
65.9
88
74.39
49.09
84.61
2.38
95.92
100
100

28
84
21
1497

28
84
21
1205

0
0
0
292

100
100
100
80.49

87
53
76
85
68
68
93
87
77
35
94
96
16
46
60
80
95
67
79
70
30

12
7
3
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

87.87
88.33
96.2
100
95.77
100
100
100
100
100
100
96.96
57.14
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

63
78
104
24
63
66

0
0
0
0
0
0

100
100
100
100
100
100

Province of Sulaimaniya and New Province of Kirkuk **
Center of Sulaimaniya
Sarchinar
99
Bazian
60
Tanjaro\Arbat
79
Qaradakh
85
Chamchamal
Center of Chamchamal 71
Aghjalar
68
Sangaw
93
Qadir Karam
87
Pishdar
Center of Pishdar
77
Hero
35
Sangasar\Nawdasht
94
Rania
Chwar Qurna
99
Betwata
28
Dukan
Khalakan\Chinaran
46
Bingrd
60
Surdash
80
Chwarta
Cneter of Chwarta
95
Srochik
67
Mawat
79
Siwail
70
Darbandikhan
Center of
30
Darbandikhan
Penjwen
Center of Penjwen
63
Garmik
78
Halabja
Sirwan
104
Biara
24
Khurmal
63
Sharazoor
66
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40
39
1
97.5
27
25
2
92.59
81
81
0
100
69
69
0
100
Sub-total
2167
2124
43
98.01
Total of All Provinces
4787
4138
649
86.44
(*) This table excludes most of the villages destroyed in stage #3 of the Anfal campaign in areas that are
outside the official, but within contested, boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan region.
(**) Some of the municipalities in this table were part of Province of Sulaimaniya during the Al-Anfal
campaign, but they were redistricted to belong to a new Province of Kirkuk in 1993 under the authority of
the de facto autonomous Kurdistan Region as a result of 1991 Kuwait War and local uprisings.
______________
Source: Bakhtiar Baban, A study of Agrarian Land Ownership and Conflicts in Kurdistan Region and
Suggested Solutions (In Kurdish).,Unpublished study. Sulaimaniya-Iraq, 2007.pp 62-65.
Kalar

Zaraian
Center of Kalar
Tilako
Pebaz

The rest of the displaced families were forced into “modern towns” that were built in
wide-open areas, on what was previously prime agrarian land, and surrounded by military
observation towers. The following table is a list of the “modern towns” in Province of
Sulaimaniya only, as an example:
Table #6: List of Forced Relocation “Modern Towns” in Sulaimaniya Province and the Area of Agrarian
Land They Put Out of Commission
Area of Agrarian Land Built on
(in Dunums)
“Modern” Town
Irrigated by Surface
Irrigated by Rain
Water
Kalar Modern Town
0
2,916.23
Saddamiyah of Halabja
242.11
0
Nasr Modern Town in Zaraian
107.8
2,366.3
Braiati Modern Town in Barika
10
4,567.13
Modern Town #8 in Chamchamal
0
2,631.2
Modern Town #9 in Chamchamal
6
2,098.4
Modern Town of Takiai Kakamand 0
500.15
Bainjan Modern Town #1 in Bazian 597
1,337.21
Bainjan Modern Town #2 in Bazian 58.06
736.23
Saddamiyah of Bazian #1
510.15
650.22
Saddamiyah of Bazian #2
112.1
1,731
Piramagroon Modern Town
706.15
2,895
Saddamiyah of Rania
350
0
(Designed but Not implemented)
Total
2,700.6
22,430.1
Source: Bakhtiar Baban, op. cit.; p. 55

The agrarian land that was “yielded” from the Anfal campaign was reregistered as
government owned, without compensation, even for those with proper documentation of
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full private ownership.134 Any attempt to access most of the “yielded” land became an
offense against the state. Orders were given to military and security personnel to shoot
and kill any peasant or grazing domestic animal found on the “yielded” land. 135 In the
province of Sulaimaniya, the inaccessible land was more than 73% of total cultivatable
land, as presented in the following table:
Table #7: Accessibility of Agrarian Land in Sulaimaniya Province in 1990-1991 Season, as Described in a
Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Cultivation Campaign in Sulaimaniya Province in Fall
of 1990
Type of agrarian Land (in Dunum)
Sub-total
(%) of Total
Type of Access
Area of Irrigated by
Area of Irrigated by
(in Dunum)
Arable Area
Surface Water
Rain
Accessible
81,395*
457,988
539,383
26.53
Restricted by
Security and
74,039
844,095
918,134
45.17
Military
Measures
The Forbidden
165,152
410,283
575,435
28.31
Boarder Stretch
320,586
1,712,366
2,032,592
Total
100
(*) This number was wrong in the original hand-written document, and was noticed and corrected by Mr.
Baban later.
______________
Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; pp. 120-121

134

The Iraqi regime did not even bother with deciding the legal fate of the “yielded” land, since it was not
planning to allow access to most of it, for the foreseeable future anyway. But it was forced to address the
legal status issue when it opened conditional access to areas that were banned since Al-Anfal Campaign, in
1990. Hence came the “Council of Revolution Leadership” Decision No. 367 in 9/7/1990 that penalized
farming families for failing to use the land in agricultural activities, even though the state itself blocked
their access to the land.
135
In a memorandum signed by Governor of Sulaimaniya, Director of Military Intelligence in the region,
Head of Ba’ath Party organization in Sulaimaniya, Commander of First Army Division, Director of
Security Apparatus in Sulaimaniya, Director of Civil Defense in Sulaimaniya, and Director of Agriculture
and Irrigation Administration in Sulaimaniya, the following were put forward as reasons for not allowing
access to most of agrarian land in the Province: “ A- Cultivating these areas would require the presence of
the peasants during tilling, seeding and harvest (…). B- The presence of peasants in these areas might
lead to insurgent infiltration and would allow them to continue their destructive operations. C- (…)
Cultivating these areas would require building housing structures and barns, or at least tents, to protect
from the elements, And as we explained, that will jeopardize the security of our military”. See: Alan
Noory. Conflicts of Land Ownership and Their Role in Hindering Agricultural Development in IraqiKurdistan: 1991 – 1995 (In Arabic). Unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Salahaddin, Iraq, (1996),
p.120 (footnote)
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Even after cramming the entire peasant population of Sulaimaniya Province in 26.53% of
the cultivatable area, the central authorities were insisting on applying the inapplicable
laws of 1983 that required opening all uncultivated government owned land for public
bidding and in area measures that were, so called, more viable economically. In a
confidential and urgent memo to the Central Agency for Administration of Agriculture
and Land Reform in 1991, the Sulaimaniya Branch of Agriculture and Irrigation
Administration explained their non-compliance with those laws: “First: The law (No.35
in 1983) requires renting the areas that are not needed by the local farmers. However, in
the accessible areas there is no land that is not needed by the local farmers, not when all
villages from the restricted and forbidden areas were relocated in this portion of land.
Second: The law does not specify the upper and lower area limits for what constitutes
economically viable to rent. It also does not require any of the eligibility standards
observed in land reform laws (distribution only for persons who have no occupation but
farming). But the scarceness of agrarian land and the over-population in the accessible
areas compelled our branch to devise our own rules and regulations that were compatible
to previous land reform laws.
Third: The law requires all rent contracts to be permanent, and does not allow seasonal
temporary contracts, yet half of our rent contracts are temporary and seasonal. That is
because in the restricted areas, for security reasons, all contracts are made with the
approval of military and security authorities, and their approval is nullified when the
approving troops are rotated or when security conditions change.
Fourth: The law requires public auctions for renting state owned land. That was not
followed, because most of applicable land was already possessed by local farmers.
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Renting those areas to outsiders resulted in problems, including crop burning, homicide
and threats. This is why the idea of allowing farmers from other areas to participate in
public biddings was not feasible. In addition, newspapers did not reach all population
centers, and therefore, farmers would have missed dates and locations of the public
auctions.”136

The invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the establishment of what proved to be a
devastating 14 years of international embargo against Iraq, compelled the Ba’ath Regime
to appreciate the strategic importance of agriculture and production of food. After years
of neglect and abuse, the regime announced a National Cultivation Campaign by which
all agricultural operations were centralized, regardless of ownership structure. Agrarian
vehicles and machinery were allocated from all over Iraq to work based on where they
were needed first, due to time differences among agricultural operations in different
regions of Iraq. All possessors and owners of land were compelled to meet a production
quota, or lose their land, without compensation. This was enforced, regardless of the type
of possession,137 and without the right to bid to re-rent the land once it was put up for rent
in public auctions.138

Vast areas were rented out according to formulas that allowed for the new renters to
possess pieces of land that were, in some cases, more than 20 times larger than the
136

Sulaimaniya Branch of Agriculture and Irrigation Administration. Agrarian Land Department.
Confidential and Urgent Memo to Secretary of Agriculture and Land Reform Management of the
Autonomous Region (of Kurdistan). No. Confidential /3/106. Date 7/28/1991.
137
See: Council of Revolution Leadership (CRL)’s Decision No. 367 in 7/9/1990, which was attached to
communication No. 29478 in 11/28/1990 from Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation to All Branches of
Agriculture and Irrigation Administration in All Provinces.
138
See Directive No. 5 in 1990 by Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, on how to implement (CRL)’s
Decision No. 367, that was attached to the above communication No. 29478 in 11/28/1990.

113

average farming families’ possession. In other areas that were deemed security threats,
“trustworthy” renters were rewarded with areas as much as 40 times larger than the
average possession.139

Furthermore, in cases where no one came forward to rent recently “repossessed” land,140
another order from Revolution Leadership Council exempted anyone willing to invest in
such areas from both the maximum limits of possession and rent.141 In the Kurdistan
Region this was implemented by a directive from Saddam Hussein’s office ordering the
transfer, without rent, of all previously restricted or banned areas for security and military
reasons, to heads of paramilitary forces known as light brigades and security battalions.142

Ghosts of the Far and Near Past:
Kurdistan Agrarian Communities in Post 1991 Gulf War

Although devastating on every socio-economic level, the war of 1991 presented a
political opportunity in Iraqi Kurdistan. This opportunity led to an uprising (March 1991),

139

In a personal interview with Mr. Bakhtiyar Baban, in 5/25/1996, he mentioned that one paramilitary
leader received 76,000 dunnums in Kalar. This would put him, in terms of control over agrarian land, on
the same level with the last two royal families in the history of Sulaimaniya Province prior to the land
reform of 1959; the (Baban)s who established the semi-independent Emirat of Sulaimaniya and built the
city of Sulaimaniya, and the (Al-Hafid Al-Barzinji) family, the relatives of the self-proclaimed King of
Kurdistan during World War One, who ruled the entire Province of Sulaimaniya and beyond. Another
paramilitary leader received 36,000 dunnums in the same municipality of Kalar, while another 13,000
dunnnums in Bazian municipality were given to a third paramilitary leader.
140
for reasons varying from social embarrassment or kinship relationship to former farming families that
used to possess the land and all the way to harassment, threat of violence from former possessors, or
blackmail from nearby security or military outposts.
141
.CRL Decision No. 364 in 9/5/1990 and Directive No. 4 from Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation to
All Branches of Agriculture and Irrigation Administration in All Provinces explaining how to follow the
CRL decision.
142
This is according to Directive No. 2534 in 1990 issued from the Office of the President and had the legal
power of an addendum to an existing law.
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the crushing of that uprising (April 1991), negotiations with the central government
(April 1991), a year of dual authority in most of the Kurdish region (1991), and 3 more
local uprisings within the same year. All of this eventually led to the withdrawal of Iraqi
civil authorities, security apparatus, and army (October 1991).

These developments cleared the path for an election that created the first Kurdistan
National Assembly in June, 4, 1992 and the first Government for the region in July, 4,
1992.143

A critical factor in loosening Saddam’s grip on the Iraqi-Kurdistan region was the
presence of Kurdish paramilitary leaders. Saddam used them in his Anfal campaign and
rewarded them with vast holdings of land yielded from the notorious campaign. These
leaders collectively controlled half a million armed militiamen, comprised mainly of
former peasants who had lost their land holdings and had few options short of working in
the paramilitary. But the Kurdish paramilitary leaders decided to abandon Saddam and
cross over to the other side in a move calculated to secure their status within the new
power structures.

As many of the paramilitary leaders merged into the two main dominant political parties
(Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), they managed to retain

143

See: Alan Noory, op. cit.; pp. 128-129.
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the organizational structure of their forces within the militia of the political parties and
received their cooperation and blessing144 for the wide scale looting they performed.145

The dual authority of the central government and the Kurdistan United Front, in 1991,
created a chaotic legal structure with regard to land possession/ownership in the
agricultural sector. On one hand, the central government was sending instructions and
orders demanding the continuation of the post-Anfal structure, which denied original land
holders access to land and ordered the post-Anfal leases to be made permanent. On the
other hand, torn between loyalty to peasants and its newfound interest in integrating the
paramilitary leaders into their own power structure, the Kurdistan United Front instructed
the same authorities to dismantle all contracts resulting from the Anfal campaign and
ended the implementation of the 1983 laws. But for that year’s harvest, the KUF ordered
45% -45% sharing of the harvest between the original owner/possessors and the post
Anfal leasers while it attempted to collect the remaining 10% for itself, 146 thereby

144

For example, minutes of the meetings of Kurdistan United Front, the collective leading body of the de
facto authorities prior to elections in Kurdistan, reveled that deciding figures in both of the two main parties
“sold” the unfinished Bekhma dam project site, with all its equipments, buildings and vehicles to a former
influential paramilitary leader, who, in turn, sold everything to Iranian merchants.
145
The level of the organized looting was devastating in all economic sectors. Statistics generated in a
report by the central government’s agrarian authorities in the province of Sulaimanya in summer of 1991,
indicated the loss of 68% of total tractors from the agricultural sector (a loss of 3073 tractors), Although the
report does not give the number of combines in the province before 1991, it suggests that the number is
down to 51 working combines, while it estimates the needed combines to be 1219. By 1993, the
administration of agriculture sector in the province lost 66 of its own vehicles to looting. Another report in
1993 indicated that 55% of water pumps from irrigation projects in Kurdistan were looted (a loss of 3322
pumps). Source:
Alan Noory, op. cit.; pp. 130-131
146
This %10 harvest tax was without any legal merit, since all taxes on farming families were explicitly
abolished by land reform laws since 1975.
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allocating the harvest of hundreds of thousands of dunums to the former militia
leaders.147

After the withdrawal of the central government’s administration, KUF issued new orders
to return all land ownership/possession to the conditions immediately prior to the Anfal
campaign, with the exception of lands where the post-Anfal leasers invested in
excavation for water and bought pumps. The order allowed those leasers to possess 50
dunnums in the area surrounding each water pump for one agricultural season to recoup
their expenses. A year later, after the election and the establishment of the new Kurdish
government, the Ministry of Agriculture issued another directive mandating the return of
peasants to their lands. The issuing of this order for the third time in two years indicated
the level of resistance that former militia leaders and the new comrades were mounting
against the return of peasants to their lands.148

Even with the legislative elections and the establishment of Kurdistan Region’s
Government (KRG), a legal framework for ending the post Anfal conditions and chronic
problems from earlier eras, never materialized. 149 When pressed by the media, the Prime
Minister of (KRG) suggested that the legal framework for land ownership structure in
Kurdistan was a three-pronged: application of local customs in border areas, Law No. 90
of 1975 in the rest of the areas recognized as Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Iraqi
147

In most incidents both the peasants and the former militia leaders resisted this order. In Erbil valley one
of the former militia leaders who was renting 14,000 dunums, harvested 10,000 dunums of grains with the
help of nearby Iraqi military posts and used the army artillery to burn the rest and run to the areas
controlled by the central government. Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; p. 133.
148
See: Alan Noory, op. cit.; pp. 133-136.
149
The parliament was dominated by members of abusive landlord families from the pre land reforms era
and never actually brought to the floor for vote a (1993) proposal to unify the legal structure of
ownership/possession of agrarian land.
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laws, and Law No. 117 of 1970 for the remaining areas under the KRG control.150 That
meant that a vast area of the region was, as far as the KRG was concerned, out of the
reach of any law and was left to the, so called, local customs to handle their chronic
conflicts. In a bureaucratic power-grab intended to bolster its budget and revenue
streams, the Ministry of Agriculture took over legislation and issued what was known as
the Instructions No. 2 in 1992. This proclamation canceled an article of the 1975 reforms
that exempted peasants from paying rent to the government, and attempted to tie the
renewal of contracts to the collection of rent revenue. Only 3864 peasants, possessing
only 6.54% of total land owned by government in Sulaimaniya Province, came forward
to renew their contracts for 1993/1994 season, and that percentage trended downwards
every subsequent year, as shown in the following figures:
Figure #15-a: Percent Re-rented of Total State-owned Agrarian Land
in Sulaimaniya Province 1993-1996
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See: Alan Noory, op. cit.; p. 137

118

Figure # 15-b: Number of Farming Families Who Renewed Their Annual Contracts
on State-owned Land in Sulaimaniya Province 1993-1996
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in Kurdistan Region, Sulaimaniya Branch of Agriculture and
Irrigation Administration, Land and Takeover Administration. Unpublished data. 1996

Instruction No. 2 also called once more for the return of land possession structure to its
pre-Anfal condition. But yet again—and just like its predecessor, the KUF order—it was
neglected by the most powerful newly integrated Anfal warlords.

In the face of the authorities’ unwillingness to enforce the return of peasants to their
contracted lands of pre-Anfal, a group of armed self-organized peasants from Pishdar
area (on the border with Iran in Sulaimaniya province) forced their way in Spring of 1993
back onto their former contracted lands. At the time, these lands were owned by members
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of Mirawdali tribe, which had a notorious past of semi-enslavement of their peasants in
pre-reforms days, resistance to all land reform laws, and involvement in carrying out
Anfal campaign orders to destroy peasant villages. This battle was significant beyond its
local implications. The PUK, which built its reputation in the region by consistently
supporting peasants in land tenure conflicts in the area, reversed itself and condemned the
peasant uprising, on the grounds of its challenge to the PUK’s authority. But the PUK’s
choice to support the losing side diminished its historical dominance over the region and
provided the opportunity for KDP operatives with land tenure conflicts to link between
their personal conflicts and their party’s drive to regain political control over the region
that they lost some 20 years earlier.

In this fragile atmosphere, a conflict over agrarian land illegally converted to a
commercial property in Qaladze municipality prompted the PUK to attack and take over
all local offices of the KDP in all towns and population centers in Qaladze and
neighboring Rania territories on May 1, 1994.151

From then on, the events quickly snowballed into an all-out civil war in Iraqi Kurdistan,
and led to the split of the Iraqi Kurdistan region into two exclusive party controlled areas.

151

See a detailed daily account of how the events in Qaladza led to an all out civil war in Kurdistan, in an
on-line book titled “Dream or Nightmare! Inside the Events in Iraqi Kurdistan (1992-2002) (In Kurdish)”.
The book contains documents, correspondence, and personal perspective of Nawshirwan Mustafa, the once
leader of Komalai Ranjdaran, the largest organ in PUK, and the second in command in that political party
who recently formed the Change Movement that shook the foundation of PUK’s dominance in Sulaimaniya
Province since the Kurdistan Region’s general elections in summer of 2009. Nawshirwan’s objective in the
book is to counter a narrative on civil wars in Iraqi Kurdistan that puts him in the center of all episodes of
tensions and hostilities since the 1980s. See:
http://www.sbeiy.com/%28A%28MHjkURx8ygEkAAAAMDk1Zjg1NDUtMWJlNi00OTNiLTkzYWItOD
NjMDlhYTliZTY0YKkI7H4nevPGZC8WVY9Gb7xan301%29%29/ku/ArticleParts.aspx?PartID=32&Arti
cleID=1539&AuthorID=36
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It also forced massive migrations of supporters who found themselves in areas controlled
by their new enemies.

The inaction that marked the attitude of the government before May 1994 was replaced
by the party takeover of government in both regions. Government bureaucracy was
utilized to lend legitimacy to what otherwise would have been considered acts of revenge.
Previous laws and their application were ignored in the newly found interest in
expediting those land tenure conflict cases.

The practice of disregard for any legal reference soon became the norm, even for local
and international (NGOs) that, with funds allocated by the governments of the USA and
the European Union, became the main source of reconstruction, rehabilitation and
development projects in rural Kurdistan.

To summarize, since 1991, dominant political parties with a long established culture of
violence took over bureaucracies with a long established culture of cronyism. They left
the administration of economic rehabilitation in the region to a dysfunctional and
uncoordinated NGO community. Together, they were the only authority structures in the
region by the end of 1991. None of them was interested in a uniform legal standard for
dealing with historic and complex land conflicts that were exacerbated by the changing
political and socio-economic landscape. This led to a significant surge in violence. One
such wave of violent conflict is considered the trigger that sparked a civil war in the
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region, which began in 1994 and from which the polity is yet to recover sixteen years
later.
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Chapter Four:

When Violence Becomes The Only Game in Town:
Presentation of Key data in 1996 Field Research in Sulaymania
Province
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Research Structure, Scope and Methodology
This study was conducted in spring of 1996 in Sulaimaniya province152, during a
relatively calm period in this province’s front of the civil war in Kurdistan (1994-200?).
By then, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was dominating most of the province,
except for most of Halabja, Biara, Khurmal and parts of Said Saiq territories. The
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and a coalition of Islamic parties, all fighting the
(PUK), were collectively in control of those areas of the province. The relative calm
allowed me to obtain passes from both sides of the conflict to travel relatively freely
among their territories.

The study was designed to investigate the effects of complicated historical grievances and
the violent recent history of the area on the structure of possession of agrarian land in
rural Sulaimaniya, and also to study the effect of conflicts over land possession on the
tendency to resort to violence at the level of individual rural population centers.

Initially, the study was designed to cover two tracks; Track One was to interview local
representatives of a sample of population centers (villages), based on their willingness to
host the interviews openly in their respective communities. The questions were designed

152

In 1993, the new authorities in the Kurdistan Region redrew the Sulaimaniya Province boarders to make
room for a new province, under their control, called Kirkuk Province. This new province encompassed the
municipalities and counties that were home for large forced resettlements of displaced Kurds from AlTa’amim Province (formally known as Kirkuk Province). At the time, this was a political statement to
assert the right of return of the displaced population, against the state-sanctioned Arabization campaign that
had been occuring in Al-Ta’amim/Kirkuk Province for decades. Another change was made to Sulaimaniya
Province’s boundaries, as a consequence of the civil war and its out comes in 1995. After the control of
Halabja municipality and its counties by the Kurdistan Democratic Party et, al. , the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan reattached the Zaraian area, that was once part of Sharazoor/Halabja territories to Sulaimaniya
Province and called it the Municipality of Sharazoor.
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to encourage the participation of all of the interviewees. The main goal was to get the
most accurate account of their collective memory of their community’s history of
conflicts over land possession, their collective understanding of the legal structure of
possession and ownership of land in the community, the norms of land lease, labor
compensation, and the obligations between owners of land and agrarian machinery on
one side and farmers/peasants on the other.

The Second Track was focused on the reconstruction and rehabilitation process of rural
Kurdistan, which was mainly funded by the governments of the United States of America
and the European Union via contracts with international and local not-for-profit, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The focus of this track was to interview
Sulaimaniya branch executives of those NGOs. My aim was to get a sense of how
conflicts over land possession were affecting their work, what procedures they had in
place to address those effects, and to attempt to get a quantitative measure of lost
opportunities in communities where conflicts prevented reconstruction and rehabilitation
projects.

As I was preparing for the field trips, I met Mr. Bakhtiyar Baban, an agrarian engineer in
Sulaimaniya Branch of Agriculture and Irrigation Administration (SBAIA), who proved
to be a valuable asset to my study in more ways than I could have imagined. I learned
from him that after the PUK acquired control of most of Sulaimaniya province, they
instructed the (SBAIA) to form a supreme agrarian committee and address some of what
PUK considered, for security reasons, high priority cases of land possession conflicts in
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the province. That added another component to the structure of my study: the chance to
study the committee’s minutes and decisions as they were addressing the conflicts. This
provided a chance to examine the interaction between institutions of public
administration and fighting factions of the civil war, as well as their joint venture in
addressing land conflicts.

Track One:
Scope:
I used the official map of Sulaimaniya Province, in 1996, as shown in figure (1). This
automatically excluded the Darbandikhan, Kalar, and Chamchamal municipalities and
their counties. To avoid any conflicts of interest, I intentionally excluded the Sarchinar,
and Bazian administrative units and their counties that are under the jurisdiction of the
Center of Sulaimaniya municipality, since my extended family owns land there. I also
avoided most of Dukan municipality and its counties, because most of the (SBAIA)
committee activities were in the area surrounding Lake Dukan. The information I
received from the (SBAIA) committee documents track was very similar to what I was
intending to gather. Therefore, I felt justified in not making the trip there.

Figure # 16: Map Showing the Changes in Province of Sulaimaniya’s Boundaries (1993-2003)
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Sulaimaniya Province 1995-2003
Part of New Kirkuk Province 19931995
New Kirkuk Province 1991993-2003

Sources:
Map of Iraq: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html
Map of Sulaimaniya: http://www.krso.net/oldsite/sulimaniA.htm
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Changes since 1993: Alan Noory. Conflicts of Land Ownership and Their Role in Hindering Agricultural
Development in Iraqi-Kurdistan: 1991 – 1995 (In Arabic). Unpublished Masters Thesis, University of
Salahaddin, Iraq, (1996), p.140

I made eight trips throughout the spring of 1996, to the rest of Sulaimaniya Province’s
rural areas. The details of each are as following:
The first trip was to Qaradagh area. I went to six153 villages in four counties and
met with their local representatives. The villages were: Upper Darawian, Lower
Darawian, Mirkhuzar, Jafaran, Tangi Sar and Awai Hamai Karam.

The second trip was to the portion of the Shahrazur Valley that was controlled by
the PUK. I went to four villages/population centers in three counties: Bestan Suri
Gaura, Qaragol, Zaraian and Kani Mil.

I then proceeded to areas controlled by the KDP and small Islamist groups. I was
not able to secure free access to villages in the counties adjacent to the Center of
Halabja without KDP escorts. So, I left for my third trip to the Hawraman area,
where the Islamist groups had more decisive authority, but were less interested in
controlling my research. I went to four population centers in four counties of
Hawraman: Tawela, Balkha, Dargai Shekhan, and Biara.

When I returned from my third trip, to Halabja, I was given guarantees by KDP
representatives in Sirwan (a large population center and an administration unit
153

Mirkhuzar was never reconstructed and their former residents are living in the Upper and Lower
Darawians.
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under Halabja’s jurisdiction) that I could meet with elders from surrounding
destroyed villages who reside in Sirwan in the Administration building, without
any interference or presence by any KDP officials, who agreed to impose no
restrictions on local residents’ attendance. I met with elders from eight villages in
eight counties: Dwanza Imam, Bezhaw, Qaramani, Ghulami, Hasan Awa, Lower
Prem, Gunda Saraw, and Lower Dalen. I was also able to visit two more villages
in two counties, . Lower Basharat, and Tapi Safa, and meet their elders on-site.

My fifth trip was to the Penjwin area. The territory was loosely controlled by the
PUK. I met with elders from Qzlja, a battleground in an on-going armed conflict
over land possession in the town of Penjwin. I then traveled to Gokhlan, Garmik,
and Taratawand, and met with their elders on-site.

The sixth trip was to the Sharbazher area, which was also under PUK control. I
was forced to cut the trip short; I was stung by a scorpion and later, my shoes got
torn where I could not find a replacement to buy or borrow. I only managed to
visit 4 villages/population centers in 4 counties, meet with their elders, before
heading back to Sulaimaniya after the scorpion and the shoes accidents.

I then traveled to the Pishdar regions. Pishdar is where the Kurdistan Civil War
(1994-200?) started. When I went there, in spring 1996, the area was under PUK
control, yet active hostilities had not ceased. The hostilities were not between
political parties, but between militant tribal structures, claimants of former
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nobility status, and peasant families. In the spring of 1993, these peasants forced
their way back into most of the villages where they claimed residency before the
Anfal campaigns. They did so by defeating the militant tribesmen and forcing
them onto a narrow stretch of mountains on the boarder of Iran. I met with
peasant elders of Sindolan, Dawudiya, Sultana De, and Nawdasht (four villages in
four different counties) in the house of a peasant activist, who was a known leader
of the local 1993 uprising. They were all unable to go back to their former
villages, because their land and villages were under the control of the militant
tribesmen. Afterwards, I went to Dega and Kela Spi (in two different counties) to
meet with their elders. All residents of these two villages were living in tents,
because the on-going battles with militant tribesmen prevented them from
rebuilding their destroyed villages. Still, they had to stay to protect their crops
from the tribesmen. I also went to four existing villages in four different counties
to meet with their elders. The villages were: Dere, Delo, Alan, and Sreje.

My last trip was to the population center of Chwarqurna (an administration unit
under jurisdiction of Rania, where the populations of six surrounding villages
were moved after the construction of Lake Dukan’s Dam, and their villages were
submerged. I met with elders of the original Chwarqurna, Quruja, Gulak,
Tobakaran, Dw grdkan, Kolaka and Sardw Qamisha (all different counties). Later,
I went to meet with elders of Saruchawa, with the promise that I would arrive
before sunrise and leave within an hour, because they did not want the “land lord”
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to know who I met with. I then headed to Qurabaraza, Kani Maran, and the
village of Qarani Agha in Grdjan County, and met with their elders.

The following table shows the distribution of my research sample:
Table #8: Special Distribution of the 1996 Field Study
Population
Counties
Municipality
Centers
Surveyed
Surveyed
Center of Sulaimaniya
6
8
Chamchamal
0
0
Kalar
0
0
Darbandikhan
0
0
Halabja
15
10
Penjwin
4
4
Chwarta
4
4
Dukan
2
2
Rania
12
6
Pishdar
8
8
Total
51
42

Defining Unit of Analysis in Track One:

This clarification is warranted because of the confusion that terms such as county,
village, community, and population center are causing in the context of defining rural
Kurdistan, and Iraq as well for that matter.

The agrarian authorities have a system of dividing all land into sectors called “Muqata’a”,
which can be loosely translated into counties. Ordinarily, the population that possesses
agrarian land in a county would reside in one population center. In Kurdistan, if all the
residing families in a population center earn their livelihood from agrarian activities, then
that population center is called “De” or “Gund”, which is “Village”. If resources,
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especially irrigation water, are abundant, villages can be quite large (500 households and
more), and they are called “Gawra De”, which means “Mega Village”. When government
administrative units, and significant numbers of state employees, such as law
enforcement, reside in a rural population center, it is usually called a “Sharochka”, which
is “Town”. There are also forced-resettlement towns that are called “Ordugah”, which
means “Camp”. Relocated populations usually reside in blocks resembling their former
villages, and perhaps might even travel daily to their former lands to farm, if they were a
reasonable distance and there were no prohibiting obstacles.

In this field study, most sample units were villages that controlled all of the agrarian land
in the county they resided in. In some cases, the village controlled most of, but not all, the
county land. That was properly noted in the detailed version of the dataset, but was
considered one unit of a County/Population Center. In one case, three villages (two
existing and one former), shared a county. Yet they were all a natural expansion of one
original community with strong kinship ties, and were considered one unit of a
County/Population Center. The same procedure was used in another county shared by
two villages, where it was not clear that the residents of the two villages were originally
one community. In two large population centers where relocated villages resided,
preserved their former communities, and continued to possess or claim possession of
their former land, I counted them as separate units of County/Population Center despite
the fact that they all lived in the same population center. This meant that, for the purpose
of this study, the surveyed units were 52 County/Population Centers.
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Because of the requirements of the statistical model that I chose for this study, I multiply
the entire entry for each unit of my dataset by the number of households residing at the
time of the study, for undestroyed population centers, or resided prior to the destruction
for destroyed or relocated population centers. This will be further explained later.

Survey Design in Track One:

The survey questions were divided into 5 groups. The first set of questions was designed
to get a sense of the size of the community prior to the Anfal campaign or earlier forced
migrations, if applicable. I compared this information with the current size of the
community to assign a measure for the reconstruction rate of the population center. A
community that was not destroyed was noted as such, but in the reconstruction rate it
would receive a %100. Within this group, I collected information on the type of help the
community received, if any, from the not-for-profit and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that were the sole providers of any organized help in the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of rural Kurdistan at the time.

The second set of questions was designed to get the community’s collective
understanding of what type of land they have legal access to and who owns/possesses
it.154 I then compared that information with that in the official records held by the

154

Most of the communities I went to did not know any measures of area, other than how many “Tanaka”s
of wheat seed can cover a given area. A “tanaka” refers to tin cans of uniform size that were used to
transport Kerosene, and reused by communities for everyday purposes. I was informed by the Sulaimaniya
branch of Agriculture and Irrigation that a “tanaka” of seed can cover roughly a dunum of land.
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Sulaimaniya Branch of Agriculture and Irrigation.155 For historical reasons, the gap
between local understanding and the state’s understanding of the size, type, and
ownership structure of agrarian land, was significant in most cases. I devised a measure
by which I would consider differences in size of available agrarian land that was less than
100 dunum of rain irrigated and/or 20 dunum of surface water irrigated to be minor
discrepancies between the local understanding and what is considered legal
documentation by the agrarian authorities. Discrepancies in the structure of possession
and ownership that are kept within the same area limit of 100 and 20 dunum were also
considered minor. Any discrepancies beyond that were considered major.

The third group of questions probed the collective recollection of conflicts over land
possession from pre-Anfal, or prior to forced migrations, and the socio-economic status
of the parties involved in the conflicts.

The fourth set of questions addressed the extraordinary season of 1990-1991; who
controlled the land until the popular uprising of March 1991? What was their prior
relationship to the land? How did they treat the former possessors? And how was the
reconciliatory compromise by the new authority of the Kurdistan United Front followed
in the harvest season of 1991?

The last segment of the questions addressed the current conditions of possession and
production relationships. The main focus was to get as accurate a picture as possible of
155

This was only possible with the tireless help of Mr. Bakhtiyar Baban, who went through his
department’s files to identify official county names and provide the summery of size, type of land, and
legal possession and ownership structure of all the communities I visited.
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the norms of agrarian relationships and the type of conflicts that arise from them. The
main indicators I used to capture the type of conflicts were the degree to which violence
and intimidation were used in the conflict, and whether the parties in the conflicts are the
same or generational reoccurrences from the earlier conflicts.

Procedures of Track One:

In every trip I made, I was able to make arrangements for only the first stop in the area.
That was usually through contacts with relatives of the elders who lived in the city of
Sulaimaniya. My standard procedure was to go the village mosque, and ask to meet with
the elders there, to ensure openness and access for everyone who wanted to attend the
interview. However, I usually ended up conducting the interviews in the most senior
elder’s home, because keeping a guest in the mosque was usually a sign of the guest not
being welcome. I only experienced this unwelcoming gesture once in a village in
Sharbazher area. I learned later that it was retaliation for the act of an NGO surveyor who
claimed that he was assessing their need for veterinarian assistance, and asked for the
number of cattle they had in the village. It turned out that he was assessing poverty to see
if they qualify for a “poor village” status for a drinking water project. He ended up
disqualifying them on the grounds that they were not poor because they had cattle.
I always showed documentation that my survey was a part of a university research project
that would not bring direct benefits or harm the community in any way. In a few
incidents, after the conclusion of the survey, I was asked by those who knew my
relationship to one of the oldest pharmacists in the province, to send them medical kits
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for insect and snake bites. In one other incident I was asked to inform them what the legal
status of possession was in their county, after I found out. I gladly did all of that.

After the interview in my first stop, I would ask if the elders could connect me to elders
from other villages not within their county. If given more than one option, I normally
selected one that was no more than one day’s walk away, or one that I could secure a car
ride to.

Track Two (The NGO Survey):

Scope:

I used the contact list provided by the United Nation’s office in Sulaimaniya in June
1995, for all non-governmental and not-for-profit agencies registered with the UN and
active within the Province of Sulaimaniya, known locally as (NGO)s. These were a mix
of foreign and local agencies dedicated to the rehabilitation and development of the
ravaged communities in Kurdistan. Their main source of funding came from the
humanitarian aid budgets of the US and European Union.

I randomly contacted one-fifth of all thirty registered foreign NGOs on the list, and onefifth of the fifteen local NGOs. If local administrators from an agency would not agree to
take the survey, which happened with four foreign agencies, then a replacement was
picked randomly from their group.
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Survey Design in Track Two:

There were four groups of questions in the survey: The first group was identification
questions that focused on the country origin of the organizations and the date they
became active in Kurdistan and in Sulaimaniya Province. The second group of questions
was concerned with their per-year spending on reconstruction and development projects
in the agrarian sector in Sulaimaniya, and the estimated population that benefited from
the projects. The third group of questions focused on the number and the location of
population centers that had significant property conflicts that threatened their projects,
and asked to identify the means by which these conflicts were resolved. The last group of
questions explored the number and locations of population centers where conflicts over
property rights were irresolvable to a degree that planned projects had to be canceled. If
that was the case, then the organization was asked to provide information on the type of
project, its projected cost, and the number of proposed beneficiaries.

Procedures:

Most of the participating organizations preferred written responses over direct interviews.
I normally met with their designated contact to explain the survey questions, followed up
within a week to receive the written answers, requesting any necessary clarifications at
the follow up meeting.
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Track Three (Agrarian Committee Files):

Scope and Selection Process:

Although a Supreme Agrarian Committee (SAC), established by the Sulaimaniya
Province’s Branch of Agriculture and Irrigation Administration, was supposed to be the
authority resolving conflicts over land possession and water rights in the province, it was
not called upon to actively engage in such conflicts from March of 1991 until 1995.
Since then, the PUK (the party that controlled most of the province) has started using this
bureaucratic tool in their efforts to address security threats emanating from some high
profile cases of land possession conflicts.

The reactivation of the (SAC) allowed it to function not only in high profile cases, but
also in routine cases. Since I was interested in how the civil administration authorities
functioned during the civil war, especially in cases where complex conflicts over land
possession were deemed security threats, I chose documents related to the work of the
committee in only 17 cases. My criterion for this choice was the complexity of the
conflict the documents addressed.

I had the privilege of an interview with Mr. Bakhtiyar Baban, who was an active member
of the committee. I used his information about the historical aspects of the conflicts and
the socio-economic background the involved parties, wherever such information was
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absent or not clear in the documents. The following table shows the geographical
distribution of the cases addressed by the selected documents:

Table #9: Special Distribution of the Selected Documents of the Supreme Agrarian Committee in
Sulaimaniya (1995-1996)
Population
Municipality
Counties
Centers
Center of Sulaimaniya
2
2
Chamchamal
0
0
Kalar
0
0
Darbandikhan
0
0
Halabja
0
0
Penjwin
0
0
Chwarta
2
2
Dukan
8
9
Rania
2
2
Pishdar
3
3
Total
17
18

Content Presentation:

In studying the documents, I focused on three aspects:
The nature of the document, issuing party, official title of the signatories, reason for
issuance of the document, and location of conflict it addressed.
The conflicting parties, their relation to the agrarian land in dispute, and the type of
agrarian land in dispute.
The nature of the resolutions suggested in the documents and degree to which they
adhered to established laws.

The original dataset from all three tracks of the research contains detailed descriptive
information in each field. My intention was to capture as much information as possible
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and avoid quantifying, because of the inevitable disadvantages that come with
categorization and generalization of nuanced information. Yet, with quantification,
generalization, and categorization comes the ability to spot the trans-local aspects and the
general tendencies in the studied communities, and with that comes the ability to predict
causes, effects, and outcomes in relatively similar socio-political conditions.

The selection and grouping of key data from all three tracks is based on the
interconnected narrative they collectively present:

Communities Torn by Generations-old, Resurgent, and Irreconcilable Conflicts

In 1996, after years of a devastating embargo imposed by the international community
(since the invasion of Kuwait in 1990), the neighboring countries, and the Iraqi regime
itself (since summer of 1991), the overcrowded urban centers in Iraqi Kurdistan were left
with crushing unemployment rates and no economic opportunities short of working in the
semi-legal trade sector, or for the UN organizations, the international NGOs, private
militias of the political parties, and the security apparatus of the du facto authorities.

Activities in the trade sector were severely limited to importing sub-standard or expired
packaged food, dumped tobacco products, and alcohol from or via Turkey to Iraq in
return for smuggled raw petroleum, and then exporting the tobacco and alcohol, mainly
illegally, to Iran in return for refined petroleum products and sub-standard consumer
goods.
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Aside from the above mentioned limited employment opportunities, there was a
consensus in Iraqi Kurdistan that rebuilding, rehabilitating, and developing rural
Kurdistan was the only path to a viable economy under the region’s harsh political and
economic realities.

Yet, in the 1996 field study, I found that the population in more than half of the
villages/population centers I visited was fewer than 50% of their pre-Anfal population,
and 68.96% of them were in the (less than 10%) category, as shown in the following
figure:
Figure # 17: Reconstruction Rate in Villages/Population Centers Observed in the 1996 Research,
Measured as Percent of Current Population to Pre-Displacement Population
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Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

141

To make sense of these percentages, it is important to take into account the following:
Six of the villages/population centers in the (90-100% category) were not destroyed
during the Anfal Campaign, and the rest were post-displacement settlements where
the population could not return to their original villages.
Four villages/population centers in different categories were repopulated by relatives
of owners, pre-reform owners, or claimers of ownership, while the original displaced
population was not allowed back. Another five villages/population centers were
partially repopulated by displaced population from other neighboring villages or from
areas under the control of the central government of Iraq.
Six of the villages/population centers where the reconstruction was at the (0-10%)
level were battle grounds for ongoing armed conflicts over land possession, and those
who lived there were living in temporary structures and tents. One village in this
category was not rebuilt in an agreement to avoid future conflicts over an irrigation
source that supported two other villages.

The above were hardly the only communities burdened by conflicts over land possession.
In fact, only twelve villages/population centers claimed to have no such conflicts since
1991, while thirty-seven reported violent conflicts156 over land possession in the (19911996) period, Of these, twenty-one were ongoing at the time of field study. See the
following figure:

156

Violent conflicts, for the purpose of this study, are defined as conflicts where one side or more used
coercive action to advance their claims. This ranged from credible threat of use of arms all the way to
forced migration and murder.
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Figure #18: Reported Conflicts and Their Types in the Observed
Villages/Population Centers (1991-1996)
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Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

The vast majority of these post 1991 conflicts did not come out of a vacuum. In fact,
when asked about their collective memory of past violent conflicts, residents of only
three villages/population centers did not recall any such conflicts as far as they could
remember.

After reading their conflict story, and comparing it with the history of the legal status of
land possession in their county/population centers, I found that in 56% of the observed
villages/counties where such a violent history was recalled, at least one party in the
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conflict did not have any legal standing that was recognized by the state in their conflict.
They were mainly pre-land reform owners who never accepted the laws, were never able
to prove their ownership with accepted legal documentations, or never finalized the
settlement of their ownership until such settlements were canceled in the 1970s and the
disputed lands were considered government owned and distributed between farming
families in the area as such. See the following figure:

Figure #19: Pre- 1991 Violent Conflicts, As Recalled in the Observed
Villages/Population Centers, and Their Legal Standing of One or More of Their Sides
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Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.
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This was more complicated than members of an old social class resisting progress and
loss of status. A long history of corruption within the agrarian authorities led, in many
cases, to registering wrong measures of area, type of land, and/or type of irrigation.
Furthermore, there is evidence in some other cases that the agrarian authorities never
informed farming families of their new rights after reform laws, and further, conspired
with pre-reform landlords to conceal the legal status of possession. There is also evidence
of the state’s abuse through using its authorities to punish political opponents and to
reward supporters by forcing different standards in different areas. All this led to serious
discrepancies between what residents understood collectively to be the status of
ownership and possession in forty of the communities that I collected information from,
as shown in the following figure:

Figure #20: Discrepancy between Local Collective Understandings of Possession
Rights and Registered Legal Status in the Observed Counties/Population Centers in 1996
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Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

It is worth noting that the three communities that had a clear understanding about their
land possession and ownership rights were the same communities that did not recall any
pre-1991 history of violent conflicts in their communities.
With such conflict filled history, and continuous and irreconcilable distance between the
legal status of land tenure and the claims the sides of conflicts make, it is only logical that
of the counties/population centers that reported post-1991 conflicts, thirty-five of them
defined those conflicts to be between the same sides of their pre-1991 conflicts or their
generational extensions. See the following figure:

146

Figure #21: Reappearance of Pre-1991 Conflict Sides or Their Generational Extensions in
Post-1991 Conflicts in the Observed Counties/Population Centers (as of 1996)
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Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

The State Is the Problem!

The fingerprints of the state’s policies, practices, and bureaucratic abuse of power
throughout the modern history of Iraq and the Kurdistan region can be found all over the
history of violence in almost all the communities I visited in my 1996 study. This is true
even without accounting for the brutal waves of genocide and displacement that rural
Kurdistan witnessed.
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Examples of such cases are:
Registering vast land of seven counties for a Sheikh family that executed elders in six
out of seven population centers in the Penjwin area to fabricate the documentation of
their alleged possession of the land, with the “consent” of the farming families in a
way that made them eligible to get Tapu issued for them as part of the settlement
process in 1969.
The abolition of the process of settlement, regardless of the capacity of small farmers
to present legitimate documents to support their claims of possession of small land for
generations after 1975, and then getting the same land back as part within a group
redistribution that created unnecessary conflicts over who gets what in otherwise
peaceful communities in Barzinja area.
Redistributing land to individual farming families when the village requested group
distribution because they were accustomed to rotating the possession of the land on
an annual basis to allow access to the best pieces of land to all families for
generations in Qaradagh area.
Punishing community leaders who refused to become informants by redistributing to
everyone except them, also in Qaradagh area.
Never making information available to farming families about changes in laws and
land distribution decisions, despite personnel changes in the bureaucratic
administration in the Pishdar, Bitwen and Dukan areas.

The waves of displacement, and especially the Anfal campaign, made it clear to all
communities in the Kurdistan region that the state was the problem. The entitlements of
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citizenship and rule of law since the Anfal campaign became more unattainable and
irrelevant in land possession disputes than ever before. See the following figure, which
explains how many counties/population centers that I visited in 1996 shared that tragic
experience.

Figure #22: Traumatic Experience of Anfal Campaign or Earlier Waves of Home
Destruction and Forced Migration in the Observed Counties/Population Centers in the 1996 Study
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Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

To add insult to injury, the Iraqi regime allowed farming, but not resettlement, in thirtyseven of the counties/population centers that experienced Anfal and displacement in my
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1996 study sample. In only one of them were field workers allowed to build shelters and
stay after sunset, as shown in the following figure:
Figure #23: Military Restrictions on Access to Land in 1990-1991 Season in the Observed
Counties/Population Centers in the 1996 Study
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Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

All of the newly re-accessed areas were rented, or given without rent, to Kurdish paramilitary leaders who participated in the Anfal campaign. Some of those had prior claims,
legal or otherwise, to the land; others had some kinship relationship to the original
possessors. But other para-military leaders who received land had no prior relationship to
the land or the people who possessed the land prior to the Anfal campaign, as shown in
the following figure:
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Figure #24: Who Controlled the Land in 1990-1991 Season in the
Observed Counties/Population Centers in the 1996 Study?

18
16
16

14
12

Frequency

12
10
10
9
8
6
6

4

2

0

Original Possessors
Para-militant Leaders with History of Claims to the Land
Para-militant Leaders with Kinship Relations to Original Possessors
Para-militant Leaders with No History of Claim to the Land or Relations
to the Original Possessors
Land Was Abandoned that Season
____________________________
Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

As for the original possessors who survived the horrors of the Anfal campaign, some of
them settled for working as crop-sharers, seasonal workers, or sub-renters on their own
lands, while others were denied even that cruelty. See the following figure:

Figure #25: Status of Original Possessors’ Access to Their Land in 1990-1991
Season in the Observed Counties/Population Centers in the 1996 Study
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It is important to note that cultivatable lands in fifteen of the twenty-five
counties/population centers, which the former possessors had no access to, were in
production that season, but by agrarian workers from other areas, mainly registered as
para-militia under the command of the warlords who controlled the area.

The New that Was not New
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True to their own history of thirty years of insurgency, the political parties that formed
the Kurdistan United Front (KUF), when handed most of Kurdistan region in multiple
popular uprisings and a critical switch of alliances by the leaders of the abusive Kurdish
Para-military leaders, kept relying on cash extraction from economic activities, with an
extreme laissez-faire overall attitude that did not question even the looting of public
property, as long as the dominant parties in (KUF) received a “share”, and leaving the
implementation of their own policies to their local patronage relationships.

If the start of the 1990-1991 agrarian season was the height of brutal irony in the way
Anfal victims’ access to the land was determined by the Iraqi regime, then the harvest
was a powerful indicator of how the collapse of central authority and the transfer of
power to (KUF) was not able to produce different dynamics on the ground, except adding
the (KUF) as another contender for a share in the harvest, while allowing multiple levels
of abuse by the Para-militia leaders who rented the lands from central government in the
1990-1991 agrarian season, as shown in the following figure:

Figure #26: Status of Implementation of KUF Orders in 1991 Harvest in the
Observed Counties/Population Centers in the 1996 Study
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If we consider the fact that the last column of figure #13 represents counties that were
abandoned in the 1991 agrarian season, and six out of nine from the column before that
were controlled by the original possessors (as explained in Figure #12), then the picture
of the drastically skewed power relations leading to the 1991 harvest is clear. The abusive
para-military renters had access to all, most, or at least half of the proceeds from 1991
harvest season in thirty out of thirty-seven counties/population centers, received less than
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half in another four counties/population centers, while they were denied all proceeds in
only three counties/population centers.

Another indicator that patronage relationships continued to trump citizenry was the fate
of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development efforts by NGOs. All the NGOs that
agreed to be interviewed acknowledged that they avoided population centers where they
could not get consensus from all involved parties about water rights and land possession
rights during the feasibility assessment stage of any project. This meant that it was a
common practice to ask for written promises from all sides that there would be no
conflict over the use of water or land for a reconstruction, rehabilitation, or development
project. Occasionally, the NGO’s demanded guarantees from either the dominant political
party or local law enforcement.

One organization agreed to show me a sample of promissory documents they collected. It
was written by elders of a village in the Dukan area, confirming that they will pay
customary, but illegal, water fees to a Sheikh family that did not reside in the village, in
return for allowing a sanitation project for the village to go ahead. The document
contained written enforcement guarantees from the local leader of the dominant political
party in the area (PUK), along with the chief of police in Dukan municipality. The
“rights” in question in that document were for a non-excavated, naturally flowing small
river that Iraqi laws allowed no claim of royalty upon.
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Six out of nine NGOs in the study sample reported experiencing conflicts even after
obtaining such promissory notes, and approving funds for projects, as explained in the
following table:

Table #10: Geographical Distribution of Post-fund-Allocation Conflicts and the Fate of Budgeted
Projects as Experienced by the Studied NGOs in Sulaimaniya Province by Summer 1996

Municipality

Center of Sulaimaniya
Halabja
Penjwin
Sharbazher
Dukan
Btwen (Rania)
Pishdar
Total

Projects Experienced Post Fund Allocation Conflicts
Population Centers Where
Population Centers with Renewed, Projects Canceled Due to
but Re-settled Conflicts
Renewed and Unresolved
Conflicts
2
2
1
0
0
5
1
1
7
2
0
1
5
1
16
12
____________________________
Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

Out of the twenty-eight cases of renewed conflicts only one of them was resolved in
accordance with laws and via the court system. In four cases, the NGOs reported making
financial payments to one or more sides to end the conflict (Never more than %1 of total
allocation for the projects). In all the sixteen renewed and resolved conflicts, new
promissory notes were signed with renewed guarantees.

The following detailing the types of projects and accompanying costs lost due to the
community’s inability to resolve conflicts:

Table #11: Type of Projects and Amount of Allocated Funds, which NGOs Withdrew from 12
Communities Due to Renewed Conflicts, as Reported by the Studied NGOs in Sulaimaniya Province by
Summer 1996
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Type of Project

# of Communities Lost

Avg. Allocated Funds per Project

such Project*

(in US Dollars)

Drinking Water Excavation

2

6,000

Drinking Water Pipe Lines

8

10,000

Schools

2

12,000

Housing Construction

6

25,000

*some communities were awarded more than one project.
___________________________
Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

To put these allocated funds in perspective, it is important to note that based on numbers
provided by the surveyed nine NGOs, as of summer of 1996, an average NGO spent
$13,907 per population center served (i.e., close to $37 per person).157

Even that limited amount was subject to much discrimination, based on kinship and the
political relationships of the local staff working in the NGOs, many of whom owed their
employment to the dominant political parties. This golden employment opportunity with
the NGOs, in the severely stagnant economy of the Kurdistan region in the 1990s, was
part of a barter by which political parties provided employment services to their patrons,
and NGOs gained assurances that their projects were not going to be sabotaged. Yet the
result was a reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development effort that was highly skewed
towards the well-connected communities with power structures that were able to suppress
conflicts, as evident from the two following figures:

157

See: Alan Noory, op. cit.; p145.
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Figure #27: Status of NGO Help in Reconstruction and Development of the
Observed Counties/Population Centers in the 1996 Study
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31
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Frequency

22
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0

No Help Was Provided
Some Help Was Provided

____________________________
Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

As of mid-1996, 58.5% of the counties/population centers I visited did not receive any
help in their attempt to rebuild, rehabilitate, or develop their communities. This high
percentage provides a grim picture of the fate of the reconstruction of rural Kurdistan.
Yet, the following data that presents an even worse side of the unregulated reconstruction
process, adds more detail .
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The following figure shows how many NGOs provided services to each
county/population center that did receive help. Tragically, those who received help were
in some cases a mere 10-minute car ride away from those who didn’t.

Figure #28: Frequency of Number of NGO Provided Help in Reconstruction and Development to Each of
the Twenty-two Counties/Population Centers that Acknowledged Receiving Help in the 1996 Study
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Frequency

8

6

4
3
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1
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1

2
3
No. of NGOs Helped

4

____________________________
Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #36.

Land Conflicts as an Extension of Civil War,
Civil War as an Extension of Land Conflicts
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Nowhere was the relationship between the civil war and land conflicts more obvious than
in the seventeen documents I examined from the High Agrarian Committee (HAC) and
its sub-committees in Sulaimaniya Province.

Although the PUK controlled most areas of Sulaimaniya province, along with its public
administration institutions, it could not afford to neglect any security threats emanating
from land conflicts, especially after the lessons it learned from the peasant uprising and
subsequent erosion of its dominance in the Pishdar and Rania areas since 1993.

The PUK used its control over the Sulaimaniya branch of agrarian administration to
activate, but also manipulate the work of, the HAC. The PUK heavily interfered in
HAC’s work. and limited its ability to follow laws and standard procedures in order to
come out with decisions that aimed at suppressing potential violent conflicts without
much adherence to rule of law, broader public interest, or principles of social justices.
Another outcome of this manipulation was the selective use of the HAC to punish
fugitive supporters of KDP who already fled the area,

As the following figure shows, the stated reason for activating the HAC in sixteen out of
seventeen cases was actual or imminent threat of violence. The only case that did not
involve current violence was a case of a person fleeing the local area. He had a history of
violence toward farming families in the area and many unsubstantiated claims of land
ownership. When he fled to a KDP-controlled territory (for other reasons, not involving
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land tenure), the agrarian committee gratuitously awarded the land he had claimed to the
farming families in the area, a very atypical sequence for such committees.

Figure #29: Reasons for Sulaimaniya’s High Agrarian Committee Intervention,
As Explained in the (17) Studied Files 1995-1996
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Sides appealed to Prevent Armed Conflict
Armed Conflict
Threat of Violence and Forced Migration
Political Reprisal Against Fleeing Participants in Civil War

____________________________
Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #35.

With the help of Mr. Bakhtiyar Baban, an active member of the HAC at the time, I was
able to decode the bureaucratic language of the documents in order to present the
following description of the parties involved in the conflicts and the actual incidents that
prompted the activation of the HAC, as shown in the following figure:

Figure #30: Sides of the Conflicts in the (17) Studied Documents of
Sulaimaniya’s High Agrarian Committee 1995-1996*
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1
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Owners Encroaching on Public Land vs. Peasants
Individuals Claiming Possession Rights vs. Peasants
Pre-reform Owners vs. Peasants
Tribal Encroachers vs. Peasants
Owners and Peasants Encroaching on Public Land
Peasants Encroaching on Owners’ Land
Former Agrarian Committee vs. Peasants

*Some cases had multiple conflicts, sides and incidents
___________________________
Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #35.

In fifteen of the seventeen cases, large state-owned lands were encroached upon. In eight
cases, the lands became state-owned as a result of the building of the Dukan Dam. This
led to the prohibition of agricultural activities on the banks of Lake Dukan, to protect its
health as well as the viability of Dukan’s hydroelectric power plant, which supplied most
of the province with its electric needs.
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Most of the cases were clear, in terms of laws and broader public interest. Given that, had
the HAC operated within the boundaries of laws and standard procedures, the cases
would have been decided in a much different way than they were. In my examination of
the documents, I identified twenty-five decisions by the HAC that could be characterized
as unsupported by then-current laws. A summary of the type of those decisions is
illustrated in the following figure:

Figure #31: Types of Illegal Decision Made by Sulaimaniya’s High Agrarian Committee or
Established in the Documents related to Its Work in the (17) Studied Documents 1995-1996
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14
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Frequency

10

8
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4
4

2
2

0

Establishing rent contracts on public land without following rules and regulations
Establishing or confirming abusive rent relations between owners and peasants
Rewarding violent encroachers with possession rights
Replacing established laws with abusive traditions

____________________________
Source: Alan Noory, op. cit.; Table #35.
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An examination of the membership structure of the sub-committees, which are normally
composed of agrarian officials along with observers from the concerned parties, provides
the answer to how the functioning of those committees was altered. In all the thirteen
sub-committees whose meeting minutes I examined, the supposed observers were full
members with voting rights. PUK local leadership personnel were deciding members in
five of those committees.
In four of them, the agrarian officials were outnumbered by those who were not supposed
to vote in the first place.

The following is a deleted account of what six of the documents revealed, as an example
to provide support for the statistics provided above:

Example (1)
Minutes of an Agrarian Sub-Committee Meeting
Date: 11/22/1995
County #: 16: Basira – Chinaran
Municipality: Dukan
Reason(s) for Committee: Armed Conflict, Continuous Armed StandLootings, Crop Destruction since end of 1991

Offs, Homicide,

Sides of Conflict:
• Religious Sheikh Family: Registered agrarian land in the county in their names, were
subjected to land reforms, and were left with the legal maximum. Continued to take
rent not only from their maximum legal lands, but also from the banks of Lake
Dukan, rocky lands, and grazing lands (all state-owned), up until 1992.
• Farming Families: Some of them possess legal rights documents from the Ottoman
era, and were never able to register the land in their name during settlements due to
the influence of the Sheikh family.
Type(s) of Disputed Land:
• Delegated by Tabu to the Sheikh Family: 1976 Dunums of rain-irrigated land, and 58
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•

Dunums of surface water irrigated land (only 5 Dunums meet the description, and the
rest were registered as such to obtain tobacco permits to re-sell in the black market).
State-owned: 41 Dunums of rain-irrigated, and 1700 Dumums of lake banks that are
designated as “submerged’ to protect the Dukan dam and power plant.

Committee’s Decisions:
• Nullified possession rights of farming families on 1329 Dunums, and set them aside
for the Sheikhs family to “accommodate their natural expansion”, while distributing
180 Dunums of the state-owned submerged land and all the 41 Dunums of rainirrigated land to the same family to accommodate the same earlier mentioned natural
expansion.
• Distributed the remaining “submerged” land to the farming families with no
stipulations to ensure the safety of the dam and the electric plant.
• Obligated farming families possessing the surface-irrigated lands to pay 1,000 Iraqi
Dinars per Dunum as rent, regardless of chances of crop failure or market price
(incompatible with Iraqi Laws).
• Obligated farming families possessing the rest of the Sheikhs’ Tabu-owned land to
pay higher percentage of crop than legal requirement

Example (2)
Minutes of an Agrarian Sub-Committee Meeting
Committee assembled with a request from the dominant political party and infused with
the political party’s representative.
Date: 5/21-23/1995 (This is the 4th committee to address the problem with assumed legal
power to enforce its decisions)
County #: 16: Klkan - Khalakan
Municipality: Dukan
Reason(s) for Committee: Armed Conflict, Continuous Armed Stand-Offs since 1992,
and a mass voluntary evacuation of farming families from the entire village in protest in
December 1995.
Sides of Conflict:
Sheikh Family: from a famous Sufi order, relatives to the Secretary General of the
dominant political party. Owners who refused to accept compensation for their
“submerged” lands. Subject to land reform, claim that farming families gave up all
possession rights when they abandoned the village before the forced displacement
campaign of 1976.
Farming Families: claim to have been forced to abandon their homes and crops under
constant raids and destruction of their crops by the Sheikh family. Forced their return
after 1991 and took over the Sheikhs’ lands and other state-owned arable and rocky land.
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Type(s) of Disputed Land:
Delegated by Tabu to the Sheikhs’ Family: 500 Dunums of rain-irrigated land, and
207 Dunums of surface water irrigated land
• State-owned: 50 Dunums of rain-irrigated land, and 631 Dumums of lake banks that
are designated as “submerged’ to protect the Dukan dam and power plant.
•

Committee’s Decisions:
• Nullified possession rights of farming families on 350 Dunums and set them aside for
the Sheikhs family to accommodate their expansion, while distributing 200 Dunums
of the state-owned submerged land to the same family without fulfilling eligibility
requirements.
• Distributed the remaining “submerged” to the farming families with no stipulations to
insure the safety of the dam and the electric plant.
• Rejecting the Sheikhs claim to rent for a natural spring used for irrigation, but
obligated farming families possessing the rest of the Sheikhs’ Tabu-owned land to
pay higher percentage of crop than legal requirement.

Example (3)
Minutes of an Agrarian Sub-Committee Meeting
Committee assembled with a request from the dominant political party. (second to an
earlier committee in October 1994, that was rejected by the Aghas’ side of the conflict)
Date: 5/28/1995
County #: 71: Hizobi Gawra
Municipality: Rania
Reason(s) for Committee: to end wide scale illegal practices
Sides of Conflict:
• Agha Family: claim ownership of the land that was ruled state-owned since 1975 for
lack of documents proving their ownership.
• Farming Families that have been farming as informal tenants of the Agha family
because they never got the land distributed to them, as a result of the political
influence of the Agha family with the Iraqi authorities. Now the Agha family wants
them out of the land.
Type(s) of Disputed Land:
• State-owned: 1850 Dunums of rain-irrigated land and 5000 Dumums of grazing land.
Committee’s Decisions:
• Nullified an earlier committee’s decision to allow the Agha family to decide who
among the farming families should get the land distributed to them. This earlier
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•

•

committee was heavily influenced by the dominant political party’s attempt to
persuade the Agha family to switch their political loyalty from the opposing party to
them.
Established rules to start distribution of 25 Dunums per family to farming families
that have continuously been living in the village for the past 15 years. This
distribution rate led to the designation of some grazing land for the purpose of
farming without legal procedures to change the type of land accordingly.
Obligated the Agha family to pay rent for their use of the county land in the past year.

Example (4)
Minutes of an Agrarian Sub-Committee Meeting
Committee assembled with a request from the dominant political party and infused with 3
representatives of the party’s leadership and one local party representative. 3 members of
a militant tribal structure were also assigned full membership in this committee.
Date: 6/5/1995
County #: 22: Sarkapkan
Municipality: Rania
Reason(s) for Committee: Tribal invasion that forced all possession right holders and
land reform contractors out of the area and prevented them from rebuilding the village of
Sarkapkan.
Sides of Conflict:
Militant Tribal Organization, with an abusive history.
Absent Owners: city dwellers and merchants.
Two Agricultural Entrepreneurs with contracts.
Farming Families with contracts with land reform authorities.
Type(s) of Disputed Land:
Delegated by Tabu to Absent Owners: 300 Dunums of rain-irrigated land and turned
to irrigated by excavated-to-surfaces (kahriz) water and an irrigation system of 5
wells.
• State-owned: 100 Dunums of rain-irrigated land, turned to irrigated by excavated
water and irrigation systems put in place by two contracting agricultural
entrepreneurs, and 800 Dunums of rain-irrigated land distributed farming families
with contracts.
•

Committee’s Decisions:
Established an investigation committee to revoke contracts from farming families that
no longer qualify for said contracts, and set aside their land for the invading tribal
structure to decide who within the tribe should get the land, regardless of them

•
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•
•
•

meeting guidelines for contracts or not.
Called for the return of the two agricultural entrepreneurs to their contracted land.
Launched an investigation about one of the absent owners being a fugitive, to put his
land under the custody of the dominant political party.
Delegated a member of the committee who was also a member of the leadership
council of the dominant party to contact the remaining absent owners to persuade
them to sell their land to members of the invading tribe.

Example (5)
Minutes of an Agrarian Sub-Committee Meeting
Date: 10/02/1995
County #: 20: Kharak Resa – Bingrd
Municipality: Dukan
Reason(s) for Committee: Threats of an armed conflict.
Sides of Conflict:
• Former Owners; received compensation for their submerged land in 1971, but kept
controlling it because of the status of one of their members with the Iraqi
government-backed para-military.
• Farming Families: from the submerged old village of Kharak Resa and 3 surrounding
villages.
Type(s) of Disputed Land:
State-owned: 1100 Dunums of arable land registered as “submerged” to protect the
Dukan Dam and its electric plant.

•

Committee’s Decisions:
Distributed the “submerged” land to all parties in blocks to separate between them
with irregular units of distribution, in order to take in account the actual possessions
of the disputing parties.

•

Example (6)
Settlement (Produced in conclusion of the work of an agrarian sub-committee)
Signed by representatives of the farming families, witnessed and guarantied by the
administrator of Pishdar municipality and the head of the local steering committee of the
dominant political party.
Date: 12/28/1995
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County: Garmkan - Bingrd
Municipality: Dukan
Reason(s) for Committee: Armed Conflict resulted in killing 9 persons, burning houses
and property and the forced displacement of an Agha family in 1993.
Sides of Conflict:
Agha Family: owners of most of the arable land in the area according to settlement ruling
despite the fact that they never presented documents supporting their claim. Did not allow
for peaceful return of the farming families after 1991.
Farming Families: some of them possess documents from the Ottoman era supporting
their claim to the land but were never able to reach the courts because of the influence of
the Agha family. 55 of the farming families had contracts on state-owned land but never
were able to access their land since the 1970s. Forced their return in 1993 by displacing
the Aga family.
Type(s) of Disputed Land:
Delegated by Tabu to the Agha Family: 1300 Dunums of rain-irrigated land.
State-owned (as a result of land reforms): 110 Dunums of rain-irrigated land, and 220
Dumums of surface water-irrigated land.

•
•

Settlement Summery:
Farming families promised to pay higher than legal rates rent (in form of a percentage
of the crop at harvest) to the dominant political party, which in turn pays a sum of
120,000 dinar to the Agha family for one harvest season of 1996.
• The sides will re-negotiate a permanent, peaceful solution at the end of this contract.
•
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Chapter Five:

By the Numbers:
A Statistical Model to Predict Chances of Outbreaks of Violence in
Local Agrarian Land Tenure Conflicts
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To examine the applicability of the knowledge gained from the 1996 field study, beyond
the counties/population centers visited, and beyond the land tenures conflict incidents
captured in the study, a model to predict the chances of violent local conflicts over land
tenure is in order.

Hypothesis

In this model I hypothesize that, given a political climate that allows access to competing
political structures with violent history, via kinship and patronage relationships, the
tendency of local land tenure conflicts to have violent outcomes is dependent upon the
history of their earlier conflicts, their position in the conflict, the legitimacy of historic
claims on one hand, and the rate of reconstruction and flow of capital for reconstruction
on the other hand.

General overview of the variables

The following table is a description of the variables that are used in the model:

Variable
(As Appears in
Dataset)
vil_n

Table #12: Variables and their description in the dataset
Full Name
Description

anf_st

Village/County/Popu
lation Center’s Name
Anfal Status

Pop_pre_anf

Population Prior to

Name of the Village
Was the village destroyed in the Anfal campaign or not?
0 = not destroyed
1= destroyed
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rcn_rt

Anfal Campaign
Reconstruction Rate

ngo_hlp

NGO Help

dcp_la_lslo

Discrepancy
Between Local
Understanding Legal
Status of Land
Tenure

conf_hst

Conflict History

conf_9195

Conflicts 1991-1995

con_sd_ra

Conflict Sides
Reoccurring-

Reconstruction rate (measured by percent family units
reconstructed to family units before destruction)
Was help provided by international NGOs in resettlement?
0 = no
1 = Yes
Discrepancy between local understanding and legal status of
land ownership and possession. (Discrepancies that did not alter
the fundamentals of tenure structure were coded as “minor” and
those that did were coded as “major”) :
0 = no record of discrepancy
1 = minor discrepancies
2 = major discrepancies
Pre 1991 Conflict History (Conflicts between sides with legal
standings in tenure relationships were coded as “between
legitimate sides” and when one or more sides of the conflict did
not have any legal standing, then the conflict was coded as one
“with claimers of ownership”:
0 = none
1 = Conflicts between legitimate sides
2 = Conflicts with claimers of ownership
Conflicts after 1991:
0 = none
1 = Conflicts with no violence
2 = Violent conflicts, including those resulting in homicide and
forced migration
Are conflict sides the same as before 1990?
0 = no conflict
1 = Yes
2 = Not the same

To translate the hypothesis to the vocabulary of the dataset, the model will test the
following:
Pr (Conflicts 1991-1995) = F {(Reconstruction Rate), (NGO Help), (Discrepancy
between Local Understanding and Legal Status of Land Tenure), (Conflict History),
(Conflict Sides Reoccurring)}

Ordinal Logistic Regression Model:
Best Possible Functional Form?
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The question of the best functional form is one of finding a mathematical model that can
best represent the dataset that we have. Our choice of simple vs. complicated functional
forms is constrained by the nature of the variables and by the limitations imposed by both
the research environment and our own research design.

In the case of my 1996 research dataset, and since the dependent variable (DV) is a
categorical (values 0, 1, and 2 represent categories), and not a continuous variable (an
interval or ratio scale), then a simple linear regression model, known as Ordinary Lest
Squares (OLS), is out of the question. An OLS model assumes the DV to be a continuous
variable, and therefore, provides results that cannot be interpreted in terms of category.
An OLS model also assumes a linear relationship between the independent variables
(IVs) and the DV, which is a relationship that cannot be assumed in the case of my
dataset.

Based on the nature of the data collected and quantified, a logistic model would be more
fitting to the data. It does away with the linear relationship assumption between the DV
and the IVs. It also is capable of recognizing the categorical nature of the DV.

Since the DV is an ordinal categorical variable, based on the assumption that my ordering
of the data is the only possible order that the variable could take, and since there is a
significant theoretical importance of potential for? elevating options from no conflict to
peaceful conflict and from a peaceful conflict to a violent one, I suggest that an Ordinal
Logistic Regression (OLR) Model would be more suitable than a Multinomial Logistic
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Regression (MLR) Model for this dataset. MLR assumes that there is no a unique
objectively recognizable order between the categories of the DV.

Another reason for preferring OLR over MLR is the advantage OLR gives by comparing
the odds of each level of outcome of the Dependent Variable to all the other levels, and
not just to one base level, as in MLR.

And specifically for this dataset, an MLR would show a perfect prediction problem in 4
out of 5 of the independent variables in the level of comparing (Conflicts 1991-1995 ==
0) to (Conflicts 1991-1995 ==2), and that puts in question the standard error estimates
and therefore, the capability of the model to produce better predictions than flipping a
coin. The OLR model, as shown later, avoids that problem, and therefore would be a
better choice than MLR, especially if it makes better theoretical sense.

Limits of the Dataset, Limits of the Ordinal Logistic Model

Although an OLR model makes theoretical sense for my dataset, it poses significant
statistical challenges. Chief among them is the size of the observations in the dataset. For
a logistic model to make statistically significant predictions, it requires far more
observations than the 53 that I have in my dataset. This is a common and usually
neglected problem of statistical models in social science literature.
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I remedy this problem by multiplying every entry in the dataset by the number of
households residing in each county/population center prior to the Anfal campaign or
earlier waves of forced migration.

My justification for this inflation of the data, other than the obvious statistical need, is
that the size of the population center plays a significant role in the direction conflicts
take. On one hand, smaller communities have fewer resources to escalate conflicts to
violent outcomes. On the other hand, they are more isolated and easier to victimize.
Therefore, this procedure will increase the size of the dataset without significantly
altering the outcomes of the dataset in one direction or anther. A comparison between the
pre and post inflation tables of the statistical summaries of the variables will help make
this point clear:
Table #13: Statistic summaries of the variables
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Median
Anfal Status
53
.89
.32
1
Reconstruction Rate
53
41.7
40.3
30
NGO Help
53
.41
.50
0
Discrepancy between Local
53
1.7
.6
2
Understanding and Legal Status of
Land Tenure
Conflict History
53
1.35
.6
1
Conflicts 1991-1995
53
1.47
.84
2
Conflict Sides Reoccurring
53
.88
.57
1

Min
0
0
0
0

Max
1
100
1
2

0
0
0

2
2
2

Table #14: Statistic summaries of the variables × Number of
Households in Each County/Population center, Prior to Displacement
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Median
Anfal Status
9700
.90
.30
1
Reconstruction Rate
9700
46.91
40.82
45
NGO Help
9700
.33
.47
0
Discrepancy between Local
9700
1.5
.74
2
Understanding and Legal Status of
Land Tenure
Conflict History
9700
1.26
.55
1
Conflicts 1991-1995
9700
1.62
.71
2

Min
0
0
0
0

Max
1
100
1
2

0
0

2
2
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Conflict Sides Reoccurring

9700

1.14

.63

1

0

2

What we can conclude from comparing the Mean column in tables (10a) and (10b) is the
following:
•

Reconstruction is slightly skewed towards larger communities, yet NGO help is
significantly skewed towards smaller communities, because projects in those
communities are more manageable.

•

Discrepancy between local understanding and legal status of land tenure is slightly
skewed towards major discrepancies in smaller communities. The same goes for
conflict history, which is slightly skewed towards conflicts with claimers of
ownership in smaller communities.

•

New (1991-1995) conflicts are slightly skewed towards more violent outcomes in
larger communities, and that can be explained by the next observation, which
suggests that the new conflicts in larger communities are skewed towards one or more
parties being new contenders.

•

All this, while the number of observations of the dataset has grown more than 183
times bigger.

Another area of concern is an ORL models limitation, known as the Parallel Regression
Assumption. This means that an ordinal regression assumes that one coefficient per IV
can explain the model’s behavior throughout the different levels of the DV. That means,
in my model’s case, that the coefficient for all and any of the IVs should be the same (or
not sizably different) for each ordered level of the DV, and the difference between the
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levels should be primarily explained by the constant. My dataset violates the parallel
regression assumption.

Violation of the parallel regression assumption, although common, is an indication of a
serious model specification or data collection problem. However, it is common in social
sciences literature to accept this violation rather than resorting to a less complicated OLS
model for datasets with ordered DVs, because OLS model problems would be much more
serious than ORL.158

A better alternative is to choose more complicated models that relax the parallel
regression requirements, such as multi-level models like Generalized Linear Latent and
Mixed Model (GLLAMM). Theoretically, the choice of multi-level models would
provide a powerful dimension to my model by allowing for the recognition and
incorporation of the subtle differences between regions in terms of the history of conflicts
and the socio-political relationships between the parties involved in those conflicts. For
example, in many villages in Qaradakh, Hawraman or Sharbazher areas, farming families
voluntarily allowed registering land in the name of leaders of Sufi orders during the
Ottoman Empire times to avoid cumbersome taxation and the military draft. This meant
conflict-history-wise, that a Sheikh had to be very powerful politically to assert so-called
ownership over traditionally recognized peasants’ rights to the land they used to own just
few generations ago.

158

See: Scott Long and Jeremy Freese. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using
STATA (Second Revised Edition), TX: STATA Press, 2003, p. 168.
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In areas where the owners or claimers of ownership are tribal leaders, the tribal identity
of their peasants makes a significant difference in terms of how conflicts developed and
escalated. Many peasants in Sharazoor are from the same semi-nomadic tribe as the
owners. That allowed tribal institutions to suppress conflicts in a way that was not
possible for other peasants from Pishdar and Bitwen areas, where tribal “owners” had
invaded generations earlier and had subsequently treated the peasants as spoils of war.

Despite the obvious benefits of a multi-level model that addresses these regional
differences, it required capturing certain information that was not in the original design of
the research and therefore was not done systematically.

As a result, and given the limitations of the dataset, I consider an OLR to be the best
feasible model.

Presentation of the Model and Its Predictions

The following is the outcome of running the Ordinal Logit regression for the model:

Table #15: Ordinal logit Estimates of the Model, and
Odds Ratio Method of Interpretation
Dependent Variable: Conflicts 1991-1995
b & SE
e^b
Anfal Status
4.12*
61.80
(.19)
Reconstruction Rate
-.020*
.98
(.002)
NGO Help
-3.11*
.04
(.136)
Discrepancy between Local Understanding
-1.07*
.34
and Legal Status of Land Tenure
(.91)
Conflict History
1.47*
4.35

e^bstdX
3.42
.43
.23
.45
2.26
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Conflict Sides Reoccurring
_cut1
_cut2
Standard Error in Parentheses
* is significant at .1%
Number of Obs: 9700
LR chi2(5) = 10287.33
Prob > Chi2 =0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.7294
Log Likelihood = -1908.65

(.87)
5.24*
188.2
26.8
(.14)
1.32*
(.27)
5.11*
(.3)
e^b = exp(b) = factor change in odds for
unit increase in X.
e^bstdX = exp(b*SD of X) = change in
odds for SD increase in X.

The LR Chi², which tests the statistical significance of the model as a whole against the
constant, and the value of the Pseudo R², both point to the significance of the health of
the model in general.

The regression results’ sign for each individual IV represents the negative or positive
relationship between the direction of change in each IV and the direction of change in the
DV (when holding everything else constant, including the other IVs). The model
regression results suggest that changing from no traumatic forced migration to
experiencing such trauma tends to lead to escalated conflicts towards violent outcomes,
while the (-) sign of the coefficient for the Reconstruction Rate variable suggests that
higher levels of reconstruction and rehabilitation tend to decrease the chances of violent
outcomes. The same can be said about the level of involvement of NGOs in the
reconstruction and the rehabilitation process.

The coefficient sign for the (Discrepancy between Local Understanding
and Legal Status of Land Tenure) variable is challenging and interesting at the same
180

time. It suggests that the chances of violent outcomes of conflicts are less with major
discrepancies than with minor ones. If the discrepancies were the result of lack of
information, then the suppressed tendency towards violent outcomes could be interpreted
as a matter of overwhelming imbalance of power that sustained dominance of the
beneficiary side in the conflict. In the cases of discrepancies being driven by dispersed
illegal tenure of public land by all sides of conflict, this is also a logical suppressant of
violent outcomes of conflicts.

The coefficient sign for the (Conflict History) variable suggests more tendencies
towards violent recent (1991-1995) conflicts in communities with such history, compared
to communities with no conflict history, and even more tendency towards violence in
recent conflicts when one or more sides of the history of conflicts had no legal claim to
tenure.

The positive sign of the coefficient for (Conflict Sides Reoccurring) suggests a tendency
towards more violent outcomes with new sides entering the land tenure conflicts.

In conclusion, the coefficient signs for all the variables are consistent with theoretical
expectations.

Because of the nature of the OLR model, the values of the coefficients, that are all
statistically significant at the high confident level of (0.1%), could not be interpreted the
same way as the coefficients in an OLS regression model. The linear association is not
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between relative change in the values of the IVs and relative change in the values of the
DV, but rather between relative changes in the values of the IVs and relative change in
the log of the DV.

To get more intuitive interpretation of the effect of change in each IV on change in the
DV (in a controlled environment where everything else is held constant, including the
other IVs), I use both (e^b) and (e^bstdX) indicators. The (e^b) column measures factor
changes in the odds of violent escalation of conflicts with unit changes in each of the IVs.
This means that the odds of violent outcomes in land tenure conflicts increase 61.8 times
in communities with traumatic experience of mass displacement when compared with
communities with no such experience (always, while holding everything else constant).

For (Reconstruction Rate) the regression model suggests that the odds of having violent
outcomes in land tenure conflicts are 0.98 times smaller with every unit increase of
reconstruction rate in the communities with conflicts. Similarly, the odds for violent
outcomes in land tenure conflicts are 0.04 times smaller in communities that received
NGOs help with reconstruction and rehabilitation of their villages/population centers.

The model also suggests that when there are major discrepancies between local
understanding and the legal status of land tenure in their communities, the odds of violent
outcomes in their land tenure conflicts are 0.34 times less than in communities with few
discrepancies. This is an eye-opening measure of the level of contempt for the prevailing
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laws in communities with as clear as possible an understanding of the legal status of their
land tenure conflicts.

According to the model, the odds of violent outcomes increase 4.35 times in communities
with a history of conflicts where one or more party’s claim to possession and ownership
is not recognized by law, vs. those where conflicts were mainly between legitimate
parties. This is not contradicting the earlier suggestion by the model that major
discrepancies between local understanding and legal structure lead to lower odds of
violent outcomes. This is because most of the claimers of ownership resided outside the
communities, and more times than not, the communities knew that their claims were not
based on any legal documentation.

Lastly, the model suggests a huge increase, of 188.2 times, in odds of violent outcomes
when one or more parties in the new conflicts have no history of claims of tenure, vs. the
conflicts where the parties are the same or generational extensions of the sides of earlier
conflicts.

The (e^bstdX) column measures the effect of unit changes in every IV on the odds of
change in the standard deviation of the DV.

The _cut1 and _cut2 data are representing the cut points in an assumed, single, latent,
continuous variable that is at the background of our ordinal 3 level dependent variable in
the model. Each of the cut points is a point on the continuous curve of the assumed latent
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variable that, beyond it, the political choice moves from one level to another. In other
words; they represent the points beyond which political choice of no conflict changes to
conflict (in case of _cut1) and non-violent conflict to violent conflict (in case of _cut2).

The OLR models provide powerful ways to present the predictions of the model beyond
the coefficients, and their interpretations. One such tool is the following dotplot, which
allows a visual presentation of where the predicted chances of observing each level of
Conflict (1991-1995) fall, percentage wise:
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Figure #32: Dotplot of the Predictions of the Model
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As shown above, holding the environment that the model works in constant, we can see
that the most of predicted chances for No Conflicts (NC) is clustered at 0%, and the range
of most predicted Conflicts with No Violence (CNV) is in the 0-20%, while most of the
predicted Violent Conflicts (VC) is in the range of 90-100% chance.

We can also calculate predicted probabilities for violent or non-violent conflicts,
assuming the interaction between different levels of multiple independent variables
(holding all other variables at their medium value). For example, the following table
shows the predicted probabilities for both violent and non-violent conflicts assuming the
interaction of different levels of Conflict History, Conflict Sides Reoccurring, and the
Discrepancy between local Understanding and Legal Status of Land Tenure.

Conflict With Claimers
of Ownership

Conflict Between
Legitimate Sides

No Discrepancy .0342
Minor
.0934
Discrepancies
Major
.2292
Discrepancies
Predicted Probability of (Violent Conflict)
No Discrepancy .9650
Minor
.9042
Discrepancies
Major
.7639
Discrepancies

Conflict With Claimers
of Ownership

Conflict Between
Legitimate Sides

Discrepancy between Local
Understanding
and Legal Status of Land
Tenure

Table #16: Predicted Probabilities of Violent and Non-violent Conflicts Based on Sets of 3 Criteria
Predicted Probability of (Conflict With No Violence)
Conflict Sides Reoccurring
Post 1991 Conflicts Are Between the Same
Post 1991 Conflicts Are With
Sides of Previous Conflict
One or More New Sides

.0081

.0002

.0000

.0232

.0005

.0001

.0647

.0016

.0004

.9917

.9998

1.0000

.9763

.9994

.9999

.9337

.9984

.9996
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As one can see from the table, for example, in a village with prior history of conflicts
between legitimate parties, along with major discrepancies between local understanding
and legal status of land tenure, and when the same parties, or their generational
extensions show up in a new conflict, then the predicted chance of a violent outcome for
their new conflict is 76.39%. Inject a new contender with no history of tenure claims, and
the chance of violent outcome jumps to 99.84%.

Similarly, the model predicts that if a rural community has a keen understanding of the
legal status of its land tenure, and had been in conflict with claimers of ownership, prior
to 1991, it is 99.17% likely to have a violent conflict if the same claimers or their
generational extensions showed up. And if a new party with no history of claims asserted
any claims to the land, the rural community will definitely resort to violence to fend-off
the new comer.

The model is capable of generating predictions about new conflicts with any set of
criteria using all the IVs. Here are some examples:

For a county/population center, where all the IVs are held at their mean (or the closest
value that is valid theoretically) new conflict predictions are as follows:
Table #17-a: Model Predictions for Conflicts and Their Outcomes with A Pre-set Criteria
Model Predictions
% Chance
95% Confidence Interval
Predicted (No Conflict)
0.017
(0.0011 – 0.0023)
Predicted (Conflict with No Violence)
6.74
(0.0513 – 0.0835)
Predicted (Violent Conflict)
93.09
(0.9144 – 0.9475)
Assumptions:
Anfal Status: Destroyed
Reconstruction Rate: 47%
NGO Help: None
Discrepancy between Local Understanding and Legal Status of Tenure: Major
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Conflict History: Between Legitimate Sides
Conflict Sides Reoccurring: Same Sides

Now if we change criteria for traumatic mass displacement, then the model’s predictions
are as following:
Table #17-b: Model Predictions for Conflicts and Their Outcomes with A Pre-set Criteria
Model Predictions
% Chance
95% Confidence Interval
Predicted (No Conflict)
23.76
(0.1834 - .2917)
Predicted (Conflict with No Violence)
69.48
(0.6499 – 0.7397)
Predicted (Violent Conflict)
0.6
(0.0507 – 0.0845)
Assumptions:
Anfal Status: Not Destroyed
Reconstruction Rate: 100%
NGO Help: None
Discrepancy between Local Understanding and Legal Status of Tenure: Major
Conflict History: Between Legitimate Sides
Conflict Sides Reoccurring: Same Sides

A comparison between the two tables illustrates the profound consequences of traumatic
mass displacement on societal peace decades later.

Here is another interesting example of predictions for a population center that was
destroyed in the Anfal campaign, was not reconstructed, received no help, had major
discrepancies, and had a history of conflict with claimers of tenure with no legal standing,
when the same claimers or their generational extension return:
Table #17-c: Model Predictions for Conflicts and Their Outcomes with A Pre-set Criteria
Model Predictions
% Chance
95% Confidence Interval
Predicted (No Conflict)
0.001
(0.0001 – 0.0002)
Predicted (Conflict with No Violence)
0.062
(0.0041 – 0.0084)
Predicted (Violent Conflict)
99.36
(0.9914 – 0.9958)
Assumptions:
Anfal Status: Destroyed
Reconstruction Rate: 0%
NGO Help: None
Discrepancy between Local Understanding and Legal Status of Tenure: Major
Conflict History: Claimers with No Legal Standing
Conflict Sides Reoccurring: Same Sides

Now let’s compare that with predictions for another population center with the same
unfortunate Anfal experience, yet a high rate of reconstruction that was assisted by
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NGOs, had minor discrepancies, a history of conflicts between legitimate sides, when the
same sides return:
Table #17-d: Model Predictions for Conflicts and Their Outcomes with A Pre-set Criteria
Model Predictions
% Chance
95% Confidence Interval
Predicted (No Conflict)
0.25
(0.0180 – 0.0321)
Predicted (Conflict with No Violence)
50.69
(0.4608 – 0.5531)
Predicted (Violent Conflict)
46.80
(0.4181 – 0.5179)
Assumptions:
Anfal Status: Destroyed
Reconstruction Rate: 80%
NGO Help: Yes
Discrepancy between Local Understanding and Legal Status of Tenure: Minor
Conflict History: Between Legitimate Sides
Conflict Sides Reoccurring: Same Sides

Although conflicts in both cases are almost inevitable, chances of violent outcomes for
the conflicts were reduced to less than half with the new criteria. These results point to
the significance of the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in the reduction of chances
of violent outcomes.

Nevertheless, to present the full picture of the effect of reconstruction and rehabilitation
on chances for violent outcomes, we can plot predictions for no conflict as the rate of
reconstruction changes from 0 to 100% for 2 different criteria; one with the same sides of
historic conflicts reclaiming possession, and the other with new sides, with no history of
claims to tenure entering the picture.:

Figure # 33: Changes of chances of No Conflict as Rate of Construction Changes for 2 different criteria of
Sides Reoccurring
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The graph is making a very interesting statement about how those 2 criteria are behaving
differently: As reconstruction rates get higher the chance of no conflict increases when
there are no new contenders. That is because the sides from earlier conflicts rush to claim
rights to land before any reconstructions take place. Therefore, as communities are rebuilt
the tendency for conflicts goes down. But when new contenders with no tenure history
are the ones rebuilding and constructing, the more they build, the more they threaten
established claims of the others. It is then logical to assume fewer chances for conflict as
reconstruction rate gets higher.
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Chapter Six:

A Political System Boxed into A single-Identity Representation:
Post-2003 New Iraq Fights the Demons of the Past and Creates New Ones!
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Iraq’s Lost Decades and Their effect on Conflicts over Possession of Assets,
Especially Real Estate:

Since the Iraq-Iran war, the value of Iraq’s national currency, the Dinar, has dropped
precipitously against the American Dollar. Yet, no official statistics are available to track
this fall from grace. Most of currency exchange activities in Iraq, prior to 2003, occurred
in a market parallel to the fixed exchange rate established by the state. But Isam AlKhafaji, an Iraq scholar, tracked the black market exchange rate by comparing his own
sources with third party and journalistic reports. The data in the following table, up to
2003, is the result of his. From 2003 onward, Iraq’s Central Bank provides regular data
on the exchange rate:

Table #18: Changes in the Value of US $ in Iraqi Dinars 1979-2011
Date
1979
1987
Oct. 1989
Jan. 1992
March 1992
Jan. 1994
March 1995
Jan. 1996
Dec. 1998
Feb. 1999
Dec. 1999
Dec. 2001
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Jan. 2010
Nov. 2010
Jan. 2011

Value of One $
in Iraqi Dinars
.312
2.8
3.22
13.15
17.5
140
1,200
2,950
1,850
1,790
1,550
1,850
1,936
1,453
1,472
1,475
1,267
1,203
1,182
1,185
1,195
1,190
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May 2011
1,200
July 2011
1,195
______________________________________
Sources:1979-2001: Tariq Ismael and William Haddad, eds. Iraq: The Human Cost of History.
Sterling, VA: Pluto Press. 2004. p. 246.
2003-2011: http://www.cbi.iq/index.php?pid=Statistics

As the table illustrates, by 1996, the Iraqi Dinar’s value (measured by US $) plunged to
(1/9454) of its value only 17 years earlier. Despite its gradual ascendance since, it is still,
as of July 2011, only (1/3829) of its value in 1979. Therefore, for the past thirty years, the
Iraqi Dinar has largely lost its function as a store of value while remained the legal
medium of exchange.

Considering the above, and the severe economic limitations imposed by the embargo
since 1991, and the wage and income stagnation caused by the cost of wars and their
consciences, most former middle income families in Iraq started liquidating assets and
personal possessions all the way to the furniture in their homes. The need for asset
liquidation by the newly and rapidly impoverished was met by the need for real estate as
a storage of value for the few who monopolized the new forms of economic activity that
flourished as a direct result of the international embargo on Iraq since 1990, mainly
smuggling oil outside Iraq, importing fast consumption items such as food and tobacco,
re-exporting tobacco and alcohol to Iran, along with newly introduced international call
centers in the areas of Kurdistan region that were freed from Saddam’s direct control
since 1991.

A significant impediment to this liquidation and acquisition of real estate, was, and is
still, a legal infrastructure that protected renters against any raise of rent even as a result
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of changes of ownership. Iraqi laws, established during the 1970s when the purchasing
power of the Iraqi Dinar was much more stable, do not allow the eviction of the renter or
any change in the original rent agreement during such transaction without the consent of
renter in any residential, agricultural or commercial real estate property.

In fact, although illegal, it is customary for renters with rent agreements as far back as the
1970s to sell those fixed rent agreements to new occupants of commercial buildings. It is
also customary for owners of commercial real estate to charge, otherwise illegal, lump
sum money upfront in addition to monthly rent called (Sarqufliya) that is in average close
to 10-20% of the market value of the rented property. The renter then can go around and
sell the rent agreement for another Sarqufliya, and so forth.

In agriculture, even though the law recognizes only crop-sharing agreements, and not
monitory rents. The reality is, that when the owners are city dwellers with no/or weak kin
or tribal relations to the farming families who are working on their land, the relationship
becomes more and more a matter of one registered farming family becoming a contractor
with the owners and subcontracting to non-registered families for his own benefit, much
as Sarqufliya.

Since there is no indication in the IHSES data that this form of property possession is
considered (See the following table), there is no way, using existing data, to gage the
extent of this practice in Iraq’s economy or its progression in Iraq’s modern history. But
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it sure is a source of significant income and economic status that otherwise property
owners would have enjoyed exclusively.
Table #19: Sources of monthly Income in Iraq by Poverty Status in ID and US $ (Per Person)
Non-poor
ID
US $
(1000)

Indicators
Employment:
Wages in Cash
Wages in Kind
Self-employment
Total Employment
Property:
Imputed Rent
Other Property
Total Property
Transfers:
Pensions
Rations
SSN
Other Public in
Cash
Other Public in
Kind
Private in Cash
Private in Kind
Total Transfers
Total Income

Poor
ID
US $
(1000)

Iraq
ID
US $
(1000)

61.4
1.5
36.0
98.9

41.62
1.01
24.40
67.05

38.7
1.4
19.8
59.9

26.24
0.95
13.42
40.61

56.2
1.5
32.3
90.0

38.10
1.01
21.90
61.01

24.1
5.2
29.3

16.34
3.52
19.86

8.6
1.6
10.2

5.83
1.08
6.91

20.6
4.4
25.0

13.96
2.98
19.95

6.2
11.0
0.3
2.0

4.20
7.45
0.20
1.35

3.0
11.5
0.2
1.7

2.03
7.80
0.13
1.15

5.4
11.1
0.3
1.9

3.66
7.52
0.20
1.29

0.3

0.20

0.2

0.13

0.3

0.20

3.3
1.3
24.3
152.6

2.23
1.7
1.15
2.9
0.88
0.6
0.41
1.1
16.47 18.9
12.81 23.1
105.8 89.0
70.62 138.0
1
_____________________________________
Source: IBRD. Op, cit., p.35

2.0
0.75
15.66
77.97

Prior to the 1980s and 90s, claiming a property uninhabitable and hazardous was the
main non-violent way for owners to legally get out of rent contracts. Many owners
refused to repair their properties for years as a way of getting the property to the point of
inhabitability faster, or to shift the financial weight of the maintenance on to the renters.
That option became impractical during the 80s and 90s, when the value of the Iraqi Dianr
collapsed and led to the collapse of all fixed income, including income from rent.
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This type of market environment has produced, throughout the past decades, in areas
under Saddam’s regime’s control and under the de facto authorities on the Kurdistan
region, buyers who are willing to buy properties cheaper than their real market value
(without a rent contract), and then use coercive measures to force the renters out, or even
force owners to sell.

But this business of literal hostile take-over and forced evection became an epidemic as a
result of the economic hardships and the collapse of middle income class in the 80s and
90s. These Mafia-like entities have managed to take advantage of their connection to
organized violent structures such as the ruling party, security apparatus and/or militant
tribal entities, and used their connections to operate outside the rule of law. This practice
was prevalent under direct rule of Saddam’s regime and has been so in the de facto
autonomous region in Kurdistan since 1991.

Add to the above decades of state policy of stripping political dissidents, or any segment
of the population deemed to be dangerous to the state’s seventy and security, from their
real properties as a form of punishment and a way to terrorize the rest of the population to
submission, and then add the 2003 occupation, and the subsequent looting and waves of
population displacement and property rights violations with the ongoing cycles of
violence, and you have complex multi-layered cases of real property grievances in Iraq.

IPCC, CRRPD, and then PCC: a small Band-Aid on a Deep Wound
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After the collapse of Saddam’s regime and the occupation of Iraq, the Coalition
Provisional Authorities (CPA) established a new mechanism to address a narrow segment
of property rights abuses in Iraq through a special commission called the Iraq Property
Claims Commission (IPCC) in January 2004. The aim of the IPCC was to only address
claims of property rights violations allegedly perpetrated by Saddam’s regime or
powerful individuals within the regime who were able to force
uncompensated/undercompensated property transactions or received various possession
rights of state-owned property in exclusively favorable terms without legal justification.

After the transfer of CPA’s authorities to the Iraqis in June of 2004, the IPCC was
transformed into the Commission for Resolution of Real Property Disputes (CRRPD) in a
new legislation issued by Iraq’s Presidential Council in 4/6/2006. The new law kept the
main characteristics of the former IPCC intact and added procedural clarification to the
original IPCC structure. The Iraqi Parliament revisited the law in 3/9/2010 and passed a
new legislation that changed the name again to Property Claims Commission (PCC),
affirmed its status and legal person (never was challenged), and beyond that, even the
official website of PCC struggles to explain the difference between the new legislation
and its predecessor.159
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See (in Arabic): http://www.pcc.iq/2011/03/22/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%89%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%85%2813%29-%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9.html
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Regardless of the name change, the commission consciously excluded from any legal
avenue for pursuit of restitution was the following:
First:
Any and all claims of property destruction and/or abuse of property rights prior to the
second ascendance of the Ba’ath party to power in 7/17/1968. This politically motivated
limitation, that suggests the practice of state-sanctioned abuse of property rights to be an
exclusive hallmark of the Ba’ath regime, excludes from any legal avenue of restitution
events such as the state take-over of banks and privately held industries and small
manufacturing plants during the rule of the Arif brothers in Iraq (1963-1968), the Jewish
so-called migration of 1950 and the subsequent freezing and take over of properties of
the estimated 150,000 Jews, forced to leave Iraq after anti-Jewish riots known as the
Farhood.

Second:
Any and all claims of destruction of property and/or abuse of property rights in areas of
Kurdistan region that became out of the direct control of Saddam’s regime since the
beginning of the 1990s, alleged to be committed by Kurdish fractions in de facto position
of power, and by powerful individuals connected to them, or harbored by them. These
practices became systematic during the civil war between Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The two parties flipped control over
major Kurdistan cities of Erbil, Kuysanjaq and Sulaimaniya, along with tens of more
population centers, multiple times, and in each time homes and businesses of the
supporters of the other side were targets of systematic looting and take-over.
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Almost thirteen years after the end of hostilities between the two parties, and seven years
after the decision to unify the administrations in both territories, and despite the
establishment of a joined committee to address population displacement and property
abuse during the Kurdish civil war, in an interview with Kurdish news site in May 20011,
both representatives of the two parties in the committee complain that major property
claims are not resolved on booth sides.160 The KDP representative claims in the interview
that close to 10,000 dunums of agricultural land, privately owned by supporters of KDP
in Sulaimaniya province are yet to be returned to their owners despite decisions by the
committee. The PUK representative claims that 483 pieces of prime real estate lots in
Erbil, alleged to be awarded to PUK rank and file prior to their eviction from the city in
1998, have never been returned to them.

Third:
Despite the fact that since 2003, Iraq has witnessed waves of population displacement
and forced migration, the CPA limited the mandate of IPCC to only Saddam’s era claims.
Thereby, it excluded any and all claims of destruction of property and/or abuse of
property rights alleged against the coalition forces, war-related foreign companies, Iraqi
de facto authorities and powerful individuals connected to the Iraqi authorities during,
after, and as a result of the occupation of Iraq and the following cycles of violence since
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See: http://www.rubernet.net/news/226-hawler-keshakani-shari-nawkho-kurdistan.html
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2003.

There is no systematic account for post-American-occupation property destruction, abuse
of property right claims, or the extent of abuse of public property, but if we accept the
estimates of the IHSES study and the World bank’s Main Findings report, then of the 5%
of Iraq’s population that was estimated to be internally displaced by the end of 2006, only
16% of them were poor. This is significantly lower than the rate of poor in the general
population in Iraq that is 23%. 161 If we accept this premise, then we can conclude that
the majority of the displaced population of post-American-occupation Iraq are less likely
to be poor, more likely to have had owned their homes prior to displacement, and have
lost their homes temporarily or permanently due to destruction or below market value
liquidation.

As for the abuse of public resources, there are mountains of journalistic reports on the
monopolistic behavior of powerful political parties and their tribal and kinship extensions
over natural resources, government contracts, housing projects external trade and
telecommunication, each in their local strongholds that contributed to strong public
perception in Iraq about the corruption in the country. It is no wonder that Transparency
International’s annual Corruption Perception Index has consistently placed Iraq in the
bottom 5 in the world.162 The following map and table is their 2010 report summery that
places Iraq in fourth in the bottom in ranking, ahead of only Somalia, Myanmar and
Afghanistan.

161
162

See: IBRD. Op, cit., p.30.
See: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
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One confirmed example of the extent of abuse of public property is the announcement by
the president of Kurdistan Region, Masud Barzani, in 6/14/2011 that put a moratorium on
allocation of public land for economic projects until the establishment of equitable
procedures, returned 1025 dunums of commercially zoned land to public domain after
previous illegal allocation for 118 private hosing projects, informed about ongoing
investigation of 19 other projects, imitated investigation of 300 other hosing projects for
possible illegal allocation in only two provinces; Sulaimaniya, and Erbil.163

It is worth noting that Barzani’s announcement came after months of daily
demonstrations and clashes between protesters and security forces in Sulaimaniya
province. Ramped corruption was one of the main grievances of the protesters. Yet,
Barzani’s announcement fell short of addressing dominant parties’ control over oil
production, telecommunication and government contracts along with security forces, civil
service, civil society institutions, unions and etc.

Figure # 34: Corruption Perception Index (2010)
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See Barzani’s announcement (in Kurdish) at: http://rudaw.net/kurdish/news/6515-1025.rss
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___________________________
Source: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results

Fourth:
The commission in all its different names stayed away from what it vaguely defined as
Agrarian Reform Law, and consciously excluded all claims of abuse of property rights
stemming from Agrarian Reform law. The choice of the word law, instead of laws,
suggest that the intent is to lump all laws concerning ownership and possession of
agrarian land together and shield them all together from any legal pursuit of restitution.
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This lumping includes irreconcilable agrarian policy directions of land reform landmark
laws of 1958 and 1970 along with the contra-land reform laws since 1983.

If any laws could be counted as a direct assault on possession of state-owned land by
generations of farming families, then the law #35 of 1983 and the following laws in its
spirit are exactly that. Hundreds of thousands of farming families from then on where
asked to produce within a certain quota or loose their possession during an ongoing
devastating war and economic hardship. The most productive members of these families
were either fugitives for refusing enlistment in the army, actively participating in the war,
or victims of the war; dead, maimed for life or POWs.

By the end of Iraq-Iran war 38.3% of all agrarian reform land were repossessed and
redistributed in large areas to tribal leaders, business people related to the ruling party
and Arab foreign investors. After nearly two decades, much turmoil, the collapse of the
regime and new post-occupation political process, in 2008, that percentage is now 87.6%.
See the following table:
Table #20: Repossessed and Redistributed Agrarian Land in Iraq, According to
Law No. 35 of 1983 by Provinces (1989 and 2008)
Area in 1989
Area in 2008
Province
(in Dunnums)
(in Dunnums)
Ninawa
636,069
1,552,263
Salah ad-Din
316,390
1,495,219
At-Ta'mim
368,000
465,437
Diyala
275,956
833,241
Baghdad
1,706
233,948
Al-Anbar
83,517
642,248
Babil
194,691
454,522
Karbala'
22,457
173,281
An-Najaf
68,468
380,819
Al-Qadisiyah
556,756
875,418
Al-Muthanna
94,855
317,276
Dhi Qar
226,226
381,884
Wasit
175,399
1,612,515
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Maysan
267,438
604,549
Al-Basrah
67,953
341948
Dehuk
5,195
Erbil
295,153
Sulaimaniya
4,575
Dismantled State Farms (in
158,000
Included above
Multiple Provinces)
Total Re-rented
4,529,704
10,364,568
%Change
%128.8
Total State-owned and
Administered by Land Reform
11,824,800
Authorities in 1979
_____________________________________________
Source: Republic of Iraq. Central Organization for Statistics. Annual Abstract of Statistics.
1990 and 2008-2009

The only abuse of property rights that the CPA saw in this package of laws was the
exclusion of non-Arab investors from long-term below market-value rents of the
repossessed agrarian land in Iraq, and made sure that abuse was urgently corrected.164

As for the Iraqi partners of the CPA; the Iraqi Governing Council, who were victims on a
personal or family level of the kind of property rights abuse that was amply addressed by
the way the commission was structured, were also competing for the support of the tribal
leaders that benefited from the application of the 1983 law, and therefore could not
address, on a national level, the abuses of the law.165Yet, as I will attempt to demonstrate

164
See, for the presentation of law # 35 of 1983 to the US congress in the Congressional Research Service
report:
- U. S. Congressional Research Service. Iraq Agriculture and Food Supply: Background and Issues
(RL32093; June, 7, 2004), by Randy Schnepf. Text in:
(http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32093.pdf) .p 18.
And for the description of CPA negotiations with Iraqi Governing Council, see:
- James Dobbins [et al.], Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. pp. 212-16.
165

In a paper presented to the U.S. State Department at a symposium on Post-Conflict Property Restitution
in 2007, the author Peter Van der Auweraert, makes this critical observation on how the IPCC was limited
by the personal experience and interest of the influential Iraqi politicians. See:
(http://www.nrc.ch/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/48FF3C144E17CBBCC12573DB00500
C96/$file/Property+Restitution+in+Iraq+-+Peter+Van+der+Auweraert.pdf) p.4
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later, they were and still are heavily involved and invested on case-by-case bases as the
cases fit their ethno-sectarian identity politics.

In practice, and as a result of lumping all laws and regulations and orders concerning
possession of Agrarian land under the title of “Agrarian Reform Law” the special courts
of IPCC, CRRPD, and then PCC have denied thousands of cases in Kirkuk area where
the repossession of agrarian reform land, or outright takeover of land from rightful Tapu
holders from the Kurdish ethnic community and redistributing it to Arab farming families
resettled in the area for the purpose of denying the Kurdish insurgency movement safe
havens in the rural areas close to Kirkuk oil fields.

In an interview published in 10/25/2011 by Gulan, a Kurdish news magazine and
website, the director of Kirkuk branch of Agriculture administration, Mahdi Mubarak,
estimated that there are close to 1,200,000 dunums that are subject to conflicts and
grievances. Of those, are 900,000 dunums that cannot be addressed by the existing
committee and require political will to address them. Most of those grievances, as Mr.
Mubarak puts them, stem from “five orders from the Leadership Council of the
Revolution issued in 1975-1980 to repossess agrarian reform land from Kurdish and
Turkmen farming families to redistribute them later to Arabs who lived in the area and
other Arabs who we brought to settle there.”166

166

See (in Kurdish): http://www.gulan-media.com/t_detail.php?section=1&id=4608

204

In Kirkuk I interviewed two representatives of the Kakaiy family.167 They used to be
among top 10 biggest land owners in Iraq prior to the 1958 agrarian reform, with a total
of 191,039 dunums owned by the head of their extended family. They were subject to all
agrarian reform laws and kept the maximum allowed by the second agrarian reform law
of 1970. According to documents they presented in the interview, the Ba’ath regime took
over vast areas of their estate prior to the implementation of the 1970 land reform and
according to a takeover decision number 824 issued by the Revolution Leadership
Council in 1976. The decision # 824,168 is one of a host of decisions to repossess agrarian
regardless of ownership in the areas of Kirkuk with high concentration of Kurds and
Turkmen, not for public benefit or strategic economic projects, but to re-distribute to
Arab farming families.169It is worth noting that as of 5/26/2009 the appeal court has
denied their restitution request on the ground that their case is related to agrarian reform
law.

Despite the above mentioned severe limitations on the type of claims that can make it to
the property restitution committee, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis accepted it as a mean
for bringing forward their grievances. As of end of September 2011, a total of 178,234
cases were filed by Iraqis who felt safe enough to come forward with their grievances.
The following graph presents the geographical distribution of the claims:

167

Personal Interview with Ahmad and Naaim Kakaiy (Names are not real) in Kirkuk May 26, 2009. Copy
of original deeds and correspondence were provided by interviewees.
168
For the full text of this order/decision in Arabic, see: http://iraqilaws.dorar-aliraq.net/?p=12375 .
The order instructs the agriculture ministry to takeover the land with the same procedures mentioned in the
agrarian reform law # 117 of 1970, without stating any reason for this extraordinary takeover.
169
The Revolution Leadership Council decisions are: 369 in 1975, 824 in 1976, 949 in1977, 1065 in 1978
and 189 in 1979.
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Figure #35: Property Rights Abuse Claims Received by Property Restitution
Committees in Iraq from 2004 to 9/30/2011
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Source: http://www.pcc.iq/2011/11/15/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%A8%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%89.html

The geographical distribution suggests the highest concentration of claims to be in the
areas of Iraq where Arabization policies have been practiced for decades against the other
ethnicities in Kirkuk (five offices), Khanaqin, Al-Tooz, Erbil and Ninawa areas. The
second highest concentration is in Baghdad, the capital city (represented by six offices),
where most wealthy high profile political activist victims of Saddam’s regime owned
properties. As mentioned before, the claims and their geographic distribution are
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representative of only the narrow segment of property rights claims and grievances that
the committee was designed to handle.

After seven years of the existence of the committee and its court system, only 71.82% of
the cases were viewed by the lower courts. Most of the processing occurred just recently,
after the long-time head of the committee was dramatically ousted and charged with
corruption. In 2009, the percentage of the cases processed by the lower courts by then
was only 44.27%. See table #7.

A closer look at the decisions handed down by the lower courts provides a unique look at
the nature of those cases and their fates:
Figure #36: Property Restitution Claims in Iraq That Have Been Processed by Lower
Courts According to Type of Decision (As of End of September 2011)
2079, 2%
16588, 13%

9825, 8%

56457, 44%

37048, 29%
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____________________________
Source: IPCC, Ibid.

In the largest portion of the cases, the lower court decision was to nullify a state action
that only restricted the property rights where the owner/possessor kept tangible
connection to the property, provided temporary privileges/access to state-owned property
to influential individuals or the decision to take over the property was made but never
exercised. This could be the typical freezing of assets practice to punish and keep an ongoing pressure on political dissidents that only required lifting the limitations. Or
privileges generously given to influential persons in the former regime that no longer
have them since the disintegration of the regime itself.

The second largest portion of the lower court decisions is rejecting the claims, and most
likely these are claims that the court interpreted to be outside their jurisdiction due to the
limitations imposed on their mandate.

As for the 4% of the cases that were withdrawn, I was able to put a face on one of those
cases with Foad Slewa (a fictitious name), an Assyrian from Kirkuk, whose familyowned a peace of agrarian land in the outskirts of the city of Kirkuk, and was taken over
by an influential Arab Ba’athist since the 1980s. After and with the disappearance of the
Arab abuser, a powerful Kurdish militia leader took over the land since. After extensive
communications and arrangements for an interview, I went to Kirkuk in May 26, 2009 to
meet Mr. Slewa. But an hour before the interview he sent a child with a message to where
I was staying and informed me that he withdrew his case and received compensation
from the Kurdish militia leader, yet does not feel safe to go ahead with the interview!
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In 13% of the cases, where the return of the property was physically possible, the lower
courts sided with returning the properties to the original owners and when such return
was not possible, the lower courts ruled that the plaintiffs should get financial
compensation in 8% of the cases. Yet, as of end of September of 2011, only 21.51% of
these compensation orders were confirmed by the appeal court, and actual funds were
delivered to the plaintiffs. As shown in the following table:
Table #21: Comparison between the Iraqi Property Restitution Committees’
Processing of Claims in 2009 and 2011
2009
2011
Received Claims Cases
153,181
178,234
Of That…
#
% of
#
% of Total
Total
Claims
Claims
Cases Decided in Lower Courts
67,815 44.27
128,009 71.82
Cases Appeal Finalized
31,925 20.84
39,444
22.13
Appeal Approved Lower Court
7,486
4.89
21,447
12.03
Verdict
Finalized Cases with Restitutions
1,054
0.68
2,114
1.18
Paid
Beneficiaries of Paid Restitutions
3529
6805
____________
Source: Ibid.

The above table demonstrates that even this inherently limited venue of restitution for the
complex and compiled modern history of property rights abuse in Iraq, and after seven
years of experience and cumbersome paperwork was not able to process and finalize
more than 22.13% of the total cases submitted to it.

It is worth noting that In the case of claims processed in the Kurdistan region, The
Kurdish authorities insisted that the defendant to be the ministry of finance in the
Kurdistan region government in all the cases that the state was the accused side. Both
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lower and upper courts rejected that notion, and ruled the Kurdistan region ministry of
finance to be irrelevant in the cases presented. Therefore the financial compensations
were made out from the central government’s finance ministry to the plaintiffs directly.
As of end of May 2009, and because of the struggle between the two finance ministries
over the right to distribute the funds, no funds that were allocated for plaintiffs were
actually distributed and were sitting in the regional banks.170 This clash between the
Kurdistan regional authorities and the central government is reflected in the
comparatively low percentage of cases finalized from Kurdistan region because of the
additional burden of determining who the defendant is and who is irrelevant to the case.
See the following table that presents the geographical distribution of the claims in
different stages of the process:
Table #22: Cases Processed by the Iraqi Property Restitution Committees (Different Names,
Structure), by Geographical Regions, and as of End of September, 2011
AlFurat
Regions
Baghdad Kurdistan North 1
North 2
South
AlAwsat

Cases
Finalized
Cases Decided by Lower Court
by Appeal
(by Defendant)
Court (by
Verdict)

Iraq
Total

44633

26721

49595

23324

15629

18332

178234

36551

10524

29251

21405

12735

17543

128009

81.89%

39.38%

58.98%

91.77%

81.48%

95.70%

71.82%

26424

8709

28009

21058

11090

15101

110391

59.20%

32.59%

56.48%

90.28%

70.96%

82.38%

61.94%

7127

1815

1242

347

1645

2442

14618

% from Claims
Received

15.97%

6.79%

2.50%

1.49%

10.53%

13.32%

8.20%

Total Appealed

11899

2345

8119

8670

4914

3497

39444

% from Claims
Received

26.66%

8.78%

16.37%

37.17%

31.44%

19.08%

22.13%

Claims Received

170

Same

Total
% from Claims
Received
Defendant:
State
% from Claims
Received
Defendant:
Individuals

This information was confirmed by the head of Sulaimaniya’s branch of then CRRPD.
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Ruling Stayed

7927

1231

3055

4238

2761

2235

21447

% from Claims
Received

17.76%

4.61%

6.16%

18.17%

17.67%

12.19%

12.03%

Ruling Rejected

3972

1114

5064

4432

2153

1262

17997

% from Claims
Received

8.90%

4.17%

10.21%

19.00%

13.78%

6.88%

10.10%

_________________________
Source: Ibid.

It is important to note that only 8.2% of the cases processed by lower courts in all Iraq are
against individuals. And if we look at the geographical distribution of those cases, we
would find out that they are relatively less in Kurdistan and even lesser in both Kirkuk
and the rest of the northern region. My explanation is that in general these cases are
concentrated around the abuse of public property by powerful individuals in the Ba’ath
regime, because it is very hard to prove coercion in property purchase contracts between
theoretically equal sides, or to prove that intimidation was behind giving up rent contracts
by renters. And, since former abusers of public property from the Arab communities in
the geographical areas under the jurisdiction of both the North1 and North 2 regional
offices are fairly represented in the political power structure in their areas where ethnic
tensions are very high between Arabs on one side and Kurds, Turkmens and Assyrians on
the other side, the percentage of cases against individuals in those two regional offices
that are processed by the lower courts are as low as 2.5% and 1.49% of the total cases
received in their areas. As for the Kurdistan region, after two decades of the practical
non-existence of any power emanating from connection to Saddam’s Regime, since
Saddam lost direct control over the region in 1991, it is odd to have such a relatively high
percentage of cases where individuals are accused of Saddam-era abuse of public
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property. But the fact is, many of former abusers of Saddam-era were able to quickly
penetrate the new power structures in Kurdistan, taking advantage of the computation
between the two dominant parties. Only in the political atmosphere of post Americanoccupation that public persecutors were able to break the grip of the dominant parties and
start moving forward against abusers of public property that were shielded for two
decades from any persecution.

Identities for Hire!

The consistency of the limitations imposed on addressing property restitution in postAmerican-occupation Iraq, from direct CPA rule to the Iraqi Governing Council to the
Iraqi parliament, provides a unique insight to the perceptions of all involved parties about
the prevailing political discourse and the mechanisms by which they can affect the
outcomes of the system to their advantage.

All involved parties found out very early in the post-occupation political process that the
CPA is ideologically inclined to support the post 1983 legal structure of agrarian land
possession despite the fact that, in most cases, it was a blunt annexation of land. They
also found out, even before the fall of Baghdad that the revived post-1990 tribalism in
Iraq, was there to stay. Therefore, the tribalist structures that benefited from post 1983
restructuring of Iraqi agricultural sector, as primordial market driven mode of production,
were going to be viewed through the ideological lenses of state vs. private sector on one
hand and loyal vs. hostile dichotomies in the post-Ba’ath era.
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Add to the above, the limitations on identity politics imposed since Salahaddin meeting
of the, then, Iraqi opposition in 1992, where access to foreign, especially US and
regional, support became contingent on adopting a single-identity as a base for political
mobilization, and the outcome will always be rechanneling the struggle over possession
of land through the available single identity-based ideological framework.

Sides of local conflicts over possession of land, and other wealth generating assets, found
that with the collapse of the Ba’ath regime came new possibilities of change in local
power dynamics, actual change of local demographics, no national pathway for
addressing multi-faceted grievances, and single-identity political outlets with varying
coercive capabilities competing for expanding local dominance in multi-identity
communities with multi-identity individuals. Although certain aspects of grievances held
by local sides of conflicts where not addressable in the prevailing national political
discourse, they became addressable on the local level when presented within the singleidentity struggle framework.

Pre-1983 contractors on state-owned land were suddenly able to gain political support
from, Shi’a militias of a certain participant party in the national political process when
they were framing their struggle as the return of persecuted and displaced Shi’as to their
homes.171 And never mind the fact that many of them could be mixed-marriage Sunni and
Shi’a families.

171

See a vivid example of this political discourse, in reported quotes from regional and international media
about the tragic events of Al-Madaen, south of Baghdad in April 2005, presented later in this dissertation.
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In the same way, post-1983 Sunni Arab contractors in Kirkuk suddenly realized that
Shi’a militias could be their local allies if they frame their struggle as fending off Kurdish
domination of oil-rich territories. Meanwhile, it became possible for Shafi’i Sufis to
realize, as they are after all Sunnis, and could use help from Salafi militias to fend off a
Kurdish or Shi’a invasion,172 and never mind the fact that, to a Salafi, a Sufi is as infidel
as a Shi’a.

In the previously mentioned interview with the Kurdish kakaiy sheiks, Ahmad and Naaim
(Names are not real) in Kirkuk (May 26, 2009), they explained that their case was reappealed by the finance ministry after the legal period for appeals expired. The appeal
was this time was based on the claim that the lands mentioned in their case were subject
to land reform, and therefore not under the jurisdiction of the property restitution
commission’s special courts. The brothers elaborated that they met with local leaders of
dominant Kurdish political parties and with the Kurdish judge on the appeals court to ask
for their support in making the case that the state took-over 13,750 dunums of land, in
Sekani and BanShakh of Daquq district, owned by the two brothers and more than 30
other major owners of their relatives, after the land reforms. The decision to take-over
the land, the kakaiy brothers claimed, was explicitly for the purpose of changing the
demographical composition of the area by forcing their Kurdish contracting farming
families out and bringing in Arabs in a contracting relationship with the state.

172

The logistic cooperation between Sunni Arab tribesmen who are traditionally followers of Sufi orders, in
the areas stretching from Nainawa to Al-Kut provinces, with active Wahhabi insurgency is an example this
discourse.
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Naaim and Ahmad expressed their disappointment with the Kurdish parties and the
Kurdish judge who did not support them, simply (according to Naaim and Ahmad)
because after the collapse of Saddam’s regime hundreds of Kurdish families moved back
into rural areas of Kirkuk, claimed possession of lands left by the Arab families,
including their lands, and refused since to acknowledge that some of them were owned
by Kakaiy sheiks and their extended families. Simply put, the Kurdish political parties
were not ready to bring their narrative on the legitimacy of the of Kurdish repopulation of
rural Kirkuk under question.

“The only way we get respect in Baghdad (with members of appeal court and ministry of
agriculture), is because we don’t talk as Kurds at all! We present ourselves as Kakaiy
Shi’as” said Ahmad, referring to the common believes among Shi’as that Kakaiy is one
of the extremist Shi’a religious orders that have been mixed with pre-Islam religious
elements in the region.

In another interview in Kirkuk, I met Jabbar Towfiq (not his real name), the elder of a
Kurdish village near Kirkuk city, named Kilkashqan. Surrounded by many of his sons
and grand sons, Jabbar showed me documents to prove that his extended family owned
close to 600 dunums. He claimed that half of that 600 dunums was irrigated by the
Zangana River, despite otherwise mentioned in the documents. Their lands and their
village were repossessed by the state for public benefit in 1975 to build a cement factory.
Their water rights were diverted to a nearby village. He and many other owners refused
to accept what they deemed be a below-market-value compensation.
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The Kalkashqanies claim that the factory was assigned more land than it needed for
buildings, installations, and mining. They claim that the motive behind the location of the
factory and land allocation for it was to uproot as much as Kurdish villages as possible in
a widespread effort to Arabize the whole oil-rich region. Their main argument for the
excessive repossession of land is that after they were displaced, the Iraqi government
turned around and distributed much of the possessed land to Arab families who were
brought to the region from outside Kirkuk province. Yet, he acknowledged that the state
made some of the land available for agriculture after the international embargo on Iraq in
1990, as producing food became more strategic than cement, and as all industrial
production came to halt as a result of the embargo.

In the interview, Jabbar expressed his frustration with the property restitution
commission’s process, as he and his extended family have been waiting for a final
decision from the commission for four years.

It became apparent through the interview that the Kalkashqanies have already reasserted
their possession of all the land and were actually farming there at the interview. Jabbar
explained that they already have built 10 permanent housing units so far, and they want
the return of all the land to them, regardless of the needs of the cement factory. They also
want compensation for their destroyed village and the portion of their land that was
mined by the cement factory. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Jabbar made it clear
that they want, through regaining all the land, their former share of Zangana River,
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because of the enormous difference it makes in terms of agrarian production yield in an
area where adequate rain is not guaranteed.

As for their attitude towards the factory, it could be explained by what is going on not too
far from them in the areas controlled by the Kurdistan regional authorities where oil
companies and privately owned factories are buying their access to the land through
negotiated settlements with the local communities regardless of the legal status of the
land. The Kalkashqanies are actually hoping that the Kurdistan region model will
eventually be the norm in their areas too. But, for now, for all that to happen, they have to
frame the existence of the factory not as public industrial project, but as an elaborate plan
to uproot Kurds from the region.

Faces of the Beneficiaries from Post-1983 Land Re-reform:
The Sheik, the Beg/ Brigadier General, and the Professor!
Sheik Mahdi Abu Tubra173
An Arab sufi sheik from the Qadiri order. He is alleged to have been a personal friend of
Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, Saddam’s deputy and the new leader of the, now, underground
Ba’ath party after the occupation of Iraq. Abu Tubra was one of the well connected
“tribal leaders” who benefited from a combination of the post 1983 agrarian policies, the
renewed wave of Arabization of Kirkuk after the 1991 uprising and a new irrigation
project in Daquq-Kirkuk area, named after Saddam that brought surface irrigation water
to hundreds of thousands of dunums in the area.
I interviewed Sabaah Kakaiy (name is not real) on May 26, 2009 in a residence in the
Arab neighborhood of Kirkuk. He talked about his encounter with Abu Tubra. During
the 1990s arabization wave. Sabaah’s family was considered a low risk to the regime.
“Some of our fellow Kurds now tell us that we were part of the past era,” Said Sabaah.174
His family bought a 300 dunum piece of land in 1994 from a Kurdish owner who knew
he was going to be a victimized by the Arabization process and loose his land anyway.
The kakaiy family registered the land in their names formally. They soon found out that
173

All information about this person is based on allegations and charges brought forward by his accuser as
part of his case against ministry of finance and ministry of agriculture to the property claims court.
174
Personal interview with Sabaah Kakaiy (not a real name), a land owner from Kirkuk – Iraq, 5/26/2009.
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Abu Tubra was promised the land for his followers in a meeting he had, as part of the
Arabization campaign, with the leadership of the northern region of Ba’ath party. Under
the constant pressure of Abu Tubra there was a barrage of actions taken by authorities to
nullify the Kakaiy family’s contract. First, there was a request from the agrarian
administration branch to the office of real estate registrar, asking to nullify the purchase
contract. The office of the registrar requested a court order. Representatives of the
ministry of agriculture went to court to claim that they have the authority to nullify the
contract according to article 4 of Law 42 in 1978 that allows state take-over of any
agrarian land that are located in the vicinity of a strategic irrigation project. 175 The court
rejected this claim and referred to article 6 of the same law that requires re-appropriating
the same land (if possible) to the owners after the deduction of their portion of the project
expenditure and compensation for any damaged land, buildings and/or vegetation and
trees. This is where Abu Tubra allegedly used his influence and brought the office of the
leadership of the northern region of the Ba’ath party into the picture and got the office to
issue an order for a takeover of the land anyway. With this interference, Sabaah and his
family were served the evacuation orders and lost the land without any legal explanation.
Soon after, Abu Tubra’s followers were settled there.
Sabaah told me that after 2003 Abu Tubra and most of his followers went underground
and could not stay in the area, because of what alleged to be their abusive short-lived
history there. “I got the lower court in 2006 to order the return of the land to my family,
but the appeal court just recently rejected the lower court’s decision “on the ground that it
is a land reform dispute that is not within the property restitution courts’ jurisdiction.”
said Sabaah.
I asked Sabaah who controls the land now, and he said “powerful people of this new era.
But the good thing is that I know, and they know, that they have no legal claim to the
land and they are benefiting from it only temporarily.”
Fattah Beg of Jaff
A retired brigadier general from the Iraqi army, a former head of the agrarian
administration in Kurdistan region in the Ba’ath regime (a position equivalent to minister
in state bureaucratic hierarchy), a patriarch of the Jaff tribal alliance (one of the largest,
formally semi-nomadic, Kurdish tribes). During the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s he became
a so-called advisor for the Iraqi army and headed what was known as light brigades, tribal
paramilitary groups working under the command of the Iraqi army for the Ba’ath regime.
These groups were locally known as the Jack Asses. Fatah Beg commanded an active
force of 5000 Kurdish Jaff tribesmen and is alleged to have participated in the Anfal
genocide campaigns. After the 1991 uprising and Saddam’s withdrawal of most areas of
Iraqi Kurdistan, Fattah Beg fled to Baghdad and stayed there until the collapse of the
regime in 2003.176 He was later indicted by the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal, along
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For the full content of the Law no. 42 in 1978, in Arabic, see: http://iraqilaws.dorar-aliraq.net/?p=10320
Most of the information mentioned is self-introduction by Fattah Beg in an interview with Awene, a
Kurdish newspaper and website. The rest is information he did not deny in the interview.
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with 264 other high ranking Kurdish advisors who led the light brigades and actively
participated in the Anfal campaign.177 He is now living in the town of Kalar under the
protection of the dominating Kurdish political parties in the Kurdistan region.178
Fattah Beg’s extended family was at the top of the list of the biggest agrarian landowners
in Iraq before the land reforms. They collectively owned 539,333 dunums in
Sulaimaniya, Diyala and Kirkuk.179 By the beginning of the 1980s, and after 3 major land
reform laws and the natural expansion of their family, their individually owned land
diminished significantly. Yet after the Anfal campaign and especially after the
implementation of the international embargo on Iraq in 1990, he received, along with a
another Jaff leader, a total of 112,000 dunums in Kalar administrative unit according to
instruction number 2534 from Saddam’s office in 1990,180 that gave them the above
mentioned area free of rent as an exception to the Revolution Leadership Council
decision # 364 in 1990, which is in turn an exception to Law # 35 of 1983.181
Fattah Beg gave a rare interview in 11/13/2010 to Awene newspaper, an independent
Kurdish website/newspaper from Sulaimaniya – Iraq, and told the interviewer, Goran
Halabjaiyi, that he became a (Jackass) leader at the request of his tribesmen to protect
them from the war and from serving under other jackass leaders from different tribes and
regions, by providing them with a way to serve in their own areas and under the name of
their own tribe. He also claimed that he sought the job of the head of agrarian
administration in Kurdistan region, during the rule of the Ba’ath regime, only because his
tribe had to be represented in that governmental structure. As for his role in the Anfal
campaign, he claimed that he warned the population in the area under his command to
evacuate their villages to the barb-wired and so-called modern towns, months before the
Anfal campaign. Fattah Beg suggested that those who were smart enough to heed his
warnings survived and those who didn’t perished in the campaign.
It is worth noting that Fattah Beg’s rhetoric on representing his tribe coincides with
177
For the list of co-indicted and wanted former Kurdish leaders of light brigades and special security
forces, requested by the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal for their role in the Anfal campaign, see:
http://www.chaknews.com/kurdish/news.php?readmore=2785
178
In the interview with Awene, Fattah Beg acknowledges that he is wanted by the Iraqi Supreme Criminal
Tribunal, but suggests that he was not going to submit to the court unless compelled by the Kurdistan
region authorities, the only law enforcement authorities in the town of Kalar where he resides.
179
See: Hanna Batatu, Old Social Classes, op, cit., p.58.
180
See: Alan Noory, Problems of Agricultural Ownership, op, cit., p.121.

Also, it is worth noting that according to Mr. Bakhtiar Baban, who is an authority on Sulaimaniya branch of agrarian
administration’s archives, a list of the names of all beneficiaries from Instructions # 2534 is available in the archives.
See: Bakhtiar Mustafa Baban, op, cit., pp. 67-8.
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For the full content of the Law no. 42 in 1978, in Arabic, see: http://iraqilaws.dorar-aliraq.net/?p=13208
In a press release issued in 12/1/2008, the Kurdistan Regional Government condemned this effort and
defined it as an attempt to “enlist these people into forming groups that support the Prime Minister in the
disputed areas.” The press release pointed out that the support councils “are tribal councils directly
affiliated with the Office of the Prime Minister of the federal government. The Office has been contacting
people in the Kurdistan Region, and in the so-called disputed areas. The people being contacted include
former collaborators who were closely linked to the security and intelligence agencies of the defunct
regime of Saddam Hussein.” For a the full content of the press release, see:
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=26811
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recent attempts by Iraqi PM’s communications with former Jackass leaders to form
military and political structures similar to the Sons of Iraq and the Awakening Councils
to use them in the power struggle against the dominance of the Kurdish political parties
in much of the disputed areas of Kirkuk, Diyala and Nainawa provinces. Other former
Jackass leaders announced these communications to the Kurdish media as a way to
pressure the Kurdistan region authorities not to expedite them to the Iraqi Supreme
Criminal Tribunal for their role in the Anfal campaign.182
In the Awene interview, Fattah Beg claimed that the agrarian lands owned by his
ancestors were taken over by farming families. Only few months ago, he started paying
off farmers to reclaim his ancestral land. It is not clear from the interview if he means the
land that he legally owns as a result of implementing land reforms or the land that used to
belong to his family prior to the reforms and he regained control over for one season in
1990 with the help of special instructions from Saddam’s office.
Dr. Salih Al-Mutlag
A former Ba’athist who is specialized in agronomy. He held high ranking positions in
many state-run academic and scientific institutions. After the 1983 laws, he rented vast
areas of agrarian land from the state, especially after the crushing of the Iraqi uprising
against the Ba’ath regime and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of farming
families. His holdings stretched throughout the mid sector of Iraq, from Al-Anbar
province all the way to Diala and Al-Wasit provinces.183
In an interview with Nada Bakri, a New York Times reporter, He explained how he
became a major investor in agriculture in Iraq, by recalling his encounter with Saddam in
early 1980s when the later visited his farm. Bakri’s account for Mr. Mutlaq’s recollection
is that Saddam was so impressed with his farm that he wanted the state to take it over
without compensation. But, three days later, Saddam “reconsidered, returned, and this
time made Mr. Mutlaq and his partner a generous offer, he recalled.” wrote Nada Bakri
and then quoted Mr. Mutlaq saying: “I think he felt that he wasn’t being fair to us,” 184
Mutlaq joined the post-occupation political process and assisted with drafting the latest
Iraqi constitution. Joined a self-identified centrist secular coalition and became a member
of the Iraqi Parliament after the 2005 elections. He was the poster child for the DeBa’athification efforts and was accused of being the front man for Saddam’s wife’s
business dealings and the informal spokesperson for the underground Ba’ath party later.
Despite his opposition to ethno-sectarian quotas in political institutions in Iraq, he is now
Iraq’s deputy prime minister, representing the Sunni Arabs, in a negotiated quota.
183

See his biography on the Arabic version of Wikipedia (last edited on 12/28/2011).
http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%
B7%D9%84%D9%83
The information there is mainly accurate except for his connection to the Ba’ath party, which follows the
official storyline but is disputed by his opponents who believe he was formally fired from the party to allow
him to transition to a other roles given to him by the state’s secret police.
184
See Bakri’s article at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/world/middleeast/19sunni.html
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In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, an Arabic news paper, Mutlaq denied having any
business dealings with Saddam’s wife. He was quoted in the article saying: “My agrarian
investments were ten times larger than hers. Would someone in my position be an agent
for someone else who has such small holding, compared to mine? I never rented from her
or even met her.”185
I interviewed Mr. Wathiq Hussein Ali, the first post-Saddam head of agriculture
administration in Diyala province, where Salih Al-Mutlag had most of his agrarian
holdings, and asked him if he met with Mr. Mutlaq. He told me that he contacted Mr.
Mutlaq in early 2004 to ask him about his intentions and plans for his holdings in the
province. Mr. Wathiq Ali Husain’s recollection of Al-Mutalq’s answer was that even in
Saddam’s time, with all the might of the state behind him, he have had trouble asserting
his right to the vast areas he rented from Iraqi government according to the 1983 laws,
and have ended up paying off or crop-sharing with the former holders. Therefore, after
the collapse of Saddam’s regime, he has lost control over his holdings. Yet, as far as he
was concerned his lease contracts with the state were valid as long as the state’s
incapacity to provide security was the reason why he could not fulfill his side of the
contracts.
Many of the former holders of the vast areas leased to Mr. Mutlaq in the province were
political dissident or former PWO from Iraq-Iran war who lived in Iran and were able to
return after the collapse of Saddam’s regime. Therefore, it is only natural that most of the
political rhetoric of Mr. Mutlaq is about the “dangers of the Iranian invasion.”

The Slaman Pak Tragedy:
A Land Conflict through the Lenses of Ethno-Sectarianism

On 16/4/2005, major news organizations reported a mass exodus of Iraqi Shi’a families
from an agrarian town on the Tigris River, 15 miles south east of Baghdad, called AlMadaen.186 Fleeing families interviewed in the city of Al-Kut, further to the south east of
Baghdad confirmed that their Hussainiya (a religious/social activities center for the
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See: http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=342915&issueno=9907 (In Arabic,
translation is mine).
186
A town formally, and locally known as Salman Pak. It was named after Salman Al-Farsi, one of
Muhammad’s disciples and a prominent Shi’a, who is believed to be berried in the town. It was also the
capital city of the Sassanied empire prior to their defeat by the Muslim army in a 11 year war that ended in
624 D.C.
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Shi’as) was leveled to the ground with explosives. An unnamed source in the interior
ministry claimed that as many as 80 members of the community were taken hostage in
the besieged town by armed Sunni militia.

The estimates for the number of hostages quickly jumped to 150 by a spokesperson for
the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) 187 one of the major Shi’a
groups that are actively participating in the political process since the toppling of
Saddam’s regime. 188

The events took a dramatic turn when, according to police records, sixty floating bodies
were recovered downstream in the nearby town of Suwayrah. Two women and Two
Children were among the recovered bodies. Throats of five of the victims were slit and 2
others were beheaded.189

Despite the gruesome details of this tragic event, it could have been just another terrorist
incident that, since the occupation, Iraqis have grown to expect every now and then. Yet a
shift in the national political atmosphere allowed it such exposure to international media
and investigative tools that were not afforded to any similar incidents. This provided a
unique insight to how local conflicts interact with the dominant single-identity political
mobilization structures on the national level.
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They claimed later that they based their number on an unnamed official from the Iraqi army, who was
also sourced by many news agencies.
188
The leadership of SCIRI dropped the Revolution from their party’s name and changed it to the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in May 2007.
189
See Jim Muir’s report for the BBC at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4470803.stm
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This tragic incident coincided with the first participation of what was known, within the
confines of single-identity based political process, as the Sunni-Arabs in the national
elections campaign for parliament.

For the first time, Sunni-Islamists became integrated in the political process and were
expected to strongly enter the parliament in the next election that was scheduled for the
end of 2005. They were, therefore, capable of influencing possible parliamentary allies
without being in the parliament yet.

On the other hand, the traditional rivalry between the Al-Hakim, and Al-Sadr families led
the Sadrist fraction of the Shi’a movement to adapting more anti-occupation, nationalistic
rhetoric that was more consolatory towards the Sunni-Islamists, based on the tragic
events of both Fallujah and Najaf that closely followed each other in 2004. The Sadrists
were also expected to forcefully participate in the next elections and were expected to
form a solid block in the new parliament.

For the Ultra-Islamist insurgency movements, the chance to control Al-Madaen was a
prize that they could not pass. Control over Al-Madaen meant control over a strategic
highway connecting Baghdad to Iran, in an area with high-density vegetations where they
could evade aerial surveillance and set up training camps and supply depots.

In response to the initial disturbing news, Iraqi and American forces isolated Al-Madaen
and blocked all its entrances. On 17/4/2005 The Iraqi/American forces entered the town
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and regained control. This is where the consensus narrative, on all levels of Iraqi political
establishment, ended, and each fraction went on to telling its own narrative.

Riza Muhammad Taqi, a SCIRI leadership spokesperson, painted for the media an image
of a peaceful Shi’a community being driven away from their homes for no reason other
than being Shi’as.190 Aiyad Allawi, the outgoing prime minister went as far as accusing
the Iraqi version of Al-Qaaida of taking over the town and committing the atrocities.191

Yet, from the beginning of the crisis, the Sadrist movement, represented in the media by
Abdul Hadi Al-Darraji, rejected the validity of the news about sectarian tensions in AlMadaen and claimed it to be propaganda war against the Iraqi people.192

As the Iraqi and US forces recaptured the town, without any resistance, facts started to
drip; Qasim Dawd, a national security advisor to the Iraqi government dismissed an
earlier statement by the spokesperson of the Defense Ministry suggesting that the Iraqi
and American joined forces freed 15 Iraqi Shi’a hostage families, but confirmed finding
7 cars rigged with explosives and what appeared to be an insurgent training camp in the
town.193 Other news sources confirmed the detention of 40 suspects, all local residents,
for interrogation.194 Major General Adnan Thabit from Interior Ministry was also quoted
that a very limited number of hostages were found and freed, and confirmed that their
190

See Al-Jazeera’s report (In Arabic): http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=112582
See Free Iraq Radio’s report (In Arabic):
http://www.iraqhurr.org/archive/news/20050417/1093/1093.html?id=1646549
192
See Aljazeera’s report (In Arabic): http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=112318
193
See BBC’s report (In Arabic):
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/arabic/middle_east_news/newsid_4452000/4452777.stm
194
See Aljazeera’s report (In Arabic): http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=112582
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initial investigation suggested a tribal feud case, and nothing more.195 Then, President
Jalal Talabani suggested to the press that 60 bodies found in the river were the hostages,
and they were killed just before the Iraqi and American forces entered the town.196 Yet,
BBC reports confirmed that police statistics were the total of all bodies found in the river
in the area downstream from Al-Madaen, and their discoveries were mostly prior to the
mass displacement of the families from Al-Madaen. In fact, the BBC’s sources confirmed
that only 6 of the bodies were found after the fleeing of the Shi’a families from AlMadaen and the rest were from as early as February.

On 4/18, Dr. Adnan Al-Dulaimi,197 the head of Diwan Al-waqf Al-Sunni,198 stated that
the conflict was a tribal dispute over agrarian land previously owned by the state, and
later this assertion was supported by President Talabani, who only dropped the previously
and asserted state ownership of the disputed lands. On the same day of Al-Dulaimi’s
statement, another newly appointed national security advisor to the Iraqi government and
a former member of the Iraqi Ruling Council, Dr. Muwafaq Al-Rubaaiyi,199 told the
media that the conflict arise from Sadddam’s policy to build a Sunni security belt around
Baghdad after the 1991 uprising by settling Sunni families around the capital city.200 The
counter argument to this “imported Sunni families” theory came from the Imam of the
195

See the previous report at: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=112582
See Bloomberg’s report:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0DFOUrNzhZ8&refer=us
197
He is among the first leaders of Iraq’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s. He worked in
academia in Saudi Arabia and Jordan prior to his return to Iraq in 2003. He is also a tribal figure with
kinship relations to the Sunni side of the conflict in Al-Madaen.
198
This is the Sunni version of the dissolved Ministry of Religious Estates (Awqaf) and Religious Affairs
that used to administer the state’s involvement in maintenance and development of all religious Estates and
other forms of state-involvement in religious affairs of all religions and sects in Iraq. In post 2003 Iraq each
main sect and religion has its own Awqaf administration.
199
A physician by profession lived in England 1979-2003.
200
See Ahmad Faruwq’s report for Al-jazeera (In Arabic):
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=112494
196
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Sunni mosque of Al-Madaen who blamed Iran for “exporting” 300 “Iranian” families led
by a person named Karim Mahood in to the area and claimed that these families that
practiced thuggery and terrorized the residents with armed robbery and vandalism. The
Imam, Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Hadhaari, claimed that the leading figure in area for these acts
is also someone who came from Iran after 2003 and claims to be a Said (descendent of
the prophet Mohammad) and was affiliated with the Badir Force, the armed militia of
SCIRI, called Uddai Al-Saaidi.201

The next day, this Iran connection statement was echoed in a press conference by
Brigadier General Salih Imran from the intelligence services in the ministry of interior,202
and later in the day by the minister of interior.203

A month later, the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq (AMSI), a Sunni Islamist
political organization and a semi-participant in the political process then, presented a very
detailed investigation report204 focusing on the conditions and events, prior to 4/16/2005,
that led to the eruption of violence between the Sunni and Shi’a communities in AlMadaen, an area where families from the two sects coexisted and intermarried for
generations.

The report confirms that the source of the problem was changes in demographics of the
town since the collapse of Saddam’s regime, and blames it on Shi’a families coming from
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See Aljazeera’s report (in Arabic): http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=112367
See Mufakirat Al-Islam’s report (in Arabic): http://www.hdrmut.net/vb/t178869.html
203
Ibid.
204
For the full document (in Arabic), see: http://www.alarabnews.com/alshaab/2005/02-09-2005/n8.htm
202
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nearby areas in Diyala. Then, as it lists the locations of kidnapping and murder incidents,
the report provides a very different picture of the economic resources that were subject of
contention. It is, certainly, a picture that is very different from just agrarian lands that
were previously owned by the state. We learn, from the report, of the kidnapping of 12
shepherds of cattle and private security guards of fishery farms, 4 workers in a modern
slaughter house and meat processing facility, and a private security officer in a consumer
electronics assembly plant producing products designed by AKAI, a Japanese founded,
Singapore headquartered Asian multinational company. These highly lucrative economic
enterprises were all located on the “agrarian land owned by the state”.

Then the report lists 27 families and 4 individuals, by names, that were forced to leave
the area, as late as February 2005, and mentions 17 more without naming them. All of
these displaced families, the report claims to be Sunni Arabs and most of them from the
Dulaim tribe. The report suggests that their homes were looted and that the perpetrators
were local followers of the previously mentioned Sheikh Uddai Al-Saaidi, militia forces
belonging to a political party and uniformed police forces along with national guards
from the Province of Al- Wasit (Kut). The latter is a neighboring province, not within
Baghdad, which has administrative jurisdiction over Al-Madaen.

The report lists the names of 160 residents of Al-Madaen that were detained in Al-Kut
prisons and claims the total, as of February of 2005, was 409. The report claims that all of
the detained experienced various forms of torture and mentions five by names that did not
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survive the interrogations. Among those who didn’t survive there were a Dulaimi tribal
leader and his son who perished during interrogation in February 2005.

Another interesting aspect of the report is its effort to explain the non-sectarian nature of
the root of the conflict by providing a contrast between the positive impact of the
evolvement of another Shi’a leader in the region, Sheikh Abdul Hadi Al-Jazairi who run
another Hussainiya nearby in Jisr Diyala area. According to the report, he negotiated a
sustainable communal peace in good faith, unlike Uddai Al-Saaidi, who, according to the
report, turned his Hussainiya into a detention/interrogation facility.

The report also suggested identity shopping by Mr. Uddai Al-Saaidi. It mentions that,
during the initial communal negotiations, Uddai Al-Saaidi claimed that his Hussainiya
was one of the Sadrist Movement offices in the region, but according to the report, the
(AMSI) contacted the Sadrist Movement, and received a confirmation from their
spokesperson, Abdul Hadi Al-Darraji, that the Hussainiya had no affiliation with them.
This is when, the report alleges, Saaidi began affiliating himself with another competitive
Shi’a movement.

All these conflicting narratives about the Al-Madaen tragedy reveal:
•

In 1991, there was a massive displacement of participants in the 1991 uprising from
the area to Iran. The choice of Iran, as a destination, was geography-based. Chased by
merciless Saddam-loyalist troops, fleeing Iraqis were exiting the country by hundreds
of thousands from every possible route.
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300 displaced families from Al-Madaen and the neighboring areas came back from Iran
as soon as Saddam’s regime collapsed in 2003. Returning displaced families from Iran, to
the Baghdad-Diyala- Al-Wasit triangle, is a familiar occurrence that coincides with the
ranking first, second and sixth in number of estimated internally displaced population by
provinces respectively. Oddly, both Al-Wasit and Diyala have seen a surge of more than
double the average yearly growth in population in Iraq’s provinces despite shedding
population, as the high numbers of internally displaced population, from these two supergrowth provinces, indicate. See the following figure that juxtaposes internal displacement
and annual rate of growth in Iraq’s provinces for an overall picture:

Figure#37: Internally displaced Persons and Average Rate of Growth of Population in Iraq’s Provinces, as
of 2007
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_____________________________
Source: IBRD. Op, cit., p.30

•

After 1991 and prior to 2003, previously distributed and repossessed state-owned
agrarian lands, were appropriated to powerful Dulaimi tribesmen with such easy rent
conditions that Dr. Adnan Al-Dulaimi thought they were “previously” owned by the
state, and a statesman/national security advisor to the government, Dr. Muwafaq AlRubaaiyi, thought of it as a state-induced settlement of Sunni tribesmen to build a
Sunni security belt around Baghdad, This is an indication of long-term leases with no
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rent, that the Saddam’s regime bestowed upon those who accepted leasing
problematic pieces of land. These were lands that the state nullified their original,
decades old, contracts with local farming families who no longer met their contracts
with the state, by the virtue of being displaced by the state! This suggests the most
extreme version of the 1983 re-reform package, similar to what was common in the
Kurdistan region after the Anfal campaign.
•

During 1991-2003 the new contractors invested heavily in the “lands”, taking
advantage of their proximity to Baghdad’s mega market. By 2005, the lands were no
longer just lands. They were modern agro-business projects.

•

As explained earlier in this chapter, there was no legal recourse for the alleged 300
families to regain possession or receive restitution for the loss of their lands. The
special courts were simply barred from addressing these cases by the legal framework
that established them. Yet, the returning families soon found out that when their case
is presented as returning persecuted Shi’a refugees to a strategic area that used to be
part of a Sunni security belt, they suddenly had an opening. All they had to do was to
offer barter; militant support for the ideological cause in return for logistic support
and national narrative cover for a violent tribal solution for what was essentially a
conflict over possession of wealth-generating assets. The solution was: Expel the
Nawasib205!

•

The Sunni families, who were mostly from the Dulaim tribe, found that, despite the
fact that the post-2003 national political and economic echo-system was heavily
biased towards the beneficiarriesof 1983 re-reform legal structure, they were not

205

Al- Nawasib, plural for Nasibi, is a Shi’a term for those who publically and viciously show animosity
towards Imam Ali, the fourth Caliph and Mohammad’s cousin, his family and his descendents.
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protected. Furthermore, they were viewed by the locally dominant political party as a
security threat. They found that this political party, not only built a patronage
relationship with the returning former possessors in Al-Madaen, it (the party) was
able and willing to make state and militia resources available to the returning families
in their quest to retake their possessions. For the post 1991 investors, the only
available avenue was to take this conflict out of its local boundaries in the hope of
finding the support they were missing locally. Against the background of Al-Madaen
being the historic symbol of the defeat of the Sassanid Persian Empire, by the Muslim
conquest, and decades of state instigated paranoia about the returning Persians to
claim their lost crown in Iraq, what can be better than the fact that the former
possessors were refugees in the Persian Iran “crossing the boarder” to reclaim
something they used to possess?
•

The takeover of Al-Madaen for few days, and the immediate surrender to the
American, and the non-local Iraqi army troops is as far as can be from the typical
diehard Islamist insurgency that was on display in Al-Fallujah just months ago (AprilDecember, 2004). As gruesome as the Al-Madaen tragedy was, for the perpetrators, it
was a desperate cry for protection from an otherwise protected socio-economic group,
that was threatened on the local level. An action that became the norm of postoccupation Iraq.

All Politics Are Local: The Iraqi Version
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How come the issue of the fundamental injustice of the 1983 package of laws was never
part of a national dialogue in the post 2003 political system, even after such a high profile
tragedy as Al-Madean’s? Why did supporters of the returning families not attempt to
utilize the capacities that governing institutions provide them (parliamentary hearings,
law proposals, national reconciliation mechanisms, etc, ), the same way they did with
making available the coercive tools of the state (the police and the Iraqi national guard)
for extra-judicial purposes?

In my interview with the first post-2003 director of Diyala branch of agriculture
administration, Mr. Wathiq Hussein Ali,206 I asked if, during his tenure in agrarian season
of 2003-2004, he could infer an overwhelming sectarian or ethnic tone to agrarian land
tenure conflicts in his province. His answer was that there were conflicts but not over
land. They were, rather, over irrigation water shares. He told me that despite what was on
paper, most of the residents of Diyala knew which piece of land belonged to whom, and
communities, in general, were respectful of this informal knowledge.207 He explained, for
example, that, on paper, the previously mentioned Dr. Salih Al-Mutlag and his agrarian
companies were the largest holders of agrarian land in the province during Saddam’s era
and continued to be so at the time of the interview. Yet even Dr. Mutlaq himself knew
better to assume possession without informal deals with the real possessors who were no
longer acknowledged by the state since the 1983 package of laws.

206

Personal Interview with Mr. Wathiq Hussein Ali. (Sulaimaniya. June, 26, 2009).
According to Mr. Wathiq Hussein Ali, the detailed archives of 14 out of 17 sub-branches of Diyala
agrarian administration were already destroyed and looted when he took the job. The ministry of
agriculture had microfilm database of most essential archives and they were made available to him.
207
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I rephrased my question to Mr. Wathiq Hussein Ali, and asked if, during his tenure as the
head of the Diyala branch of agriculture administration, he found an overwhelming ethnic
or sectarian identity to the conflicts over irrigation water shares. He continued to dismiss
that assumption and explained that during his tenure, the largest conflict he could recall
was a case of violent conflict in the villages of Bani Tamim on the Khresan River, east of
Baaquba, the administrative center of Diyala. Residents of these villages almost
exclusively belong to the Bani Tamim tribe, and they are almost exclusively Shi’as. A
powerful individual from Saddam’s era, named Raad Jawad Al-Tamimi, immediately
became well connected to the new power wielders of post 2003 era in the region. He
controlled the upstream portion of the Khresan River as it entered the Bani Tamim area.
This Shi’a person from the same tribe of Bani Tamim decided during the drought season
of 2003-2004 that he was going to use the Khresan River to produce rice in his fields, and
cut water from the rest of Bani Tami villages, where his own tribesmen lived.

Since Iraqi laws prohibited such intensive use of water resources beyond the pre
determined quotas, and rice production was specifically prohibited in that region, Mr.
Wathiq Hussein Ali sent irrigation engineers as representatives of his branch to help
enforce the laws in response to escalated violence over the water rights. After several
rounds of violent encounters that led to murder and forced migration, Mr. Ali explained,
that the recommendations of his experts on water rights were ignored and an illegal and
informal settlement was reached under pressure from the Shi’a political party that entered
a patronage relationship with Mr. Raad Al-Tamimi and made it possible for him to
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continue his rice production enterprise.

Figure #38: Map showing the location of Banu Tamim and Salman Pak/Al-Madaen in Diyala and Baghdad
provinces, where the outbreaks of communal violence occurred in 2001 and 2005
respectively.

Banu
Tamim
Villages
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In this regard, even the coalition forces, on the local level, were not an exception. They
categorized the population according a hostile/cooperative dichotomy. The legal standing
of property claims the cooperative portion of the population was not questioned or
challenged. I asked Mr. Ali if the coalition forces upheld the official possession rights
reflecting post 1983 law package changes, as they responded to claims of damaged land
or crops from their activities in the province. Given the enthusiastic support the CPA
showed for those “business-friendly laws”, I was surprised to hear that not even once
during his tenure, that the coalition forces asked his branch for clarification of official
possession rights for the people who filed complaints claiming damages from coalition
forces activities in the region. “They (American forces) basically gave money to anyone
who came forward claiming any actual damages, and never examined their right to claim
in the first place.”208

So, for a dominant Shi’a political group to preserve its dominance, where it has
dominance, in local communities, it needs to maintain patronage relationships with both
the (Udday Al-Saaidi)s, and with the (Raad Al-Tamimi)s at the same time. This means
that it needs to be with the beneficiarriesof post 1983 legal coup d'état in one place while
being against other beneficiarriesof the same change in the legal structure just miles away
in the same area.

This attitude was not a Shi’a political parties’ trade mark. Their dominant Kurdish
counterparts in Kurdistan had the same attitude. When the farmers, in mid 1990s,
208

Ibid.
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forcefully returned to their destroyed villages and retook their farming lands from the
Mirawdaly Aghas of Pishdar in Sulaimaniya, the dominant Kurdish political parties
condemned the farmers’ uprising. The dominant parties conveniently looked away from
the fact that Mirawdaly tribal leaders were granted the most fertile lands of that region
free-of-rent, as beneficiarriesof the post 1983 legal structure, during Saddam’s rule, and
as a reward for their participation in the campaign to destroy those same villages. Yet the
same Kurdish political parties, since 2003 have themselves and openly facilitated the
forceful return of thousands of displaced Kurdish farming families to their lands that
were given to Arab tribal leader as beneficiaries from the post-1983 legal structure.

How do the Iraqi political elite manage to be on the both sides of this issue at the same
time? They do so by keeping the national conversation away from a nationally uniform
economic definition of the sides as beneficiarriesvs. victims of the post 1983 legal
structure. The post-2003 political elite define the sides according to one, among many,
possible ethno-sectarian identities that allows them dominance in the locality, in return
for access to the resources of the political party, their local “governing” institutions, and,
more importantly their coercive apparatus. So the Uddai Al-Saaidis would get support in
the name of addressing grievances of the ethnicity or the sect, and the Raad Al-Tamimis
would too in the name of preserving communal peace and internal harmony of the sect or
ethnicity.

But how do they keep national governing institutions from addressing socio-economic
public policy issues within the uniform terminology of citizenry? They do so by
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committing to vaguely defined extreme liberalization of the economy and clogging the
agenda of the national debate with issues confined to security and to the power struggle
between the central government and the provinces.

In June, 2009, as part of my original research design, I enlisted two members of the Iraqi
Parliament, known as the Iraqi Representative Council (IRC), to distribute questionnaire
forms to representatives of all political groups in the Iraqi Parliament.209 The
questionnaire was designed to map the public policy positions of the participating parties
regarding their evaluation of the history of land tenure laws in Iraq, their vision for the
new era, and their practices in addressing land tenure conflicts on the level of local
communities.

After the initial distribution of the forms in June 2009, I continued personal contacts with
both of my volunteer PMs, redistributed the forms to the headquarters of the political
parties via a contractor, who agreed to be paid per forms returned, and hired a coordinator
to track the forms while I was back in the USA. By the end of 2010, all I received from
the leadership of the political parties and their senior PM members was only two forms!

Over the course of the year that I waited for the forms to arrive, I frequently asked both
my distributers for the reasons they were given for not having the forms answered. The
most frequent answer I received was that the member of the Parliament found the
questions too complex and that they forwarded it to their leadership councils. And this is
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The PM members who volunteered to help with the research were Mr. Akram Qadir Mohammad from
the Kurdistan Alliance and Mr. Mufid Mohammad Jawad Al-Jazairi from the Iraqi National List.
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where the forms went to die. One member told my distributers frankly that the questions
do not conform to his way of thinking.

Both of the PMs (names will not be mentioned) who returned the forms were ranking
members of their political parties. Both claimed to have been with their party throughout
their entire political careers. PM1 claimed to have been an active member in his party for
the past 50 years, and PM2 for the past 25 years. Both had highest levels of education
(Ph. D.), and PM2 was specialized in Law. They both were members in the Kurdistan
Alliance bloc.

The only portion of the forms that PM2 completed was his bios and identification of his
political party of which he is a member of the political bureau. The only other
information he provided was that his party was closest ideologically to the special
reforms that were targeted for Kurdistan region only. As for the future, he indicated an
ideological support for the elimination of state ownership of agrarian land via sell to
farming families.

MP1 claimed that his party was involved in thousands of land tenure conflicts in the
provinces of Kirkuk and Diyala to referee or to protect one side against the other. He also
claimed that his party, with the help of tribal structures and tribal leaders, ended at least
2500 local hostilities over land tenure in the two provinces. He blamed government
authorities for being distracted from land tenure conflicts because of their other priorities.
He also claims that the government authorities are too corrupt and lack the resources to
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intervene, but more importantly their solutions for land tenure conflicts were not
sustainable. When asked about the principles guiding his party’s intervention in such
conflicts, he mentioned his own party’s ideological stands to be their sole guidance, and
acknowledged his party’s ideological stands do collide with the existing laws.

PM1, suggested, in his answers, that his political party is ideologically close to the
Ottoman reforms system, the legal structure that defined the relation between the farmers
and owners post-British-occupation (Known as the Law of the Rights and
Responsibilities of Farmers), as well as all of the land reform laws, including the one that
was crafted exclusively for the Kurdistan region, and found that Kurdistan-exclusive law
to be applicable to all Iraq too. The only landmarks he did not find his party to be
ideologically inclined to support were the Lazma system, both as a traditional form of
tribal possession and as it was made into law prior to 1959, and the post 1983 re-reforms.

Other than the apparent lack of logic between being ideologically close to the major
landmark reforms in Iraq on one hand and the pre-reform Right & Responsibilities of
Farmers Law that was the symbol of everything that the 1959 reform came to rectify,
MP1 accepted the Ottoman Tapu system, yet distanced himself from the Lazma Law that
was designed to be a Tapu-like system for the tribal areas that did not see the
implementation of the Tapu system. Yet, the most noticeable in the answers of both MP1
and MP2 is how alien the post-1983 structural changes are to both of them; yet
parliamentary records show no reflection of this ideological stand in opposition to the
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continuation of those laws throughout their political parties’ experience in governance
since 2003.

To explain this seemingly irrational combination of ideological stands we have to look
for the ethno-sectarian mindset that is capable of producing these contradictions in a
perfect harmony within its own logic. The PMs were not answering an all-Iraq national
question. In their political block’s frame of reference they find the post -1983 laws
objectionable only as they were applied specifically to victimize Kurdish farming
families, and more specifically only when the beneficiaries were Arabs. Legislatively,
they find their role in drafting the article 58 in the Transitional Administrative Law, and
article 140 in the new Iraqi Constitution to adequately address those grievances.210 The
rest of the post-1983 package of laws, simply do not trigger any legislative effort in their
mindset. As for MP1’s ideological preference for so many ideologically opposite
landmarks, he was actually harmonizing his answers with the post-2003 legislative effort
in the Kurdistan region regarding agrarian land tenure there. In fact, that legislative effort
is a prime example of how the localizing and fragmentizing political mindsets tackle
legislation and implementation on trans-local bases.

Kurdistan Region: The Other Iraq Legislates!
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See the full documents and the mentioned articles,(for the Transitional Administrative
Law):http://web.archive.org/web/20090423064920/http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html
(for Iraqi Constitution): http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf
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After the tiring years of impasse in the Kurdish civil war, and with the collapse of
Saddam’s regime, the two territorial domains of Iraqi Kurdistan; the KDP region and the
PUK region accelerated efforts to unify the administrative and legislative bodies of
“governance” and started addressing agrarian land tenure legislation.

After more than a decade of failed reconstruction of the destroyed villages in Kurdistan,
and by the time the two dominant political parties got to addressing agrarian land tenure
possession, most of rural Kurdistan was already abandoned by farming families. They
preferred the guarantied stream of food rations from the UN-run oil-for-food program in
the big population centers and the adjacent rural counties over returning to remote
villages with no sustainable support system. Yet because they also viewed their
possession, perceived or real, of agrarian land as a potentially lucrative wealth generating
asset in a stagnant economy, they kept their claims of tenure close to their chest no matter
how contested their claims were.

After many Agrarian executive committee meetings and conferences211 in both party
dominated territories and in the unified ministry of agriculture, the following legislative
agenda became the consensus of the two dominant parties:
•

Deep resentment for ending the settlement process of Claims of ownership in 1970,
and deep resentment for Law No. 90 of 1975; particularly it’s lowering the maximum
limits of agrarian land ownership. This sentiment represents the interests of the pre-

211
My special gratitude for Mr. Bakhtiar Baban who provided me with the printed material, and his own
notes, for the April, 2006 Agrarian conference, and earlier executive meetings of 1999 and 2000 that took
place in the PUK territory of Kurdistan region, and some documentation of the unified conference of the
ministry of agriculture in June-July, 2007.
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reform social classes that initiated the rebellious movement that evolved into the
Kurdish/Kurdistan liberation movement. The leadership of both parties is packed with
members of those social classes, or their direct descendents. In ethno-politics
language, they resented the ending of settlement process and lowering of maximum
limits of ownership for being a form of punishment of Kurdish landlords for their
leading role in the rebellious movement against the central government. Never mind
the fact the two resented policies led to the largest rate of redistribution of land to
Kurdish farming families.
•

Consensus on dissolving state-ownership of agrarian land, and ideological disposition
against small scale production units.

•

Mutual efforts by both dominant political parties to legitimize their own distribution
of state-owned land to their patrons and party organizations, without regard to their
eligibility according to land reform laws on one hand, and their inability to use the
post 1983 package of laws because of its association with the genocide of Kurds and
the destruction of rural Kurdistan on the other hand. In other words the economic
outcomes of the 1983 package of laws were desirable, but their association with
ethnic politics was not.

•

Consensus on rapid expansion of major cities by making more and more agrarian
lands available for residential and urban use, as a major form of sustaining patronage,
yet, anticipating problematic transition because of chronic tenure problems.

The result was a series of laws. The most consequential among them were: Law #32 of
the year 2007, and Law #1 of the year 2008. The mere act of legislation, in the context of
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governance of Kurdistan region, is considered an achievement. For, despite the claims of
democratization and modernization, the region has been ruled, since 1994, by a single
dominant party in each territory. Each one of them dealt with land tenure conflicts on
local bases, motivated only by buying/maintaining patronage and stopping the security
threat of advancement of the dominant party from the other territory, as explained in the
previous chapter.

But, could the new legislations be evidence for the potential of ethno-sectarian mindset
being capable of producing citizenry-based and harmonized laws, rules, and regulations
for all localities? A closer look at the structure of the new laws provides evidence for
otherwise!

Law #32 of year 2007212 reopens the door for those who can prove their actual possession
and control of any land that its status was not settled, or its court settlement decision did
not gain permanent status, prior to the issuance of Law #117 of the year 1970, to
register the land as owned by the state with control and possession rights granted to those
individuals.. Yet, a year later, the same legislative body, and according to Law #1 of
2008213, gave control rights over the overwhelming majority of the same lands
mentioned in the Law# 32 to three types of other people; 214
•

Farming families who met eligibility standards at the time of application, and
received the lands as part of the redistribution process of the land reform laws.
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See: Legal Committee of National Assembly of Kurdistan. Collection of Laws Specific to Ministry of
Agriculture and Agrarian Land in Kurdistan Region (In Arabic and Kurdish), Series No. 25 Erbil –Iraq:
Shahab Printing House, 2008. pp. 109-15.
213
See: Ibid, pp. 116-24.
214
See Article One of the law in: Ibid, p. 117.
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•

Farming families, who met eligibility standards at the time of application, received
the lands as temporary contractors and renewed since.

•

Individuals and groups who did not qualify for redistribution or temporary contracts,
yet still received the lands in accordance to “laws, orders, and instructions that were
prevalent in Iraqi Kurdistan.”215

The only group that the Law #1 of 2008 required to defer to those who have unsettled
provable claims are those who assert actual possession and control over the same stateowned land without any contracts.216But, if actual possessors of state-owned land without
contract control lands that are not in the (claimed but not settled or not finalized)
category, then the Law #1 of 2008, allows them to register the lands, after three years of
continues use, as owned by the state with possession and control rights granted to them.
That is despite the fact that article five of the same law, asserts that “no legal rights can
be gained from trespassing on any agrarian land”217

Because the two laws promises the same lands to different audiences, it would be logical
to assume that Law #1 of 2008, nullifies the key provision in Law #32 of 2007. But the
2008 law does not have a customary concluding article that nullifies any legal text, laws,
or decisions that contradict any article of the new law. So, in fact, both laws are
considered current and enforceable by design!
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Ibid, same page (my translation).
See: Ibid, p.118.
217
Ibid, p.122 (my translation).
216
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I obtained218 the 2008 law proposal as it was submitted by the executive branch, and the
report on the proposal from the joint meeting of the committees on Legal, agriculture &
irrigation, municipalities affairs, and transportation, that was submitted to the Kurdistan
National Assembly under number 115 in 11/27/2007. I found that in both the proposal
and in the report of the joint meeting of the select committees of the Kurdistan National
Assembly, there was an article that nullified any contradicting laws or regulations, but
that article was dropped in the final document that was approved by the national
assembly. I looked for the deliberations on the law proposal in the National Assembly on
the day that was assigned for this law, and in 50 pages of recorded deliberations, there
was a brief mention of the contradiction by PM Abdulrahman Ahmad Riza ,who was a
member of the joint committees meeting and signed the report, and suggested that this
law does not apply to the lands that have not yet been settled, because those will be dealt
with according to the Law #32 of 2007. Nowhere else throughout the 50 pages is there
any mention of why a proposed article was dropped.219

The minister of agriculture, who was at that assembly session, explained to the PMs that
in reality “We are not going to distribute land after the passing of this law, we (the state)
no longer control any land. It is all in the hands of farmers and other possessors. All we
are doing here is turning contracts into registered control rights. There is on the ground
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My gratitude to PM Shirwan Al-Haidari, the head of the legal committee, who made the documents
available to me, as an alternative for my personal meeting with the members of his committee.
219
See: Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly. The Transcripts (In Kurdish, The title is translated into:
Protocols in Englishon the cover). Vol. 46, Year 2008, Shahab Printing House: Erbil – Iraq, 2008, pp. 14596.
As for PM Abdulrahman Ahmad Riza’s comment on the floor, see: Ibid, p. 175.
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reality and we are just registering it. In other words, we are not creating a new thing, we
are only granting ownership rights.” 220

What the minister neglected to educate the PMs of, is the fact that his ministry, and the
dominant political parties behind them, have two contradicting laws and can pick winners
and losers by enforcing one and not the other.

To visualize the size of the problem these contradicting laws create, see the following
table that shows that of the 1096 counties in Sulaimaniya province only 49.45% of them
have been settled and the rest either had no settlement at all (29.65%), or had partial
settlements (20.9%):
Table #23: Status of Settlement of Claims of Control and Possession on Agrarian Land in
Sulaimaniya Administrative Units, as of 2008
Counties With
Counties with
Counties with
Total No. of
Name
Full Settlement &
No Settlement
Partial Settlements
Counties & (%)
(%)
& (%)
& (%)
Center of Sulaimaniya
150
128 (85.33%)
1(0.6%)
21(14%)
Qaradakh
61
55 (90.16%)
0
6 (9.83%)
Sharbazher
215
36 (16.74%)
133 (61.86%)
46 (21.4%)
Sharazoor
55
48 (87.27%)
0
7 (12.72%)
Rania
95
58 (61.05%)
32 (33.68%)
5 (5.26%)
Dukan
156
88 (56.41%)
21 (13.46%)
47 (30.13%)
Halabja
90
77 (85.55%)
1 (1.11%)
12 (13.33%)
Penjwin
128
36 (28.12%)
38 (29.69%)
54 (42.19%)
Pishdar
146
16 (10.96%)
99 (67.81%)
31 (21.23%)
1096
542 (49.45%)
325 (29.65%)
229 (20.9%)
Total & (%)
_____________________________________________________
Source: Bakhtiyar Mustafa Baban. A Guide to land Settlement in Sulaimaniya Province, with Settlement
Related Laws (In Kurdish and Unpublished), Sulaimaniya – Iraq, 2007

The shaded administrative units are where most of the unsettled counties are located in
the province. Its worth noting that, for more than half a century, these administrative
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Ibid, p.159 (My translation).
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units were also strongholds of the Kurdish rebellious movement against the central
governments.

Another controversial article in the new law, that hardly registered any discussion in the
deliberation process of the national assembly, was the discrimination against the right of
possession and control that the law granted to farming families vs. the same right of
possession and control that the legal structure grants to any individual who does not have
full ownership, according to Iraqi laws.

Article six of the Law #1 of 2008 addresses procedures for state repossession of the lands
that the same law designated as owned by the state with right of possession and control
granted to the farming families who received the land as part of the land reform
redistribution or as temporary contractors. The article assigns, in case of repossession for
public benefits, 3% of the repossessed land to be registered as fully owned by the
possessor and takes the rest as owned by the state with no possession or control rights
assigned.221 But, the procedures for any other land that is owned by the state with
possession and control rights granted to any individual, as regulated by the same
legislative body, is for the individual to keep 12% as fully owned by him/her.222This
means that if an urban development plan expands the boundaries of a city to include two
pieces of agrarian land that are identical in size, one owned by a farmer who has
possession and control rights on his piece and the other owned by another individual with
the same type of possession and control over his piece of land, then the farmer would get

221
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See: Legal Committee of National Assembly of Kurdistan, op. cit., p122.
See Article One of Law #5 of 2007 in: Ibid, p.104
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a residential zoned piece of land within the new boarders of the city that is ¼ the size of
the residential zoned piece of land that the other person would get. The ¼ of value of the
land is not because of anything inherent in the land or the type of rights that the farmer
enjoys over the land, but because of who he is. This is something that is unprecedented in
Iraq’ history. It is also unclear, in the law, how the percentage changes if the land was
sold by the farmer to another individual and then was repossessed by the state, since the
3% is not tied to the nature of the land or the nature of the rights that the farmer has and
is capable of transferee to others.

Yet for a population that has already been separated from their land multiple times in few
decades, the chance of getting any type of legally recognized possession and control of
the land is a celebrated chance. “Since the issuance of the new laws, departments of
agriculture administration in all provinces have been overwhelmed by tens of thousands
of current and former farmers claiming original distribution, contracts, chains of subcontracts or actual possession of the same state-owned lands each one of them is asking
to register the possession and control rights in their names” said Mr. Bakhtyar Baban, the
resident expert in Sulaimaniya department of agriculture in a personal interview in
Sulaimaniya on 5/23/2009, and continued “all we can do is to send their claims to the
ministry of agriculture, which in turn is so overwhelmed it is accusing us of attempting to
sabotage the law, by sending them so many claims to the same pieces of land.”

Mr. Baban showed me, as an example, a folder of more than 100 sworn testimonies of
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different people claiming actual possession of only 8 dunums of state-owned land in one
county named (53/Zair) in Sulaimaniya.

With the recent laws adding more confusion than they solved, the conflicts of land tenure
in Kurdistan are not going to be solved on bases of citizenry and clear unified legal
structure, any soon and will continue to be addressed in the (tribal relations offices) of the
dominant political parties, and on the bases of patronage and political dominance
calculations. In other words, in the foreseeable future, land tenure conflicts in Kurdistan
are all tied to dominance of the political party that enforced their settlement. Therefore
they are charged and ready for a new round as soon as the map of the political dominance
changes.

To their credit, the dominant political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan have shown much greater
maturity and statesmanship than all the rest of the ethno-sectarian identity-based
participants in the political process in the rest of Iraq. In essence, they represent the upper
limits of what the current political system is capable of producing in terms of governance
and citizenry-based address of new and ages old conflicts over possession of wealthgenerating assets.
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Conclusions:

Not Out of the Woods, Yet!
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A follower of the US media and official narrative explaining the eruption of violence in
Iraq after 2003 can sum it up as a hopping journey from one simplistic shallow
explanation to another; A comparative politics application of all the popular so-called
explanatory factors to another forgotten civil war that started just a decade away from
2003 in a part of Iraq, show that the collapse of the Ba’ath regime in that part of the
country was also followed by a civil war despite the inexistence of all the popular
explanatory factors that the US media and officials have been pushing.

The Kurdistan civil war (1994-?) was in a region of Iraq where there were no ethnosectarian divides between the populations, no Ba’athist dead-enders, no foreign fighters,
no national divide over a foreign occupation or any significant vacuum of authority.

Iraq’s violent modern political history is closely linked to the structure of possession of
wealth-generating assets, especially agrarian land tenure system. A central element to the
development of this system is the foreign librators’conception of what constitutes
economic liberalization. The British occupation of Iraq legalized and normalized the most
outrageous abuses of the Ottoman Empire’s Tapu system, and developed a Lazma system
that turned tribal land possessions to private property of politically groomed tribal
chieftains. They forced a legal political structure that allowed tribal structures to set their
own customery rules for criminal conduct, advised the Iraqi government to allow tribal
raids and allowed the tribal structure to run supreme over urban populations in adjacent
areas to their tribal lands.
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After dacades of half-measure agrarian reform the state’s official policy shifted
dramatically, in 1983 and onwards, from supporting a small farms mode of production to
relentless efforts to strip land from farming families and renting it to agrobusinesses that
were usually connected to influential individuals within the ranks of Saddam’s regime.

Land annexation in Iraqi Kurdistan was coupled with an indiscriminant Anfal genocide
campaign against the rural population.

After the international embargo against Iraq for invading Kuwait in August 1990, and
faced with the possibility of food shortage, Saddam’s regime registered vast amount of
lands, in many cases free of rent, to his Kurdish paramilitary leaders in Kurdistan and to
any tribal leader or influential Ba’athist who could go against communal opposition of
stripping land from previous beneficiaries of land reform .

The three decades of war and embargo from 1980 – 2003 devastated Iraq’s economy and
drove most of the population to extreme poverty. During this period , the middle income
class was on a freefall to poverty, surviving only by selling real estate assets, home
furniture and personal belongings. One obstacle to liquidating real estate assets was the
rent laws that prohibited evicting renters and rasing the original rent without their
consent. On the other hand, war and embargo profiteers found that Iraqi currency lost its
function as a storage of value and started looking for real estate to store away their newly
made wealth. Both sides of the supply and demand forces found their match with mafia
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type, dominant-party-related urban gangs that were able and willing to force renters out
to complete the transactions.

With the Occupation of Iraq in 2003 came the opportunity for the return of hundreds of
thousands of displaced Iraqis with claims of property rights violations, along with a new
wave of displacement and property rights abuse by influential individuals in the new
political order, new/old terrorizing mafia groups to uproot renters and owners and make
more real estate available in the market.

Despite developing a mechanism for addressing property rights abuse after the collapse
of Saddam’s regime, this mechanism failed in providing a legal, citizenry-based roadmap
for addressing the following:
•

Any and all claims of property destruction and/or abuse of property rights prior to
the second ascendance of the Ba’ath party to power in 7/17/1968.

•

Any and all claims of destruction of property and/or abuse of property rights in
areas of Kurdistan region that became out of the direct control of Saddam’s
regime since the beginning of the 1990s.

•

Any and all claims of destruction of property and/or abuse of property rights
alleged against the coalition forces, war-related foreign companies, Iraqi de facto
authorities and powerful individuals connected to the Iraqi authorities during,
after, and as a result of the occupation of Iraq and the following cycles of violence
since 2003.
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•

The mechanism stayed away from what it vaguely defined as Agrarian Reform
Law, and consciously excluded all claims of abuse of property rights stemming
from Agrarian Reform law. The choice of the word law, instead of laws, suggest
that the intent is to lump all laws concerning ownership and possession of
agrarian land together and shield them all together from any legal pursuit of
restitution. This lumping includes irreconcilable agrarian policy directions of land
reform landmark laws of 1958 and 1970 along with the contra-land reform laws
since 1983.

The American occupation authorities made the same ill-fated mistake as Iraq’s former
“liberator” by considering the 1983 package of agrarian land possession laws yet another
bold step towards “liberalizing” the economy. The only change the CPA made to the
1983 package of laws was extending to all companies, domestic and foreign, the
privileges previously reserved exclusively to Iraqi and Arab companies.

After being displaced by the 1990’s popular uprising,,hundreds of thousands of farming
families returned to their hometowns and villages. But there they discovered a new
political order that shut down claims to their former possessions in the name of upholding
the 1983 package of laws.

Displaced farmers soon found out that framing their claims in the language of the
dominant political discourse—as returning persecuted Kurds, returning persecuted
Shi’as, or Sunni Arabs defending their homeland from Persian or Zionist Kurds’
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invasion, gave them, on the local level, an access to the use of actual or potential violence
to advance their claims in a way they could not do on a national citizenry-based public
policy level.

My 1996 survey of 53 villages in Sulaimaniya province found that resort to violence was
the most predictable outcome of any local conflict over possession of land tenure arising
from the tormented past since the withdrawel of of Saddam’s administration from most of
Iraqi Kurdistan, and the inability of the new political order, since then, to come up with
citizenry-based unified consensus over addressing the multi-layerd conflicts of agrarian
land tenure in the region.

My interviews in Kirkuk and with the former head of the agrarian administration of
Diyala province along with reconstructing of media reports on one of the most reported
incidents of post-2003 communal violence in the town of Madaen south of Baghdad are
further evidence for the above findings.

Despite my failure to accomplish most of my original research design in my 2009 field
study, the little response to my questioners to Iraqi political parties represented in the
Iraqi Parliament provide further evidence that the current mindset of policy makers in the
new political order of Iraq is not capable of advancing citizenry-based public policy. For
all practical purposes, these political parties find it more advantageous to address local
agrarian land tenure conflicts on a locality bases and thorough the prism of security
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threats to their local patronage relationships regardless to how that contributes to more
resort to violence in addressing those conflicts.

Kurdistan region, beying the most secure and stable part of Iraq, since 2003, provided
another opportunity to examine how the new political order legislates when it does take
up the issue of agrarian land tenure , and attempts to unify public policy in addressing the
conflicting interests. I followed new key agrarian land laws in Iraqi Kurdistan from their
insuption as recommendations to the parliament, their fate in committees and their debate
on the floor of the parliament, to conclude that not only the new laws promisse the same
land to two conflicting sides and create more irregularities and inaquties than they
attempt to fix, but more tellingly, all the problems in the laws go without substantive
discustions on the floor of the parliament. Providing evidence yet again, that even when
there is consensus the need for citizenry-based unified legislation, the current ethnosectarian midset of the new political order is prohibitive of such advancement.
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Shopping for Identity:
An Economic Explanation for the Post-2003 Violence in Iraq
Abstract

The American occupation of Iraq revealed intense intra-society violence in Iraq
that was not possible to take note of during decades of the state’s systematic practice of
violence against society and the organized counter-violence in response to it.

The occupation, along with the collapse of a regime without any viable governing
alternative, and the historic ethno-sectarian tensions are attractive explanatory factors for
the ongoing intra-society violence in Iraq. Yet, they fail to explain another civil war that
took place in Iraqi Kurdistan a decade earlier. This forgotten war took place in an almost
all Kurd/ all Sunni society, after three years of the de facto rule of a popular alternative to
Saddam’s regime in the region, without the presence of any occupying forces, or a
national divide over their role.

This research is an attempt to investigate the role of modern Iraq’s land tenure
structure in generating mass violence, and support for identity-based violent political
mobilization, .It utilizes a field study that was conducted in Iraqi Kurdistan during the
peak of its civil war, to measure the propensity for violent mobilization in rural
communities over localized conflicts of land tenure, in an attempt to capture the
underling interest-based realities that incubate violence and channel it into identity-based
mobilization.
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